Rienzo v. Santangelo
| Decision Date | 04 February 1971 |
| Citation | 160 Conn. 391,279 A.2d 565 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | Frances C. RIENZO v. John SANTANGELO. |
Richard L. Jacobs, New Haven, for the appellant (plaintiff).
John H. Peck, New Haven, for the appellee (defendant).
Before ALCORN, C.J., and HOUSE, COTTER, THIM and SHAPIRO, JJ.
Frances Cannelli Rienzo, hereinafter referred to as the plaintiff, brought this action claiming that she suffered injuries while on the premises of the defendant and as a result of the defendant's negligence. The defendant denied negligence and pleaded a special defense of contributory negligence. The case was tried to a jury which returned a verdict for the defendant. The court denied the plaintiff's motion to set the verdict aside and rendered judgment for the defendant. The plaintiff appealed and in her brief has pursued assignments of error directed at the finding, the charge to the jury, and a ruling on evidence. We find that our decision on the ruling on evidence is dispositive of the appeal.
The complaint alleged the following: (1) that on June 17, 1961, at approximately 2:15 a.m., the plaintiff came onto the defendant's premises, known as Valley Bowl; (2) that she attempted to enter the Valley Bowl building at its north end but the door was locked; (3) that she then walked south alongside the building seeking an entrance and headed for what appeared to be a pair of doors toward the southerly end of the front of the building, but instead struck a pane of glass adjacent to and at a right angle to a pair of doors. The allegations of negligence in the complaint were predicated on the location of the pane of glass which the plaintiff allegedly struck.
On the trial, the plaintiff testified in her own behalf and laid the foundation for the admission of five photographs which were offered and marked into evidence. She used these photographs to describe where on the defendant's premises she sustained her injuries. She testified to the following: At about 2:15 a.m. on the morning in question she came onto the defendant's premises, looking for a pay telephone from which to make a call. She parked her car in the parking area and then walked to the north end of the building where the door was locked. She then walked alongside the front of the defendant's building to the end of some shrubbery at the south end of the building. She then stepped onto a cement paving and walked into a windowpane.
On cross-examination, the plaintiff gave answers which indicated that the photographs used by her to describe where her injuries were sustained did not give an unobstructed view of the place on the premises where she testified she had struck the glass. The defendant's counsel then asked the plaintiff how soon after the accident she had talked with her attorney, to which an objection was made and overruled and an exception noted. The plaintiff answered that she had consulted her attorney by telephone two days after she was injured. In the absence of the jury, the defendant's counsel stated that he proposed to ask the plaintiff the question: 'Did you tell your attorney where on the premises this accident occurred?' Objection was made on the grounds that it infringed upon the attorney-client privilege and that it was prejudicial and irrelevant. In urging its admissibility, the defendant's counsel stated: 'I don't intend to ask this witness, 'What did you tell your attorney?' All I've asked her so far is, 'Did you tell your attorney where on the premises the accident occurred?". He also claimed that the answer would affect the plaintiff's credibility in that 'it clearly shows that she has told her attorney where it happened.' The question was allowed by the court and an exception was noted. The jury were recalled and the plaintiff was asked: 'Did you tell your attorney where on the premises this accident occurred?'. In response to this question the plaintiff answered 'Yes'.
The question, 'Did you tell your attorney where on the premises this accident occurred?', is what is here in issue. It is clear that by asking this question the defense counsel was trying to create the inference in the minds of the jury that the plaintiff must have related to her attorney a location where her injuries occurred other than that to which she had testified. This is borne out by the defendant's claims of proof (1) that the plaintiff told her lawyer that she struck a pane of glass at Valley Bowl other than the one to which she testified at the trial, and (2) that the plaintiff struck a pane of glass at Valley Bowl other than the one she testified at the trial to having struck. Furthermore, in...
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State v. Ross
...(adopting balancing test to accommodate conflict between attorney-client privilege and right of confrontation); Rienzo v. Santangelo, 160 Conn. 391, 395, 279 A.2d 565 (1971) (attorney-client privilege encourages candor necessary for effective legal advice); Turner's Appeal, 72 Conn. 305, 31......
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Harrison v. State
...into communications between the witness and the attorney constitutes prejudicial error, when properly preserved. See Rienzo v. Santangelo, 160 Conn. 391, 279 A.2d 565 (1971) and McConnell v. City of Osage, 80 Iowa 293, 45 N.W. 550 (1890). In Rienzo, in an action for damages claimed by the p......
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PSE Consulting, Inc. v. Frank Mercede & Sons, Inc.
...elements of the claim of privilege between attorney and client is that the communication be confidential." Rienzo v. Santangelo, 160 Conn. 391, 395, 279 A.2d 565 (1971). "Statements made in the presence of a third party, on the other hand, are usually not privileged because there is then no......
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Olson v. Accessory Controls and Equip. Corp.
...those communications necessary to obtain legal advice); Ullmann v. State, supra, 230 Conn. 713 (same); see also Rienzo v. Santangelo, 160 Conn. 391, 395, 279 A.2d 565 (1971) (attorney-client privilege encompasses confidential communications relating to legal advice sought from legal profess......