Riehl v. Riehl
| Decision Date | 15 July 1952 |
| Citation | 60 So.2d 35 |
| Parties | RIEHL v. RIEHL. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Sheppard & Roberts, Fort Myers, for appellant.
Victor Levine, Miami, for appellee.
On July 9, 1945, appellant herein instituted in the Court of Common Pleas in Cuyahoga County, Ohio, a suit against appellee herein in which she sought a divorce upon the grounds extreme cruelty and gross neglect of duty.
Appellee filed an amended answer and cross petition in that cause and sought an absolute divorce upon the grounds extreme cruelty and gross neglect of duty. On November 16, 1948, the Ohio Court entered a 'journal entry' which insofar as the prayer of each party for a divorce was concerned amounted to a final decree denying the prayer for divorce made by each of the parties. This 'journal entry' or final decree was made and entered after the issues were created by the pleadings and upon the taking of testimony which was adduced by both parties.
The instant suit was filed by James William Riehl against his wife Vera Margarite Riehl on July 18, 1950. In his bill of complaint he prayed for a divorce and the ground asserted by him was extreme cruelty. Mrs. Riehl filed an answer in which she set up the proceedings which were had in the Ohio Court and alleged that the decree of the Ohio Court was entitled to full faith and credit and that it should be declared to operate as a bar to the instant suit.
The special master recommended and the Chancellor held that full faith and credit should not be given to the Ohio Court's decree. The final decree from which this appeal was prosecuted granted a divorce to the appellee as prayed for by him in his complaint.
In the case of Gordon v. Gordon, Fla., 59 So.2d 40, we endeavored to clarify the distinction which exists between res adjudicata and estoppel by judgment. A study of this record in the light of the opinion in the case of Gordon v. Gordon, supra, discloses the fact that in determining whether full faith and credit should be given to the Ohio decree the test proper to be applied is res adjudicata. The parties in both cases are the same and the cause of action i.e. extreme cruelty, was alleged by the husband in each suit. When such a situation obtains the decree of a sister state should be given full faith and credit because such decree places at rest every justiciable controversy.
The case of Bagwell v. Bagwell, 153 Fla. 471, 14 So.2d 841, is not controlling in the instant case because the test appropriately applied therein was estoppel by judgment and not res adjudicata.
Appellant's petition for suit money, costs and attorney's fees is granted and James William Riehl is hereby ordered to pay unto Vera Margarite Riehl the sum of $1,000 to cover the aforementioned costs and charges.
The final decree granting a divorce to the appellee is hereby reversed.
On July 18, 1950, the plaintiff-appellee, James William Riehl, filed his bill of complaint Praying for a divorce in the Circuit Court of Dade County, Florida, against his wife, Vera Margarite Riehl, of 21 East 225th Street, Euclid, Ohio, on the ground of extreme cruelty. It appears that the parties were married in 1928 and three children were born to the marriage. The plaintiff-appellee alleged that the parties lived together as husband and wife until about December, 1948, when the husband was forced to abandon the wife and live separate and apart from her because of her misconduct.
The bill of complaint (a) alleged that the first act of cruelty occurred some three weeks after the parties married (1928) when the husband heard or learned that his wife was keeping company with a young man living in the same apartment house. The husband confronted the wife with the charge and she admitted it and gave as her reason for so doing that she was lonesome during the absence of the husband, who worked each night and was away from home. He further alleged that he condoned the misconduct of his wife in this instance and continued to live and cohabit with her and, in fact, their three children were each born after the alleged misconduct of his wife.
The bill of complaint (b) alleged that the second act of misconduct on the part of the wife occurred after the birth of the first child, when she began running around with another man, and when he confronted her with this charge or information, she immediately packed her clothes and went to the home of her parents. The parties later reconciled their differences and again lived and cohabited as husband and wife. The plaintiff-husband alleged that because of their child he acquiesced in all the requests of his wife, the defendant, and condoned her misconduct or alleged infidelity in his effort to preserve their marriage.
The bill of complaint as the third ground of extreme cruelty alleged (c) that after the parties moved into different surroundings the defendant-wife, instead of changing for the better, began running ground with other men constantly and continuously, and when he asked her to observe her marriage obligations, she suggested in reply that he get himself a girl friend, as it would be agreeable to her as she intended to always have boy friends.
The defendant-wife criticized the plaintiff-husband, cursed and abused him publicly in an effort to destory the plaintiff's business and undermine the confidence of plaintiff's business associates in him. On occasions when under the influence of alcohol the wife used abusive and insulting language to the plaintiff and their children. On many occasions the wife told the husband that she no longer loved him and did not care to live with him and they should separate; that she was cold and indifferent toward the plaintiff during the period the parties lived and conhabited together from 1928 continuously until he left the wife in 1947 because of ill health due to the conduct of the wife, but he alleged (Tr. 6) that he condoned all these acts of cruelty on the part of the wife.
The bill alleges further that because of the many acts of infidelity on the part of the wife occurring after their marriage in 1928 continuously until 1947, when the husband was forced to withdraw cohabitation, as living with the defendant was an intolerable burden, and so as to preserve his health, which had been adversely affected by the misconduct of his wife. Plaintiff husband alleged that he was now supporting his wife and children and expected so to do in the future to the best of his financial ability. From the above set forth, as well as other and further acts and conduct on the part of the wife, plaintiff alleges that the wife was guilty of extreme cruelty to the plaintiff-husband.
The defendant-wife, in her amended answer to the bill of complaint, denied each and every of the several allegations of extreme cruelty as alleged, and further stated that they lived together as husband and wife until a short time prior to April 26, 1944, when the husband on said date filed against her in the Courts of Ohio a suit for divorce. The parties were reconciled, the divorce suit dismissed and the parties lived together as husband and wife until July 9, 1945, when the wife filed a suit for divorce in the Courts of Ohio against her husband. The parties lived in separate rooms in the same house until November, 1947. That the wife in her suit for divorce in the Ohio Courts charged the husband with extreme cruelty and gross neglect of duty on the part of the husband toward his wife.
The answer further sets out that the husband filed in the Ohio Court an amended answer to the bill of complaint filed by the wife and additional thereto filed a cross-petition against his wife in which he charged the wife with extreme cruelty and gross neglect of duty. The Ohio Court heard the evidence adduced by the respective parties in support of the issues made by the pleadings and thereafter made and entered a final decree. A copy of the final decree is attached to defendant's answer and identified as Defendant's Exhibit 'A'. (See Tr. 1422).
The following excerpt from defendant's Exhibit 'A' (being an order or decree entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga County Ohio, as between the parties of this cause on April 4, 1949) is pertinent:
This cause was referred by the Chancellor below to a Special Master, with directions to take the evidence adduced by the parties and make findings of fact and law and recommendations as to an appropriate decree to be entered in the premises. The husband and wife each appeared before the Special Master and testified in the cause, as shown by the record. Additional thereto the testimony of several witnesses was taken in the State of Ohio, where the husband resided prior to coming to the State of Florida. The Special Master had an opportunity to observe each of the parties when they testified in the cause, as well as another witness or two called...
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...'Extreme cruelty by defendant to complainant' is the fourth ground for divorce prescribed in 5 Fla.Stat.Ann., § 65.04. In Riehl v. Riehl, 60 So.2d 35 (1952), the Florida Supreme Court * * * extreme cruelty recognized by our statute as a ground for divorce is such conduct by the husband or w......
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Kram v. Kram
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