Riffle v. Skinner
| Decision Date | 15 February 1910 |
| Citation | 67 S.E. 1075,67 W.Va. 75 |
| Parties | RIPPLE v. SKINNER. |
| Court | West Virginia Supreme Court |
Rehearing Denied May 18, 1910.
Syllabus by the Court.
In ejectment it suffices affirmatively for the plaintiff to show a recoverable legal title in himself for the land in controversy.
Seizin or possession of land, adverse to all, for the length of time of the statutory bar to real actions, vests title in the party who has been so possessed. It makes recoverable legal title.
A plaintiff in ejectment who relies upon title by adverse possession need not affirmatively prove that the state has no title to the land.
Where there has been a holding of land with all the essentials of adverse possession for the period of the statutory bar to real actions a grant is presumed.
So far as the principles herein enunciated conflict with the sixth point of the syllabus in Witten v. St. Clair, 27 W.Va. 762, the latter is disapproved.
Limitation against state discussed in Judge Brannon's note.
Error to Circuit Court, Lewis County.
Action by John S. Riffle against R. L. Skinner. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error. Affirmed.
Linn & Bland, for plaintiff in error.
W. W Brannon and E. A. Brannon, for defendant in error.
ROBINSON P.
In this action of ejectment, the plaintiff, by the verdict of a jury has judgment for a fee simple estate in 153 acres of land. In seeking to overthrow the judgment defendant insists that the evidence established more than ten years adverse possession on his part, thereby barring plaintiff from recovery against him; and that, at any rate, plaintiff did not show such title in himself as that upon which he could recover.
Plaintiff relies upon a deed from Camden and Arnold, made to him in 1875, and complete possession thereunder since that time. Defendant relies upon a deed from another source, made to him in 1890. Each deed clearly calls for a tract adjacent to that called for in the other. They each call for the line of an old survey which, properly located, is the division line between them. Upon the faces of the two deeds there is no conflict. Looking to the deeds, there is no overlap or interlock. But in actual contest there is a disputed strip. The dispute has arisen because of different claims as to the proper location of the line of the old survey separating the tracts. Plaintiff insists that defendant has crossed over this division line and encroached upon his land. To oust him therefrom this suit was instituted.
Neither party relies upon perfect chain of paper title; both rely upon possession. Plaintiff says that his possession of land under his deed has extended to the true boundaries called for by that deed and has embraced the land in controversy, and that defendant has not had such possession of the disputed strip as would bar plaintiff from its recovery. Defendant says that his deed calls for the strip; and that, in any event, he now owns it by reason of more than ten years adverse possession.
The jury found that plaintiff's claims were supported by the evidence. The evidence as to the true location of the line, possession by defendant, the character of that possession, and other material matters relating to the issue, is conflicting. It is oral testimony of witnesses in the presence of the jury. In such case we have no power to invade the province of the jury by disturbing the verdict on the alleged ground that it is contrary to the evidence.
Has the plaintiff shown a title sufficient for recovery? The jury has affirmed by its verdict his claim that he has been in possession for 27 years, under color of title adverse to all others. Is that finding of fact, such a showing of title as will enable plaintiff to recover in ejectment? The plaintiff must recover on the strength of his title alone. In ejectment this proposition is fundamental. But what are the essentials of strength of title sufficient to support ejectment? What makes a case for a plaintiff in ejectment? Must he affirmatively, as is sometimes loosely said, show title against all the world? If he must do so, it is strange practice that calls upon him so to negative the validity or existence of all other claims to the land but his own. The plaintiff, to recover, must show a legal title to the land. He must prove a legal title that has the strength to prevail over the title relied upon by defendant or proved by defendant to be outstanding in a third party. But only to that extent is the burden of showing title upon the plaintiff. He is not obliged to eliminate from consideration the possibility of a better title than his, unless the defendant presents it. Ejectment is a contest between the parties, as is any other action. The action binds only the parties to it. And when the plaintiff proves a title in himself, having the elements of strength sufficient for recovery, he may rely upon it and recover thereby unless the defendant shows that a better title exists either in himself or another. That he must show title against all the world means simply that he must show a legal title better than any other presented against it on the trial. It does not mean that he must do more affirmatively than show that he has a recoverable legal title to the land in controversy.
The expression that a title against all the world must be shown by a plaintiff in ejectment has evidently led to a belief by some that it is always incumbent on the part of such plaintiff to show that title has been granted by the commonwealth. The rule that title must be traced to the commonwealth has been carried to an extent that is not justified by reason nor by the purpose for which such tracing is ever required. In ejectment, it is required that the plaintiff trace title to the commonwealth if he relies alone on paper title. But, the rule of tracing title to its original fountain, the sovereignty of the soil, properly pertains only to a showing of paper title--a reliance on paper title alone. Even in such case, presumptions may be established which sometimes suffice to do away with the showing of a complete chain of documents. It must be so, otherwise valid titles and vested rights will be lost by long lapse of time incurring changes which produce the loss of records and evidence. So where a plaintiff in ejectment relies wholly upon paper title, upon deed without possession, he must show the chain taking the title to its origin. It requires this showing to vouch strength in the title and to make it a prima facie legal one sufficient for recovery. But where a plaintiff can rely on other than a paper title it is not so. He need not trace title to the commonwealth. Where there is seizin or possession under claim of title there is always presumption of title. Tyler on Ejectment and Adverse Enjoyment, 78; 3 Wigmore on Evidence, § 1779; Teass v. St. Albans, 38 W.Va. 1, 17 S.E. 400, 19 L.R.A. 802. "So the uninterrupted enjoyment of property or privileges for a long space of time raises a presumption of legal right." Starkie on Evidence (10th Am. Ed.), marginal page 75. And when that seizin or possession is of the length of time to bar recovery, it presumptively vests title in the party who has been possessed. It makes good legal title upon the showing of which one may recover. It makes a prima facie showing of title. True it may not be sufficient to avail against all the world, but it avails in ejectment until the defendant overthrows it. There has been a failure in some of the decisions to distinguish between the essentials of proof of paper title and the essentials of proof of title by the presumption arising from long continued seizin. It suffices, however, to enunciate true principles without particularly referring to all the instances in which they have been overlooked.
In the case under consideration, it is maintained that one may not recover in ejectment upon proof of adverse possession, unless he shows that at some time the state granted the land or that there has been that which would cause a transfer of the state's title under article 13 or the Constitution (Code p. lxxxiv)--ten years adverse possession and payment of the taxes for five years. In support of this contention we are cited to Witten v. St. Clair, 27 W.Va. 762, which we admit sanctions it. But such view seems unreasonable, unwarranted, and unsound. Shall a plaintiff in ejectment be required to show more than the affirmative of the legal title upon which he relies? Shall he be required to provide in proof against the mere contingency that the state may not have granted the land or that the state may have title by forfeiture? What if there has been an actual grant, the title resting on which has never been forfeited? Why cause the plaintiff to prove all the essentials of a transfer to him under the Constitution when there could be no transfer if the state had no title? More reasonable would it be to require him to show that title is actually out of the state. Yet suppose that the state, or the commonwealth of Virginia, never at any time had title, that the land was granted before the existence of either, as may be true in counties where ancient grants from the crown or lord of the fee were made before our independence. In such case shall plaintiff, though resting upon long and good adverse possession, be required to delve into the secret recesses of the past to find such grant, or, failing to find it, be required to prove the essentials of a transfer under our Constitution which could not have taken place because such granted title was actually outstanding and not forfeited? In following such a rule for proof of title, one may be permitted to rely on a taking of the state's title that never occurred. If there is an outstanding title in the...
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