Riesenberg v. Sanders

• Decision Date: 22 September 2021
• Docket Number: No. 20-1350,20-1350
• Citation: 967 N.W.2d 223 (Table)
• Parties: Erich RIESENBERG, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Scott SANDERS, in His Official Capacity as City Manager of the City of Des Moines, and the City of Des Moines, Iowa, City Council, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: Iowa Court of Appeals

967 N.W.2d 223 (Table)

Erich RIESENBERG, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.Scott SANDERS, in His Official Capacity as City Manager of the City of Des Moines, and the City of Des Moines, Iowa, City Council, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 20-1350

Court of Appeals of Iowa.

Filed September 22, 2021

Erich Riesenberg, Des Moines, self-represented appellant.

Michelle Mackel-Wiederanders, Assistant City Attorney, Des Moines, for appellee.

Considered by Bower, C.J., and Tabor and Ahlers, JJ.

AHLERS, Judge.

Erich Riesenberg filed a four-count petition alleging the city council of Des Moines and city manager Scott Sanders (collectively "City") violated Iowa law when the City entered into a contract with a private company for animal control property and services. Specifically, Riesenberg alleged the contract was illegal because it: (1) was exempted from competitive bidding without good cause, (2) prohibited public oversight, (3) subsidized a private company, and (4) imposed an illegal tax. Riesenberg cast his filing as a petition for writ of certiorari. The district court granted the City's motion to dismiss because Riesenberg's claims were not appropriate for certiorari action. The court then recast the proceeding as a declaratory-judgment action, dismissed count 1 for failure to state a claim, dismissed counts 2 and 4 for lack of standing, and found count 3 survived dismissal as a declaratory-judgment claim. The court later granted summary judgment in favor of the City on the remaining count, count 3.

Riesenberg appeals the rulings granting the City's motions to dismiss and for summary judgment. We review the district court rulings for correction of errors at law. See Alons v. Iowa Dist. Ct. , 698 N.W.2d 858, 863 (Iowa 2005) (certiorari); Turner v. Iowa State Bank & Tr. Co. , 743 N.W.2d 1, 2–3 (Iowa 2007) (motion to dismiss); Wallace v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Dirs. , 754 N.W.2d 854, 857 (Iowa 2008) (summary judgment). In reviewing claims resolved by motion to dismiss, we view "the well-pled facts of the petition in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, resolving any doubts in the plaintiff's favor." Turner , 743 N.W.2d at 3. "A motion to dismiss is properly granted only if a plaintiff's petition on its face shows no right of recovery under any state of facts." Rees v. City of Shenandoah , 682 N.W.2d 77, 79 (Iowa 2004) (altered for readability) (quoting Trobaugh v. Sondag , 668 N.W.2d 577, 580 (Iowa 2003) ). In reviewing the claim resolved by summary judgment, we view the facts in the light most favorable to Riesenberg as the non-moving party, and we will affirm summary judgment only "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact." Wallace , 754 N.W.2d at 857 (quoting Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.981(3) ).

Riesenberg raises numerous issues with the district court's rulings in his appellate brief. We find it necessary to address only the court's ultimate conclusions.

We begin with Riesenberg's claim the district court erred by concluding he could not seek review of the contract by a certiorari action. Initiation of certiorari actions are governed by Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.1401, which states:

A party may commence a certiorari action when authorized by statute or when the party claims an inferior tribunal, board, or officer, exercising judicial functions, or a judicial magistrate exceeded proper jurisdiction or otherwise acted illegally.

Riesenberg does not claim his action was authorized by statute, so, by rule, the only remaining manner by which Riesenberg could initiate a certiorari action would be if the City acted illegally in "exercising judicial functions." The district court found Riesenberg could not seek review of the contract by writ of certiorari because the City did not exercise "judicial functions" in approving the contract. We consider the following factors in determining whether a body exercised judicial functions:

(1) whether the questioned act involves a proceeding in which notice and an opportunity to be heard are required; (2) whether a determination of rights of parties is made which requires the exercise of discretion in finding facts and applying the law thereto; or (3) whether the challenged act goes to the determination of some right the protection of which is the peculiar office of the courts.

Wallace , 754 N.W.2d at 858 (internal quotations and citation omitted). None of these factors indicates the City exercised judicial functions. Riesenberg was not entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard beyond open-meetings requirements, which do not convert an action into a judicial exercise. See id. The City did not determine the rights of parties or otherwise act as a court. See Hoefer v. Sioux City Cmty. Sch. Dist. , 375 N.W.2d 222, 223–25 (Iowa 1985) (finding a board exercised judicial functions in selecting from multiple bidders). The City simply chose how to appropriate money, which "is a legislative function left up to the discretion of the political system." Wallace , 754 N.W.2d at 859. We find no error in dismissing Riesenberg's claims as a certiorari action. In doing so, we note the court did not deny Riesenberg a forum but instead considered his claims as a proceeding for declaratory judgment. See id. ("We note the [petitioners] are not without a remedy.").

The court dismissed count 1 for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Count 1 alleges the City failed to show good cause when approving the contract. In his petition, Riesenberg asserts the City violated its ordinances, which allow the City to exempt contracts from the competitive bidding process only "for good cause shown." See Des Moines, Iowa, Mun. Code § 7-210 (2018). However, Riesenberg's petition acknowledges the City found good cause existed when it approved the contract. Relying only on the ordinance, Riesenberg complains the City did not make specific findings as to what constituted good cause when it approved the contract. The ordinance does not require the City to make such findings, and the court did not err in dismissing count 1 for failure to state a claim.

The court dismissed counts 2 and 4 for lack of standing. To have standing, Riesenberg "must ‘(1) have a specific personal or legal interest in the litigation and (2) be injuriously affected.’ " Godfrey v. State , 752 N.W.2d 413, 418 (Iowa 2008) (quoting Alons v. Iowa Dist. Ct. , 698 N.W.2d 858, 864 (Iowa 2005) ). "A general interest shared by all citizens in making sure government acts legally is normally insufficient to support...