Riel v. Paulding County Bd. of Educ., A92A1401

Decision Date26 October 1992
Docket NumberNo. A92A1401,A92A1401
Citation206 Ga.App. 230,425 S.E.2d 305
Parties, 80 Ed. Law Rep. 358 RIEL et al. v. PAULDING COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION.
CourtGeorgia Court of Appeals

Goldstein & Redic, James A. Goldstein, Patrick R. Matarrese, Atlanta, for appellants.

Gorby, Reeves, Moraitakis & Whiteman, Nicholas C. Moraitakis, Mary M. House, Atlanta, for appellee.

SOGNIER, Chief Judge.

Raymond Riel and Robin Riel brought suit against Ricky Barnes seeking damages for injuries and loss of consortium incurred in a collision between vehicles driven by Raymond Riel and Barnes. Barnes' employer, the Paulding County Board of Education ("the Board"), was added by amendment, and Barnes was dismissed after the Riels settled their claim against him. The Board filed a motion for summary judgment, and the Riels filed cross-motions for summary judgment as to the issues of the scope of Barnes' employment and Barnes' negligence. After a hearing, the trial court granted the Board's motion for summary judgment and denied those of the Riels. The Riels appeal.

1. Appellants contend the trial court's ruling was error because a question of fact remains whether Barnes was acting in the course of his employment at the time of the collision, thereby making appellee liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior. The collision occurred in the late afternoon hours on October 26, 1990. The evidence showed that at the time of the incident, Barnes held two positions with appellee. He was employed at appellee's office as a delivery person working 40 hours per week, and also held a second job as a part-time custodian at P.B. Rich School, working 20 hours per week. The trial court concluded that this did not "appear to be a case of deviation from and return to course of employment" but was instead "a case where the employee had already left one job [with appellee] and had not yet arrived at the second one." We agree with the trial court that the evidence of record supports this conclusion.

In support of its motion, appellee proffered affidavits from several of its members, the principal of P.B. Rich School, and Barnes, in which the affiants averred, inter alia, that Barnes provided his own transportation to appellee's office every day and picked up appellee's delivery truck for use in his delivery work, delivering supplies to various locations in the school system from approximately 8:00 a.m. to approximately 4:00 p.m. When he had completed his deliveries, Barnes returned the delivery truck to its location at appellee's office and picked up his personal vehicle. He was free to set his own hours at his second job provided the assigned tasks were completed before the beginning of the next school day. His usual practice was to return home in his personal vehicle after completing his first job to eat and rest before beginning the second job. On the day in question, Barnes had completed his first job and returned the delivery truck to appellee's office. He had then driven his own car to a hair stylist, where he made an appointment for the next day, and was en route either to his home or to P.B. Rich School when the collision occurred.

"To hold a master liable for a tort committed by his servant, it must appear that at the time of the injury the servant was engaged in the master's business and not upon some private and personal matter of his own. The test is not that the act of the servant was done during the existence of the employment, but whether the servant was at that time serving the master." (Citations, emphasis and punctuation omitted.) Aubrey Silvey Enterprises v. Bohannon, 182 Ga.App. 738, 739, 356 S.E.2d 693 (1987). Since it is well...

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5 cases
  • Farzaneh v. Merit Constr. Co. Inc.
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • May 19, 2011
    ...the way to work is not in the course of his employment but rather is engaged in a personal activity.” Riel v. Paulding County Bd. of Ed., 206 Ga.App. 230, 231(1), 425 S.E.2d 305 (1992). See Chattanooga Publishing Co. v. Fulton, 215 Ga. 880, 883(3), 114 S.E.2d 138 (1960). But if the employer......
  • Gordy Const. Co. v. Stewart
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • March 8, 1995
    ...favor. Braddy, supra; see also Schofield v. Cox Enterprises, 212 Ga.App. 354, 441 S.E.2d 693 (1994); Riel v. Paulding County Bd. of Ed., 206 Ga.App. 230(1), 425 S.E.2d 305 (1992); Wright v. Transus, Inc., 209 Ga.App. 771, 775(2), 434 S.E.2d 786 (1993) (Andrews, J., I am authorized to state ......
  • Schofield v. Cox Enterprises, Inc.
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • March 9, 1994
    ...and punctuation omitted.) Curtis, Inc. v. Kelley, 167 Ga.App. 118, 119, 305 S.E.2d 828 (1983). See also Riel v. Paulding County Bd. of Ed., 206 Ga.App. 230(1), 425 S.E.2d 305 (1992); Aubrey Silvey Enterprises v. Bohannon, 182 Ga.App. 738, 356 S.E.2d 693 Marketing Sales Indus. of Ga. v. Robe......
  • Hargett's Telephone Contractors, Inc. v. McKeehan
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • August 5, 1997
    ...request or direction. See id. The facts of Aldrich Co. illustrate such a situation. As we observed in Riel v. Paulding County Bd. of Ed., 206 Ga.App. 230, 232(1), 425 S.E.2d 305 (1992), in Aldrich Co. the collision occurred as the employee drove home after making a "special errand," an off-......
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