Rigby v. Fallsway Equip. Co., Inc.
Decision Date | 13 November 2002 |
Docket Number | No. 20985.,20985. |
Citation | 2002 Ohio 6120,779 N.E.2d 1056,150 Ohio App.3d 155 |
Parties | RIGBY et al., Appellants, v. FALLSWAY EQUIPMENT COMPANY, INC. et al., Appellees. |
Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
John C. Weisensell, for appellants Stewart James Rigby and Catherine Rigby.
William T. Whitaker and Mary Margaret Rowlands, for appellants.
Christopher A. Tipping and Stewart D. Roll, for appellees.
{¶ 1} Appellants, Stewart and Catherine Rigby, appeal from the judgment of the Summit County Court of Common Pleas. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
{¶ 2} On April 18, 2000, the Rigbys filed a complaint against Fallsway Equipment Company, Inc. ("Fallsway"), Rite Hite Corporation, and Atlantic Food Distributors.1 In their complaint against Fallsway, the Rigbys alleged breach of contract, promissory estoppel, tortious interference with a contract, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and loss of consortium.
{¶ 3} Mr. Rigby was employed by Fallsway from 1996 to 1998. On April 20, 1998, while performing work for Fallsway, a dock leveler collapsed and caused severe injuries to Mr. Rigby's head. Fallsway continued to pay Mr. Rigby pursuant to its wage-continuation policy, which provided that Fallsway would supply payment of wages in lieu of workers' compensation benefits for a period of up to six months.
{¶ 4} Mr. Rigby was authorized to return to work for light duty by Dr. Nelson on August 12, 1998, by Dr. Shah on August 14, 1998, and by Dr. Magoon on August 24, 1998. Light duties involved four hours per day, three days a week, performing desktype work.
{¶ 5} On August 5, 1998, and August 21, 1998, Fallsway sent Mr. Rigby letters requesting that he return to work and that his continuing wages would terminate as of August 21, 1998. Mr. Rigby did not return to work. Mr. Rigby's attorney contacted Fallsway by letter and informed Fallsway that the wage-continuation program would terminate effective September 1, 1998, due to Fallsway's breach of the agreement and policy. Thereafter, Fallsway placed Mr. Rigby on medical leave. According to Fallsway's employee handbook, Fallsway employees are entitled to twelve weeks of medical leave. The employee handbook states that if the employee does not return to work at the end of the medical leave, Fallsway will assume that the employee has resigned. At the end of the twelve weeks, Mr. Rigby did not return to work. Fallsway terminated Mr. Rigby's employment on December 1, 1998, and this suit followed. Fallsway moved for summary judgment, and the trial court granted Fallsway's motion on all claims. It is from this judgment that the Rigbys now appeal. We will address each assignment of error in turn.
{¶ 6} "The trial court erred in holding that Fallsway's employee handbook did not alter Mr. Rigby's `employment at will' status, as there are material issues for the trier of fact to decide."
{¶ 7} In their first assignment of error, the Rigbys assert that the trial court erred in holding that Fallsway's employee handbook did not alter Mr. Rigby's employment-at-will status with regard to their breach-of-contract claim. We disagree.
{¶ 8} Appellate review of a lower court's entry of summary judgment is de novo, applying the same standard used by the trial court. McKay v. Cutup (1992), 80 Ohio App.3d 487, 491, 609 N.E.2d 1272. "[Appellate courts] review the same evidentiary materials that were properly before the trial court at the time it ruled on the summary judgment motion." Am. Energy Serv. v. Lekan (1992), 75 Ohio App.3d 205, 208, 598 N.E.2d 1315. Pursuant to Civ.R. 56(C), summary judgment is proper if:
{¶ 9} "(1) No genuine issue as to any material fact remains to be litigated; (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (3) it appears from the evidence that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, and viewing such evidence most strongly in favor of the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made, that conclusion is adverse to that party." Temple v. Wean United, Inc. (1977), 50 Ohio St.2d 317, 327, 4 O.O.3d 466, 364 N.E.2d 267.
{¶ 10} The party seeking summary judgment initially bears the burden of informing the trial court of the basis for the motion and identifying portions of the record demonstrating an absence of genuine issues of material fact as to the essential elements of the nonmoving party's claims. Dresher v. Burt (1996), 75 § Ohio St.3d 280, 293, 662 N.E.2d 264. The movant must point to some evidence in the record of the type listed in Civ.R. 56(C) in support of his motion. Id. Once this burden is satisfied, the nonmoving party has the burden, as set forth in Civ.R. 56(E), to offer specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial. Id. The nonmoving party may not rest upon the mere allegations and denials in the pleadings but instead must point to or submit some evidentiary material that shows a genuine dispute over the material facts exists. Henkle v. Henkle (1991), 75 Ohio App.3d 732, 735, 600 N.E.2d 791.
{¶ 11} In order for a party to prevail on summary judgment, he must show that no genuine issue of material fact exists. If the moving party fails to produce evidence on an issue of material fact, then summary judgment must be denied, regardless of whether the nonmoving party has produced evidence on the issue. See Toledo's Great E. Shoppers City, Inc. v. Abde's Black Angus Steak House No. III, Inc. (1986), 24 Ohio St.3d 198, 201-202, 24 OBR 426, 494 N.E.2d 1101.
{¶ 12} A court may grant summary judgment only if the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. "There is no `default' summary judgment under Ohio law." Maust v. Palmer (1994), 94 Ohio App.3d 764, 769, 641 N.E.2d 818. Even if no memorandum in opposition to a motion for summary judgment is filed, the moving party must still meet its burden under Dresher. See Morris v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. (1988), 35 Ohio St.3d 45, 47, 517 N.E.2d 904.
{¶ 13} An employment contract that does not specify a specific term of employment is "terminable at will by either party." Henkel v. Educational Research Council of Am. (1976), 45 Ohio St.2d 249, 74 O.O.2d 415, 344 N.E.2d 118, syllabus. There are two exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine where the employer's right to terminate the employee is limited: (1) employee handbooks, company policy, and oral representations may create implied or express contractual provisions that alter the at-will contract, and (2) representations or promises made to the employee that fall within the doctrine of promissory estoppel. Doe v. Lodi Community Hosp. (Dec. 13, 2000), 9th Dist. No. 2955-M, 2000 WL 1825095, citing Mers v. Dispatch Printing Co. (1985), 19 Ohio St.3d 100, 103-104, 19 OBR 261, 483 N.E.2d 150.
{¶ 14} "Generally, employee handbooks do not constitute an employment contract." Ridgill v. Little Forest Med. Ctr. (June 28, 2000), 9th Dist. Nos. 19501 and 19530, 2000 WL 840494; see, also, Finsterwald-Maiden v. AAA S. Cent. Ohio (1996), 115 Ohio App.3d 442, 446, 685 N.E.2d 786. An employee handbook may be considered with regard to the question of whether an implied contract exists, but its presence alone is not dispositive. See, Ridgill, supra. Even though the employee handbook may be considered, "[a]bsent fraud in the inducement, a disclaimer in an employee handbook stating that employment is at will precludes an employment contract other than at will based upon the terms of the employee handbook.'" Westenbarger v. St. Thomas Med. Ctr. (June 29, 1994), 9th Dist. No. 16119, 1994 WL 286022, quoting Wing v. Anchor Media, Ltd. of Texas (1991), 59 Ohio St.3d 108, 570 N.E.2d 1095, paragraph one of the syllabus.
{¶ 15} In their complaint, the Rigbys alleged that Fallsway's employee handbook alters the employment-at-will status of employees who were injured in the course of their employment. The Rigbys pointed to the portion of the handbook that states that "[e]mployees who sustain workrelated injuries are eligible for a medical leave of absence for the period of disability in accordance with all applicable laws covering occupational disabilities."
{¶ 16} In its motion for summary judgment, Fallsway attached a copy of its employee handbook, which contains the following provision entitled "Nature of Employment":
{¶ 17} "Employment with Fallsway is voluntarily entered into, and the employee is free to resign at will at any time, with or without cause. Similarly, Fallsway may terminate the employment relationship at will at any time, with or without notice or cause, so long as there is no violation of applicable federal or state law.
{¶ 18}
{¶ 19} Fallsway also attached the "Employee Acknowledgement Form," signed by Mr. Rigby, which states, "I acknowledge that this handbook is neither a contract of employment nor a legal document."
{¶ 20} In response to Fallsway's motion for summary judgment, the Rigbys asserted that the language in the employee handbook shows that Fallsway intended to treat employees injured on the job differently from employees who sought medical leave for other reasons. In support of this assertion, the Rigbys pointed to the deposition of Jackie Maynard, controller for Fallsway.2 In her deposition, the Rigbys asserted that Maynard distinguishes the disability provision in the employee handbook from the work-related injury provision. The Rigbys also attached the deposition of Scott Rainey, executive vice president of Fallsway. In his deposition, he...
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