Rierson v. Carolina Steel & Iron Co.

• Decision Date: 08 November 1922
• Docket Number: 391.
• Parties: RIERSON v. CAROLINA STEEL & IRON CO.
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

114 S.E. 467

184 N.C. 363

RIERSON v. CAROLINA STEEL & IRON CO.

No. 391.

Supreme Court of North Carolina

November 8, 1922

Appeal from Superior Court, Guilford County; Long, Judge.

Action by R. L. Rierson against the Carolina Steel & Iron Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

The charge of the court must be taken as a whole and considered and construed in its entirety, and not by the process of selecting one portion as the object of attack when, if it is viewed in the light of its relation to all that was said, a very different meaning would be revealed.

This was a civil action brought by the plaintiff to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by the negligence of defendant or its agents, while the plaintiff was in the employ of the defendant.

There was evidence, on the part of the plaintiff, tending to show That he was employed by the defendant, the Carolina Steel & Iron Company, on the 24th day of June, 1920, and was, at the time, engaged in the performance of his work--that of an acetylene torch operator, welding and cutting iron of various kinds used in construction work. That he was engaged, at the time of his injury, in the building or factory of the defendant. That this factory was a large building. That he was cutting pieces of iron into various lengths with his torch, performing his work in front of a large door or entrance to said building. That in said building there was an overhead trolleyway, used for carrying iron of various kinds from the building out through the door, in front of which he was engaged at the time of his injury. That other employees of the company, wishing to remove a number of beams or pieces of iron from the building, had wrapped around them a chain or chains, fastened to said trolley, or runway, and had hoisted them for the purpose of carrying them out through said door into the yard beyond. That as they were carrying said pieces of iron along by the overhead trolley, and as the same passed over the plaintiff, the chain or chains slipped and slackened, causing the ends of the long pieces of iron to fall or slip down upon the plaintiff's back, he being at work upon the ground and immediately underneath the overhead trolley in front of the door. That he was knocked down, his back and spine hurt, and he suffered permanent injury.

There was evidence, tending to show that there was no negligence on the part of the defendant or its agents, that the method for moving the iron approved and in general use was the one adopted by the defendant, and that if there was negligence on the part of defendant, the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence, in placing himself in a dangerous position, under the trolley line, and in front of the door that was being constantly used. The defendant further set up the defense that the negligence, if any, was that of a fellow servant.

There was evidence of the plaintiff, by the witness C. A. Walters as follows:

"I was in the shop on the morning Mr. Rierson was injured. I didn't see the angle irons when they fell. I saw them when they pulled them up, and saw them take Mr. Rierson from under them, and saw them immediately after they fell. I noticed the chain which was around them. It was a chain the hook of which was square, and was too large to go through the link, and they hooked it around the link. They had been using that chain to my knowledge ever since I had been there at work for them, and had been using it for that purpose. I knew it had been slipping before and spilling loads.

The method that is approved and in general use in plants like that of defendant for moving loads like the one that fell is to use two chains. They always used two chains where I worked. They have a large ring, and they have two chains fastened in that ring with a hook at the end of each chain. They take it out and put it around a load some six or eight feet apart, far enough apart to give the load a balance and keep it from slumping. I know what kind of chains are approved and in general use in factories like this for the purpose of lifting loads like this was on the trolley system. They use a large chain with a hook on it that will fit down tight around the load, with a hook on it large enough to go around the whole chain, and the chains that are approved and in general use have rings in them so that the hook can be put in the rings. The Carolina Steel & Iron Company, the defendant in this case, had two or three other chains. They had two or three there with rings in them. I had been there nearly three months before Mr. Rierson was hurt, and to my knowledge they had been using this chain since then. I don't know how many times I have seen this chain slip, but I saw it slip several times."

There was a verdict for the plaintiff and judgment thereon, from which defendant appealed.

Wilson & Frazier, of Greensboro, for appellant.

King, Sapp & King, of Greensboro, for appellee.

WALKER J.

The defendant objected to testimony that there was a custom to use only one chain, instead of two, in moving material along the trolley, but when we examine the evidence relating to this question, we find that really what was meant by the "custom" and what counsel denominated such in his questions to the witnesses, was evidently considered by the witness as equivalent to what was actually done on these several or numerous occasions, when he witnessed the operations of the trolley in carrying material from one place to another. If the plaintiff was seeking to prove a general custom, and exception was properly taken to his effort in doing so, plaintiff's counsel were not even moderately successful in showing such a custom, and the witness, who seemed to be very intelligent and to understand the scope of the inquiry, when confined within its proper limits, gave an unobjectionable answer. For example, in answering the first question on this subject, he said: "Well they were using only one chain; only custom I know." This can mean but one thing, and that is that defendant was using only one chain in moving the trolley from place to place when loaded with beams or pieces of iron. If evidence of the custom, in operating the trolley, was incompetent, and there was any substantial evidence of it, we would not reverse upon such a slight, or rather attenuated, departure from the true line of inquiry, when we can well see from the answers of the witness, that it could not have worked injury to the defendant. We repeat what was said in Brewer v. Ring, 177 N.C. 484, 99 S.E. 362:

"Courts do not lightly grant reversals, or set aside verdicts upon grounds which show the alleged error to be harmless or where the appellant could have sustained no injury from it. There should be at least something like a practical treatment of the motion to reverse, and it should not be granted except to subserve the real ends of substantial justice. Hilliard on New Trials (2d Ed.) §§ 1 to 7. The motion should be meritorious and not based upon merely trivial errors committed manifestly without prejudice. Reasons for attaching great importance

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