Rifkin v. Rifkin
| Decision Date | 19 April 1967 |
| Parties | Patricia M. RIFKIN v. Samuel RIFKIN. |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
Howard A. Sackett, Fairfield, for appellant (plaintiff).
John J. Darcy, Fairfield, for appellee (defendant).
Before KING, C.J., and ALCORN, HOUSE, THIM and RYAN, JJ.
This action was brought to recover weekly support payments accrued since 1952 under the terms of a property settlement and separation agreement executed under seal by the parties in 1951, when they were husband and wife. The plaintiff claims that, in rendering judgment for the defendant, the trial court erroneously concluded that '(t)he agreement was made to facilitate the plaintiff's out of state 'quickie' divorce rather than for the sole purpose of amicably settling their property affairs; and, therefore, said contract is void and unenforceable as against public policy.' Although on this appeal the plaintiff also assigned other errors, the decisive question is whether the facts support this baisc conclusion. The plaintiff is not entitled to any correction in the finding of facts and was not harmed by the assigned errors with respect to her claims of law, which, even if properly presented on the record, were, so far as relevant to this decision, merely the converse of the court's conclusion of law with respect to the unenforceability of the contract.
It is true that the court in its finding failed to include any claims of law made by the plaintiff respecting the judgment to be rendered, together with the rulings thereon. Section 619 of the Practice Book expressly provides that the court shall include these claims in its finding if any such claims were in fact made to it. It is also true that the draft finding contains a statement as to the claims of law which the plaintiff asserts she made and the court ruled on, as required by Practice Book § 614 and as indicated in Form No. 603(A), fourth paragraph. Upon the court's failure, however, to comply with § 619 and to include the claims and rulings in the finding, if the claims were in fact made, it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to seek a rectification of the appeal pursuant to $675 of the Practice Book. Failure to do so leaves this court unable to determine from the record whether or not in fact the plaintiff made any claims of law to the trial court. Since, on the issue which is determinative of this appeal, the court's application of law to the facts was the converse of that which the plaintiff asserts she claimed to the court, the same question of law is presented for our consideration, and the plaintiff is in no way harmed by this assigned error.
The question of the validity and enforceability of the contract was expressly raised by a special defense pleaded by the defendant. In her reply to this pleading, the plaintiff admitted that the agreement was not examined, approved or adopted by any court of this state or by the Arkansas court which granted her a divorce decree on March 17, 1952.
In Maisch v. Maisch, 87 Conn. 377, 87 A. 729, we stated the principles which govern the question of the enforceability of such a contract as that between these parties fixing by mutual agreement the amounts to be paid by the husband in lieu of alimony. We there referred to the earlier case of Seeley's Appeal, 56 Conn. 202, 206, 14 A. 291, 292, in which this court said: 'Court will not enforce any contract which is the price of consent by one party to the marriage relation to the procurement of a divorce by the other.' In the Maisch case, we further indicated (87 Conn. p. 383, 87 A. p. 730) that the contract in that case was objectionable because the court was left to rest a divorce decree upon evidence which did not include all the facts in the case, which objection 'goes to the root of the matter.' We also (p. 383, 87 A. p. 730) said of such agreements as that here involved: ...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Bedrick v. Bedrick
...necessarily contrary to public policy unless it is made to facilitate divorce or is concealed from the court. See Rifkin v. Rifkin, 155 Conn. 7, 9–10, 229 A.2d 358 (1967); Hooker v. Hooker, 130 Conn. 41, 47, 32 A.2d 68 (1943); Felton v. Felton, 123 Conn. 564, 568, 196 A. 791 (1938). “While ......
-
Bedrick v. Bedrick
...is not necessarily contrary to public policy unless it is made to facilitate divorce or is concealed from the court. See Rifkin v. Rifkin, 155 Conn. 7, 9-10, 229 A.2d 358 (1967); Hooker v. Hooker, 130 Conn. 41, 47, 32 A.2d 68 (1943); Felton v. Felton, 123 Conn. 564, 568, 196 A. 791 (1938). ......
-
Baker v. Baker
...added.) Maisch v. Maisch, 87 Conn. 377, 383, 87 A. 729 (1913). We have often cited this rule with approval. Rifkin v. Rifkin, 155 Conn. 7, 9-10, 229 A.2d 358 (1967); Whitney v. Heublein, 145 Conn. 154, 160, 139 A.2d 605 (1958); Koster v. Koster, 137 Conn. 707, 711, 81 A.2d 355 (1951); Hooke......
-
Piascik v. Stone, Inc.
...v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 155 Conn. 236, 248, 230 A.2d 595, 601; see State v. Dukes, 157 Conn. 498, 501, 255 A.2d 614; Rifkin v. Rifkin, 155 Conn. 7, 8, 229 A.2d 358. We are unable to determine on the record whether the defendant made such claims of law in the trial court and, if it did, ......