Riggins v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co.
| Decision Date | 17 November 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. 2:14–cv–04171–SRB,2:14–cv–04171–SRB |
| Citation | 217 F.Supp.3d 1017 |
| Parties | Darnita RIGGINS, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. AMERICAN FAMILY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Missouri |
Christopher E. Roberts, David T. Butsch, Butsch Roberts & Associates LLC, Joe D. Jacobson, Jacobson Press & Fields PC, Clayton, MO, for Plaintiff.
Daniel David Williams, Boulder, CO, Jennifer K. Harrison, Ll. Rhyddid Watkins, Margaret Young Cass, Michael S. McCarthy, Denver, CO, Jeffrey A. Kennard, Lisa Bolliger, James D. Griffin, Scharnhorst Ast Kennard Griffin, PC, Kansas City, MO, for Defendant.
Before the Court is Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. #160). For the reasons stated below, the motion is DENIED.
Plaintiff Darnita Riggins brings this action on behalf of herself and seeks to represent a class of similarly-situated individuals in Missouri who, like her, received an Actual Cash Value ("ACV") payment from Defendant American Family Mutual Insurance Company for physical loss or damage to their residences or other structures that included a depreciation factor applied to the cost of labor. Plaintiff claims that the plain language of her homeowners' policy does not allow Defendant to depreciate labor costs in calculating ACV, and Defendant therefore breached its agreement with her and potential class members whose policies included the same language. Plaintiff further claims this action is appropriate for class resolution, which is an issue that will be decided separately based on Plaintiff's pending motion for class certification. By the present motion, however, Defendant asks the Court to grant summary judgment in its favor and find that Plaintiff does not have standing to state her individual claims because her ACV payment, even though it included depreciated labor costs, also included an ACV component that estimated repair or replacement of her screens to be higher than what she later paid to repair or replace the screens, and this surplus more than offset any labor cost depreciation. The Court finds that the contract language at issue requires Defendant to pay ACV without labor costs being depreciated regardless of whether the insured later repairs or replaces at all and regardless of whether the insured later repairs or replaces for less than the estimate included in an ACV calculation.
A moving party is entitled to summary judgment on a claim "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Material facts are those "that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law," and a genuine dispute over a material fact is one "such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).
"Summary judgment is appropriate if the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the [nonmovant] and giving [the nonmovant] the benefit of all reasonable inferences, shows there are no genuine issues of material fact and [the movant] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Price v. N. States Power Co. , 664 F.3d 1186, 1191 (8th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). "Once the moving party has made and supported their motion, the nonmoving party must proffer admissible evidence demonstrating a genuine dispute as to a material fact." Holden v. Hirner , 663 F.3d 336, 340 (8th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). A party opposing summary judgment "may not rest upon mere allegation or denials of his pleading, but must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson , 477 U.S. at 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505. "Mere allegations, unsupported by specific facts or evidence beyond the nonmoving party's own conclusions, are insufficient to withstand a motion for summary judgment."
Thomas v. Corwin , 483 F.3d 516, 526–27 (8th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). Summary judgment should not be granted if a reasonable jury could find for the nonmoving party. Woodsmith Publ'g Co. v. Meredith Corp. , 904 F.2d 1244, 1247 (8th Cir. 1990) (citing Anderson , 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505 ).
Many of the facts relied on by the parties are uncontroverted. Considering the parties' factual positions as well as the record made at the in-person hearing held on October 28, 2016, in the light most favorable to Plaintiff as the non-moving party, the Court finds the relevant facts to be as follows:
Plaintiff is a St. Louis homeowner and longtime American Family policyholder, owning policies covering both her primary home and a separate rental residence. Plaintiff's homeowners' policy on her primary residence provides in relevant part:
(Doc. #161–2, p. 20). The policy defines ACV as "the amount it costs to repair or replace property with property of like kind and quality less depreciation for physical deterioration and obsolescence." (Doc. #161–2, p. 25). The policy also provides that an insured may apply for an additional payment should the cost to repair or replace exceed the ACV payment:
(Doc. #161–2, p. 21). The policy does not provide that an ACV payment will be reduced and does not require the insured to return any portion of an ACV payment should the insured subsequently repair or replace the property for less than the ACV payment amount.
On April 28, 2012, a hail storm damaged the roof, gutters, screens, and solar lights of Plaintiff's residence. Three weeks later, Plaintiff made a claim under her homeowners' policy for the damage. On or around two days later, Defendant paid Plaintiff its estimate of ACV. To reach its total ACV estimate, Defendant summed the estimated replacement costs for the exterior roof, gutters, screens, and patio roof, which amounted to $4,491.80. Defendant then deducted $368.74 for depreciation and $250.00 for the deductible to arrive at the payment amount of $3,873.06. Of the $368.74 deduction for depreciation, $189.74 was depreciated labor costs. Within its ACV calculation, Defendant estimated the replacement cost of Plaintiff's screens to be $729.06. Sometime later, however, Plaintiff repaired her screens for $300.
This is Defendant's second motion for summary judgment. In its first motion Defendant asked the Court to declare that the ACV policy definition—"the amount it costs to repair or replace property with property of like kind and quality less depreciation for physical deterioration and obsolescence"—allows Defendant to depreciate the entire estimated cost of repair, including materials and labor, in calculating Plaintiff's ACV payment. The Court found, however, that the phrase "for physical deterioration and obsolescence" limits the type of depreciation that may be factored into an ACV calculation, and as a result, Defendant's calculation of the ACV payment due to Plaintiff, which included a depreciation factor applied to the entire estimated cost of repair including labor, was improper. Defendant now argues and asks the Court to find that even though labor costs should not have been depreciated, Plaintiff suffered no injury because any deficiency in the ACV calculation was offset by the $429.06 overpayment with respect to Plaintiff's screens. Plaintiff counters that the plain contract language requires Defendant to pay full ACV without labor costs depreciated regardless of subsequent events.
"The interpretation of an insurance policy is a question of law to be determined by the Court." Lafollette v. Liberty Mutual Fire Ins. Co. , 139 F.Supp.3d 1017, 1021 (W.D. Mo. 2015) (citing Mendota Ins. Co. v. Lawson , 456 S.W.3d 898, 903 (Mo. Ct. App. 2015) ). "Missouri courts read insurance contracts ‘as a whole and determine the intent of the parties, giving effect to that intent by enforcing the contract as written.’ " Id. (citing Thiemann v. Columbia Pub. Sch. Dist. , 338 S.W.3d 835, 840 (Mo. Ct. App. 2011) ). " ‘If, giving the language used its plain and ordinary meaning, the intent of the parties is clear and unambiguous, we cannot resort to rules of construction to interpret the contract.’ " Mendota Ins. Co. , 456 S.W.3d at 903 (citing Thiemann , 338 S.W.3d at 840 ).
"Mere disagreement over the interpretation of the terms of a contract does not create an ambiguity." Id. "In examining...
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