Ritter v. Stanton

• Decision Date: 14 March 2001
• Docket Number: No. 49A02-9912-CV-883.,49A02-9912-CV-883.
• Citation: 745 N.E.2d 828
• Parties: Ira C. RITTER and The Kroger Co., Appellants-Defendants, v. Jerry STANTON and Ruth A. Stanton, Appellees-Plaintiffs.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

745 N.E.2d 828

Ira C. RITTER and The Kroger Co., Appellants-Defendants, v. Jerry STANTON and Ruth A. Stanton, Appellees-Plaintiffs.

No. 49A02-9912-CV-883.

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

March 14, 2001.

Karl L. Mulvaney, David C. Campbell, Nana Quay-Smith, Candace L. Sage, Bingham Summers Welsh & Spilman LLP, Julia Blackwell Gelinas, Kevin C. Schiferl, Locke Reynolds LLP, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellants.

Thomas E. Hamer, Anderson, IN, David V. Dorris, Dorris Law Firm, P.C., Bloomington, IN, Patricia A. Small, William L. Broom, III, Barrett, Twomey, Broom, Hughes & Wesley, Carbondale, IL, Attorneys for Appellees.

OPINION

BARNES, Judge.

Case Summary

This case stems from a personal injury action brought against Ira Ritter and the Kroger Company ("Kroger") as a result of an accident occurring on Kroger property while the Plaintiff, Jerry Stanton, was working as a truck driver for a Kroger subsidiary. The jury awarded $55,000,000 in compensatory damages after determining that Stanton was 20% at fault. We affirm.

Issues

Kroger raises two primary issues for our review, namely:

I. whether the trial court erroneously denied its motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because of the exclusivity provision of the Indiana Worker's Compensation Act ("Act"); and

II. whether the jury awarded excessive damages.

Facts

Forty-eight year-old Stanton was a truck driver for Gateway Freightline Corporation ("Gateway"), a wholly owned subsidiary of Kroger. On May 6, 1995, he traveled from his home state of Illinois to Indianapolis for the purpose of returning empty milk containers to Kroger's dairy. Prior to leaving Kroger's Indianapolis Distribution Center, he stopped for a break and parked his tractor-trailer beside a parked trailer. In the meantime, Ritter, a Kroger employee, began backing a Kroger tractor toward the same parked trailer. Unaware that Ritter was moving toward him, Stanton walked between Ritter's backing tractor and the parked trailer. After Stanton stopped momentarily, he was pinned between the parked trailer and Ritter's tractor, suffering massive injuries.

Stanton and his wife, Alfie, filed suit in June 1995 against Ritter and Kroger, alleging negligence resulting in permanent injuries to Stanton and loss of consortium to his wife. Two years later, Kroger filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction on the basis that the claims were barred by the exclusivity provision of the Act because Stanton was employed by a Kroger subsidiary. The following year, the trial court denied the motion and refused Kroger's request for interlocutory appeal.

The case was tried to a jury for several weeks in mid 1999. At trial, the parties stipulated that Stanton suffered $1,281,741 in special damages, including past medical expenses, lost earnings, and lost future pension benefits. Kroger defended the suit on the basis that Stanton's claim was barred because he was totally at fault for the accident. During his closing argument, Stanton suggested the following damage amounts: $2 million for future medical expenses; $3 million for past disfigurement; $10 million for future disfigurement; $7 million for past pain and suffering/ability to function as a whole person; $30 million for future pain and suffering; $2 million for past loss of consortium; and $10 million for future loss of consortium. Including the $1,281,741 in special damages, Stanton requested a total verdict of $65,281,741. After deliberating for a relatively short time, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the Stantons for $55,000,000, which reflected a 20% reduction or discount for Stanton's comparative fault.

Analysis

I. Exclusivity of Worker's Compensation Remedy

The threshold issue this case presents is whether the exclusivity provision of the Act bars Stanton's claim. This provision of the Act provides:

[T]he rights and remedies granted an employee¹ subject to I.C. 22-3-2 through I.C. 22-3-6 on account of personal injury or death by accident shall exclude all other rights and remedies of such employee, the employee's personal representatives, dependents, or next of kin, at common law or otherwise, on account of such injury or death....

Ind.Code § 22-3-2-6. The only way for an employee to recover for personal injuries arising out of and in the course of employment is through worker's compensation. Kroger claims that Kroger and Gateway are the same "employer" for purposes of the exclusivity provision, and, therefore, that Stanton's sole remedy is through worker's compensation.

A. Standard of Review

The appropriate standard of review is disputed by the parties with respect to the question of jurisdiction. Kroger filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 12(B)(1). In ruling on a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, the trial court may resolve factual disputes. Perry v. Stitzer Buick GMC, 637 N.E.2d 1282, 1286-87 (Ind.1994); Common Council v. Matonovich, 691 N.E.2d 1326, 1328 (Ind.Ct.App. 1998), trans. denied. In doing so it may consider not only the complaint and motion to dismiss but any affidavits or other evidence submitted. Id. Moreover, a court may weigh the evidence to determine the existence of the requisite jurisdictional facts. Id. It is well-settled that when the facts are not in dispute, we review a ruling on a motion to dismiss de novo. See, e.g., Common Council, 691 N.E.2d at 1328

; Rieheman v. Cornerstone Seeds, Inc., 671 N.E.2d 489, 491 (Ind.Ct.App.1996),

trans. denied.

When the facts related to subject-matter jurisdiction are in dispute, the proper standard of review is not as clear. Some cases have said that "when we review a trial court's ruling on [a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction], we may affirm the judgment on any theory supported by the evidence of record." Vranicar v. Board of Comm'rs of Brown County, 730 N.E.2d 752, 755 (Ind. Ct.App.2000); M.V. v. Charter Terre Haute Behavioral Health System, Inc., 712 N.E.2d 1064, 1066 (Ind.Ct.App.1999). Additionally, when in ruling on such a motion the trial court considers evidence outside the complaint (affidavits, etc.), holds a hearing during which the parties present arguments regarding the evidence, and issues findings of fact and conclusions thereon, an appellate court will review the trial court's resolution of the factual disputes by applying a clearly erroneous standard. Lawson v. Raney Mfg., 678 N.E.2d 122, 126 (Ind.Ct.App.1997),trans. denied.

We have stated that the question of whether an injury occurred in the course of employment depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. Northcutt v. Smith, 642 N.E.2d 254 (Ind.Ct.App.1994). In that case, we reasoned:

[a]lthough the Northcutts concede that Northcutt's injury arose in the course of his employment and the facts are not in dispute regarding how, where, and when the injury occurred, the question of whether Smith is subject to liability pursuant to the Act remains a mixed question of law and fact, which ultimately will determine whether the trial court has jurisdiction over the subject matter.

Id. at 256 (emphasis added). We concluded that the review of such a factual determination was for an abuse of discretion. Id.

Despite the semantic differences among these cases in articulating the standard of review, the overarching principle is clear: when the trial court resolves factual issues in reaching its decision on subject-matter jurisdiction, deference should be afforded on appeal just as in any other type of case where the trial court weighs the facts. The standard of review for the jurisdiction determination in this case then turns on the question of whether there were any questions of fact before the trial court in ruling on the motion to dismiss. The parties may not dispute the facts surrounding the accident, but they do dispute some of the facts and many of the inferences to be drawn therefrom relating to the relationships between Kroger and Gateway and between Kroger and Stanton. The trial court necessarily made factual determinations in reaching its conclusion that Stanton's claim was not barred by the Act, even though it did not issue written findings detailing those specific determinations. Therefore, we will give deference to the trial court's decision when reviewing this issue. We now turn to the substance of the arguments.

B. McQuade v. Draw Tite, Inc.

The thrust of Kroger's jurisdictional argument is that Kroger and Gateway were the same employer at the time of the accident and, as a result, Stanton is prohibited from suing Kroger. In effect, Kroger is asking us to permit it to defensively "pierce the corporate veil" erected when it formed its parent-subsidiary corporate structure and find that it was actually the employer of Stanton by virtue of the fact that it is Gateway's parent company.

The watershed case addressing this issue is McQuade v. Draw Tite, Inc., 659 N.E.2d 1016 (Ind.1995). In that case, an injured employee brought a negligence action against her employer's parent corporation for injuries sustained in the course of employment. The trial court held that the parent company was so interconnected with the subsidiary that it was equivalent to the plaintiff's "employer" under the Act and, therefore, that the plaintiff could not pursue the cause of action because the exclusive remedy for her injuries against her "employer" was under the Act. McQuade, 659 N.E.2d at 1017.

Our supreme court reversed the trial court and this court, rejecting our conclusion that because the parent company oversaw and controlled the subsidiary's operations, reported the subsidiary's earnings as profits, shared a worker's compensation policy with the subsidiary, and performed payroll and accounting functions for the subsidiary, the parent and subsidiary corporations were not distinct and separately operated corporations. Id. at 1020. The supreme court held as a...