Rigano v. County of Sullivan

Citation486 F.Supp.2d 244
Decision Date13 April 2007
Docket NumberNo. 05 Civ. 0016(WCC).,05 Civ. 0016(WCC).
PartiesDanielle RIGANO, Plaintiff, v. The COUNTY OF SULLIVAN, Sullivan County Sheriff's Office, Sheriff Daniel Hogue, in his capacity as Sheriff and individually, Undersheriff Joseph Decker, in his capacity as Undersheriff and individually, Law Administrator Kenneth LaPorte, in his capacity as Jail Administrator and individually, Dean Washington, Jermaine Davis, Keishau Davis, Marquis Fields, and Corrections Officers James Pugh, Robert McCauley, John Hamilton, Andeas Nedwetzky, Greg McDoal, James Bilyou, Thomas Compasso, Sgt. James Ginty, Brian Gleason and Brad Magie, sued in their individual capacities, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

Law Offices of Michael H. Sussman (Christopher D. Watkins, Esq., of Counsel), Goshen, NY, for Plaintiff.

Samuel Yasgur, Sullivan County Attorney (Samuel Yasgur, Sullivan County Attorney, of Counsel), Monticello, NY, Law Office of Michael Frey (Michael Frey, Esq., of Counsel), Barryville, NY, for the Defendants The County of Sullivan, Sullivan County Sheriff's Office, Sheriff Daniel Hogue, Undersheriff Joseph Decker, Law Administrator Kenneth LaPorte, Corrections Officers James Pugh, Robert Mccauley, John Hamilton, Andeas Nedwetzky, Greg McDoal, James Bilyou, Thomas Compasso, Sgt. James Ginty, Brian Gleason and Brad Magie.

OPINION AND ORDER

WILLIAM C. CONNER, Senior District Judge.

Plaintiff, Danielle Rigano, brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against defendants the County of Sullivan (the "County"), the County Sheriff's Office (the "Sheriff's Office"), Sheriff Daniel Hogue ("Hogue"), Undersheriff Joseph Decker ("Decker"), County Jail Administrator Kenneth LaPorte ("LaPorte"),1 inmates of the County Jail Dean Washington ("Washington"), Jermaine Davis ("J.Davis"), Keishau Davis ("K.Davis") and Marquis Fields ("Fields") (collectively, the "inmate defendants"), and Corrections Officers of the County Jail James Pugh ("Pugh"), Robert McCauley ("McCauley"), John Hamilton ("Hamilton"), Andeas Nedwetzky ("Nedwetzky"), Greg McDoal ("McDoal"), James Bilyou ("Bilyou"), Thomas Compasso ("Compasso"), Sergeant James Ginty ("Ginty"), Brian Gleason ("Gleason") and Brad Magie ("Magie"),2 for violation of his constitutional rights guaranteed by the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.3 Plaintiff also brings a claim for negligence against the County defendants, as well as claims for assault, battery and false imprisonment against the inmate defendants. Plaintiff alleges that he was harassed and beaten by the inmate defendants over the course of a twelve-hour period while serving his sentence at the County Jail, and that the County defendants failed to properly supervise the inmates or were otherwise deliberately indifferent to the treatment that plaintiff endured. The County defendants moved for summary judgment pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 56 on plaintiff's claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and for common law negligence. Plaintiff thereafter withdrew his § 1983 claim against the County and all claims against the Sheriffs Office, Hogue, Decker, LaPorte, McCauley, Hamilton, Bilyou and Ginty. (See Pl. Mem. Opp. Mot. Summ. J. at 1.) Plaintiff continues to assert: (1) a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Pugh, Nedwetsky, McDoal, Compasso, Gleason, Magie and the inmate defendants; (2) a negligence claim against the County, Pugh, Nedwetsky, McDoal, Compasso, Gleason and Magie; and (3) common law claims of assault, battery and false imprisonment against the inmate defendants. (See id.) For the following reasons, the County defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted.

BACKGROUND

Viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff,4 the record reveals the following relevant facts. On the night of November 8, 2002, after socializing at a local bar, plaintiff and William Depaw ("Depaw"), apparently a friend of plaintiff, broke into the home of the individual who owned the bar that they were frequenting and stole several bottles of liquor and a watch. (See County Defs. Rule 56.1 Stmt., Ex. B (Pl. Dep. at 30-32).) A week later, plaintiff was arrested and later pled guilty to second degree burglary and petit larceny. (See id. (Pl. Dep. at 33); Watkins Aff'm, Ex. 1.) Plaintiff was seventeen years old5 when he committed the crime and was adjudicated as a Youthful Offender.6 (See Watkins Aff'm, Ex. 1.) On December 17, 2003, he was sentenced to two hundred hours of community service, five years of probation and incarceration for six consecutive weekends at the County Jail (the "Jail") to commence on January 2, 2004. (See County Defs. Rule 56.1 Stmt., Ex. B (Pl. Dep. at 36); Watkins Affm, Ex. 1.)

On January 2, 2004, at approximately 6:00 p.m., plaintiff's grandfather brought him to the Jail to begin his sentence. (See County Defs. Rule 56.1 Stmt., Ex. B (Pl. Dep. at 38); Watkins Aff m, Ex. 1.) Upon his arrival, he was booked, searched and issued a blue jumpsuit to wear. (See County Defs. Rule 56.1 Stmt., Ex. B (PI. Dep. at 42).) Plaintiff also underwent an intake process required by New York State law to determine where and in what manner he would be housed. (See id. (Pl. Dep. at 42); LaPorte Aff. ¶ 5, Exs. A, B, D.)

As part of the intake process, all inmates are asked a series of questions by a corrections officer who then completes the "Initial Inmate Classification Form," which results in a score that is used in determining how the inmate will be classified and, as a result, where he will be housed.7 (See LaPorte Aff. ¶ 6, Ex. A.) The questions relate to the prisoner's criminal history, present charges, escape history, age, employment status, residency and other considerations, including, inter alia, whether he had: (1) ever been victimized in prison; (2) any enemies currently in the Jail population; (3) cooperated with or provided testimony to law enforcement; (4) a history of mental illness; and (5) any physical disabilities. (See LaPorte Aff., Exs. A, B; County Defs. Rule 56.1 Stmt., Ex. B (Pl. Dep. at 42-47)) In addition, prisoners are asked whether they know of any reason why they should not be placed in general population. (See LaPorte Aff., Ex. B.) Throughout the entire examination, plaintiff did not indicate anything to suggest that he should not be placed into' general population and, based upon his offense and age at the time, he was assigned to maximum security housing reserved for inmates between the ages of sixteen and eighteen, which was located in the Jail's "Cell Block C, Second Tier."8 (See LaPorte Aff. ¶¶ 5, 7, 11, Exs. A, B; County Defs. Rule 56.1 Stmt., Ex. B (Pl. Dep. at 39, 46-47, 49-50).)

After plaintiffs intake was completed, a corrections officer escorted plaintiff through a hallway towards Cell Block C and past the "first tier" where the adult inmates were housed. (See County Defs. Rule 56.1 Stmt., Ex. B (Pl. Dep. at 49-50, 64, 70).) When they arrived at the second tier, the corrections officer instructed plaintiff to enter a gated common area containing some tables and chairs and a television. (See id. (Pl. Dep. at 49-50, 55, 59).) Four or five other inmates were already fraternizing in the area. (See id.) He was instructed to go into his cell, which was the first cell of five consecutive cells located against the far wall of the common area. (See id. (Pl. Dep. at 49, 51).) Once plaintiff entered the cell, the corrections officer closed its barred gate by using a lever located outside the' general area. (See id. (Pl. Dep. at 49, 60).) The inmate population of Cell Block C, .tier two on the weekend of January 2, 2004 consisted of plaintiff, the inmate defendants and Kevin Matthews ("Matthews").9 (See id. (Pl. Dep. at 55).)

It is the Jail's policy for a corrections officer to be stationed at a desk in Cell Block C between the two tiers where he is able to view the barred gates leading into both areas containing the cells. (See LaPorte Aff. ¶ 18.) Every fifteen minutes, the corrections officer is required to conduct a visual inspection of the inmates and the tier itself. (See id. ¶ 19.) As LaPorte explained, "[t]o accomplish this, the officer would walk from his desk several feet to the barred door to each grouping of cells and visualize each prisoner and the activities of those prisoners." (Id.) In order to insure that the required inspections are conducted, the Jail instituted an electronic recording system know as "Guard1." (See id. ¶ 20.) Guard1 monitors the guard's activities by requiring that "[e]ach officer carr[y] a small electronic wand that he must touch to an electronic sensor at the various vantage points at which he ... position[ed] himself in order to view the inmates." (Id.) Each time the officer touches the electronic sensor with the electronic wand, the Guard1 system generates a computerized record of the contact, which can be later printed out in physical form. (See id.) It is also the Jail's policy to conduct head counts every eight hours during which the inmates are required to enter their cell so that the guards can "visualize the flesh of each inmate so as to prevent the use of dummies in escape attempts." (See id. ¶ 21.)

A few minutes after plaintiff was put in his cell, one of the inmate defendants came over to plaintiffs cell and asked him his name and what he was in for. (See County Defs. Rule 56.1 Stmt., Ex. B (Pl. Dep. at 53-54).) Throughout the evening, the other inmate defendants came over and started conversations with plaintiff. (See id. (Pl. Dep. at 55).) Plaintiff claims that he did not feel threatened in anyway at this time. (See id. (Pl. Dep. at 54).) However, upon learning that plaintiff was sentenced to incarceration only during the weekends, the other inmates threatened him with physical violence if he did not smuggle drugs or alcohol into the Jail the following weekend. (See id. (Pl. Dep. at 57, 61-62).)

At some point on Friday evening, a corrections officer instructed plaintiff to switch cells with Matthews, who was...

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