Riener v. Riener, 68624

• Decision Date: 09 April 1996
• Docket Number: No. 68624,68624
• Citation: 926 S.W.2d 6
• Parties: Michael A. RIENER, Appellant, v. Patricia RIENER, k/n/a Patricia Benson, Respondent.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

Page 6

926 S.W.2d 6

Michael A. RIENER, Appellant, v. Patricia RIENER, k/n/a Patricia Benson, Respondent.

No. 68624.

Missouri Court of Appeals,

Eastern District,

Division One.

April 9, 1996.

Motion for Rehearing and/or Transfer to

Supreme Court Denied June 4, 1996.

Application to Transfer Denied

Aug. 20, 1996.

David L. Campbell, St. Louis, for Appellant.

Greg L. Roberts, Chesterfield, for Respondent.

KAROHL, Judge.

Michael Riener (Husband) appeals a denial of his "MOTION TO MODIFY AND FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION" which requested an interpretation of a qualified domestic relations order (QDRO) which was part of a separation agreement, incorporated into the decree of dissolution. We affirm in part, and reverse and remand in part.

The parties were divorced December 15, 1989. The decree incorporated a separation agreement which included two QDROs, dividing Husband's two employee pension plans: one with a Shell Provident Fund (Provident Fund), the other with a Shell Pension Trust (Pension Trust). The Provident Fund was divided 60% to Patricia Riener (Wife) and 40% to Husband; the Pension Trust was divided equally. With respect to this appeal, the parties only address the Provident Fund.

On June 24, 1993, the parties filed a joint motion to modify the decree because the plan administrator determined the QDRO did not comply with 26 U.S.C. § 414(p) and 26 U.S.C. § 206(d)(3). The parties consented to a technical modification of the decree to satisfy the requirements for qualification of the QDRO.

On December 30, 1994, Husband filed another motion to modify the QDRO portion of the decree and requested a preliminary injunction. On April 12, 1995, Wife filed a motion to enforce the QDRO. The trial court heard both motions. It denied Husband's motion to modify and preliminary injunction, and sustained Wife's motion to enforce the QDRO. This appeal ensued.

Husband challenges the QDRO portion of the separation agreement as incorporated in the decree. The portion in dispute reads:

(f) [Husband] is the beneficiary of several employee benefit plans at the place of his employment, Shell Oil Company, and with respect thereto agrees as follows:

(i) [Wife] shall be entitled to withdraw from the Provident Fund, in accordance with the provisions thereof, an amount equal to 60% of the balance therein in [Husband's] account as of June 30, 1989. [Wife] shall not be entitled to any contributions, accretions, earnings or the like in said Provident Fund accruing or accumulating after June 30, 1989.... (Our emphasis).

We review in accord with Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Mo. banc 1976). A decree which conveys more than one meaning such that a reasonable person may fairly and honestly differ in the construction of the terms is ambiguous. Young Dental Manufacturing Co. v. Engineered Products, Inc., 838 S.W.2d 154, 155 (Mo.App.E.D.1992); Brown v. Brown, 848 S.W.2d 551, 552 (Mo.App.E.D.1993). To determine if a decree is ambiguous, we consider the whole instrument and give the words their natural and ordinary meaning. Young Dental Manufacturing Co. 838 S.W.2d at 156.

Both parties maintain the terms relating to the Provident Fund in the separation agreement, as incorporated in the decree, are not ambiguous. However, they interpret the terms differently. Husband asserts the language in the agreement indicates Wife is not entitled to "any contributions, accretions, earnings or the like" from the Providence Fund accruing or accumulating after June 30, 1989; a date mentioned in the agreement and six months before the decree. Wife interprets the language to mean that "as of" the appointed date of valuations and division, June 30, 1989, her 60% should be found her sole and separate property and any accretions, interest or the like are...