Rigdon v. State
| Decision Date | 04 April 1899 |
| Parties | RIGDON et al. v. STATE. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Error to circuit court, Baker county; Rhydon M. Call, Judge.
Application by William P. Rigdon and others for bail. Bail was refused and accused bring error. Affirmed.
Syllabus by the Court
1. In an application for bail under an indictment for a capital offense, it devolves upon the accused to take the initiative and show from the testimony in the case, including that of the state, that the proof is not evident, nor the presumption great.
2. When names of witnesses are placed upon an indictment, the presumption is that all of the witnesses for the state are there given, and the applieant for bail need produce no other witnesses on behalf of the state. In case no witnesses are placed upon the indictment, and the state attorney furnishes to the accused a list of the witnesses relief on by the state in due time to secure their presence, he should produce their testimony as that of the state; and as to all the testimony produced as that of the state the right of cross-examination exists in favor of the accused, and he is not to be prejudiced thereby on the trial before the jury.
COUNSEL Alex. St. Clair-Abrams, for plaintiffs in error.
William B. Lamar, Atty. Gen., for the State.
Writ of error from decision of the circuit court on an application for bail.
Plaintiffs in error were indicted by a grand jury in Baker county for the murder of George P. Canova, and were taken into custody by the sheriff of that county. They applied to the circuit judge of the Fourth judical circuit for a writ of habeas corpus to have the cause of their detention inquired into and that they be discharged from custody or admitted to bail. The sworn application for the writ states that plaintiffs in error were detained in custody in the county jail of Baker county under a charge of murder, and had been refused bail without lawful authority; that they were innocent of the charge brought against them, and the proof against them was neither evidence, nor was the presumption great. The writ issued, and notice of the hearing was given to the state attorney.
Upon the production of the accused by the sheriff, with a return they proceeded to introduce evidence before the judge. The indictment was first read in evidence. It charged the accused with murder in the first degree, in the premeditated killing of George P. Canova on the 5th day of June, 1898, in Baker county, and had no witnesses indorsed on it. It appears that after the writ issued the state attorney delivered to the attorney for the accused a list of witnesses the state relied on in the case. The testimony introduced shows that the deceased was shot and killed at his house in Baker county on a Sunday night in June, 1898, but on what Sunday night, or the exact time of the night when the killing was done, is not definitely shown.
The accused testified in their own behalf, and their testimony in connection with other which they introduced, tended to establish for them an alibi during the night that Canova was killed. This testimony did not disclose any circumstances connected with the killing of the deceased, but was confined solely to an endeavor to establish an alibi. Upon the announcement of counsel for the accused that they rested their case, the state attorney informed the court that the state had no evidence to introduce, and the state's witnesses were present in court. Thereupon the accused moved for bail on the ground that the proof of the charge against them was not evident, nor was the presumption great. In refusing the motion, and in remanding the accused to the custody of the sheriff, the court made the following statement, viz.:
A question presented and argued under the ruling of the court is whether or not it is incumbent on an accused under an indictment for a capital offense to produce all the evidence in the case, including that of the state, in order that the court may determine the question of bail. The point of practice raised has not been directly passed on by this court. It was decided in Alabama (Ex parte Hammock, 78 Ala. 414) that, on application for bail by a person in custody under an indictment for murder, the production of the indictment makes out a prima facie case against him, and casts upon him the burden of adducing exculpatory evidence, but he is not required to introduce the witnesses for the state, although they be present in court, and if the evidence adduced by him, none being offered by the state, is such as to entitle him to bail, it should be granted. The decision by Leonard, C.J., in Ex parte Finlen, 20 Nev. 141, 18 P. 827, strongly supports the view that it devolves upon the accused, under an indictment for a capital offense, to produce all the evidence in the case, including that of the state, on application for bail. The accused in that case had been indicted for murder in the first degree, and his petition for bail contained allegations which, if true, showed the offense to be manslaughter. He produced all the testimony of the state in connection with that proposed by himself, and it was held that he could show the truth of the allegations in his petition by witnesses who testified before the grand jury, and by other witnesses, but the evidence to entitle him to bail must establish all the exculpatory facts without material conflict.
In Indiana it was held that the accused, under an indictment for a capital offense, must produce all the evidence, including that of the state. Ex parte Heffren, 27 Ind. 87. In that case the accused was required to produce the evidence upon which the state intended to rely for a conviction, and complaint was made of such ruling. The court held that the burden was upon the accused to show that the proof of his guilt was not evident, or the presumption great, and that in order to show this he must produce the evidence upon which the state intended to rely. The objection that the accused should not be required to produce the state's witnesses, because he would then not be permitted to cross-examine or contradict them, was met by holding that such right was not lost to him on such application. The cases cited are the only ones found bearing directly on the point. An accurate conception of the true...
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Ford v. Dilley
...take notice of their evidence which they by their oath are bound to conceal.” That this is the reason for the rule is said in Rigdon v. State, 41 Fla. 308, 26 South. 711; Regina v. Andrews, 2 Dowell, L. 10; Lumm v. State, 3 Ind. at 294; Ex parte Bryant, 34 Ala. 270; Chittey's Criminal Law, ......
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Ford v. Dilley
...notice of their evidence which they by their oath are bound to conceal". That this is the reason for the rule is said in Rigdon v. State, (Fla.) 41 Fla. 308, 26 So. 711; Regina v. Andrews, 2 Dowling & Loundes Pr. Lumm v. State, 3 Porter (Ind.) 293 at 294; Ex parte Bryant, 34 Ala. 270; Chitt......
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State v. Arthur
...proof is not evident and the presumption not great before being entitled to release on bail. 7 This rule originated in Rigdon v. State, 41 Fla. 308, 26 So. 711 (1899), where this Court stated that "(a)t common law ... after an indictment for a capital offense the accused was presumed guilty......
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Preston v. Gee
...that there was longstanding precedent holding that the accused bore the burden of proof. Id. at 719 (quoting Rigdon v. State, 41 Fla. 308, 26 So. 711, 712 (1899)). The court wrote that “[w]e can no longer ascribe to this procedure” and proceeded to explain why. Id. In contrast, the Arthur c......