Mendota Ins. Co. v. Lawson
| Decision Date | 24 March 2015 |
| Docket Number | WD 77483,C/w WD 77484 |
| Citation | 456 S.W.3d 898 |
| Parties | Mendota Insurance Company, Respondent, v. Diane Lawson, et al., Appellants. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Ellen J. Brooke, St. Louis, MO, for respondent.
Kirk R. Presley and James H. Thompson, Jr., Kansas City, MO, for appellant.
Before Division Three: Victor C. Howard, Presiding Judge, James E. Welsh, Judge and Gary D. Witt, Judge
Diane Lawson (“Lawson”) and Heather Burlingame (“Burlingame”) appeal from the trial court's summary judgment rulings in favor of Mendota Insurance Company (“Mendota”) arising out of an action for wrongful death. In the proceedings below, based on stipulated facts, the trial court found that a personal automobile insurance policy between Lawson's deceased husband and Mendota was clear and unambiguous, that the policy was valid and enforceable, and that Mendota had no duty to defend or indemnify. The trial court thus denied Lawson's and Burlingame's motions for summary judgment, granted Mendota's motion for summary judgment, and granted Mendota's motion to dismiss Lawson's counter-claim. Lawson and Burlingame appeal these rulings. We affirm.
The key facts are stipulated by the parties. On June 3, 2012, Terry W. Lawson (“Terry”)1 and Jeffery King (“King”) were killed in an automobile accident when a 2001 Chevrolet S–10 pickup truck (the “Chevrolet”), owned and operated by Terry, struck a ditch and overturned. Terry's wife, Lawson, is King's natural mother. She filed a wrongful death action against Terry's personal representative, Burlingame.2 Lawson alleged that Terry's negligent conduct caused King's wrongful death. Lawson obtained a judgment of more than three million dollars finding that Terry was negligent and that the negligence caused King's death.
Two automobiles, a 2005 Dodge Stratus (the “Dodge”) and a 2006 Pontiac GT (the “Pontiac”), were listed in the declarations section of Lawson's policy with Mendota (the “Policy”). The Policy provided liability coverage of $25,000 per person and $50,000 per occurrence for those two vehicles. Additionally, the Chevrolet was a declared vehicle in a separate policy that Terry held with Progressive Casualty Insurance Company (“Progressive”). The parties settled regarding all matters concerning the Progressive policy, and Progressive is not part of this appeal.
Mendota brought a declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration of its rights and obligations under the Policy. Inter alia, Mendota sought a judicial declaration that no liability coverage exists for any wrongful death claims, that the policy exclusions are valid and enforceable, that the policy exclusions apply to the facts of this case, that Mendota has no duty to defend the personal representative of Terry's estate, and that Mendota has no duty to indemnify the personal representative of Terry's estate.
Lawson filed a counter-claim against Mendota under Section 379.2003 for bad faith failure to defend Burlingame in the underlying action that led to the judgment of more than three million dollars because Mendota had agreed to defend Burlingame only under a reservation of rights. Lawson alleged that Mendota is obligated to indemnify Terry's personal representative under the policy for damages flowing from its breach of the duty to defend and provide coverage.4
As noted above, Mendota, Lawson, and Burlingame each filed motions for summary judgment based on the stipulated facts and the terms of the Policy, and Mendota filed a motion to dismiss Lawson's counter-claim. The trial court granted Mendota's motion for summary judgment, overruled Lawson's and Burlingame's motions for summary judgment, and dismissed Lawson's counter-claim.
The following provisions from the Policy are at issue:
Lawson and Burlingame bring three points of error, the first two asserting that the trial court erred in finding the Policy valid and enforceable and granting summary judgment in favor of Mendota and denying Lawson's and Burlingame's motions for summary judgment and dismissing Lawson's counter-claim. In their first point, more specifically, the appellants argue that the Policy's owned-auto exclusion violates the Missouri Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law (“MVFRL”) because the Policy designates that coverage is granted with respect to the Chevrolet and because Section 303.190.2 accordingly requires that the Policy provide coverage. In their second point, the appellants argue that the Policy is ambiguous because when the insuring agreement and the owned-auto exclusion are considered together, the Policy purports to provide coverage to the named insured for the use of any auto but then attempts to take away that coverage. In the third point, the appellants argue that the trial court erred in dismissing Lawson's counter-claim because it states a claim upon which relief can be granted.
We address the issues out of order, first resolving the threshold matter of whether the Policy's insuring agreement in the Liability portion applies to this accident. We then address whether Exclusion B applies (Point II) and whether the MVFRL applies (Point I).
Our Supreme Court has set forth our standard for reviewing summary judgment rulings:
Summary judgment is appropriate only when the moving party demonstrates that there is no genuine dispute as to the facts and that the facts as admitted show a legal right to judgment for the movant. The movant bears the burden of establishing both a legal right to judgment and the absence of any genuine issue of material fact required to support the claimed right to judgment. The propriety of summary judgment is purely an issue of law, and this Court's review is essentially de novo. As the trial court's judgment is founded on the record submitted and the law, an appellate court need not defer to the trial court's order granting summary judgment.
Bob DeGeorge Assoc.'s, Inc. v. Hawthorn Bank, 377 S.W.3d 592, 596 (Mo. banc 2012) (quoting ITT Commercial Fin. Corp. v. Mid–Am. Marine Supply Corp., 854 S.W.2d 371, 380 (Mo. banc 1993) ) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Additionally, the interpretation of an insurance policy is a question of law that we also determine de novo. Seeck v. Geico Gen. Ins. Co., 212 S.W.3d 129, 132 (Mo. banc 2007) (citations omitted); Blumer v. Auto. Club Inter–Ins. Exch., 340 S.W.3d 214, 218 (Mo.App.W.D.2011) ().
Given that the issue is solely one of interpretation of an insurance policy, we note at the outset that “[w]e read a contract as a whole and determine the intent of the parties, giving effect to that intent by enforcing the contract as written.”Thiemann v. Columbia Pub. Sch. Dist., 338 S.W.3d 835, 840 (Mo.App.W.D.2011) (citation omitted). Put another way, “[w]e do not interpret insurance policy provisions in isolation but rather evaluate the policy in terms of a whole.” Durbin v. Deitrick, 323 S.W.3d 122, 125 (Mo. App. W.D. 2010) (citing Ritchie v. Allied Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 307 S.W.3d 132, 135 (Mo. banc 2009) ).
In so doing, we give the language in an insurance contract its plain and ordinary meaning. Thiemann, 338 S.W.3d at 840 (citation omitted). “If, giving the language used its plain and ordinary meaning, the intent of the parties is clear and unambiguous, we cannot resort to rules of construction to interpret the contract.” Id. Mere disagreement over the interpretation of the terms of a contract does not create an ambiguity. Id. In examining whether the language used in an insurance policy is ambiguous, the language is normally considered in the light in which it would normally be understood by the lay person who bought and paid for the policy. Blumer, 340 S.W.3d at 218 (citation omitted).
If the policy does not contain an ambiguity, the insurance contract will be enforced as written. Fanning v. Progressive N.w. Ins. Co., 412 S.W.3d 360, 364 (Mo.App. W.D. 2013) (). Where an ambiguity exists, we construe the policy language against the insurer. Blumer, 340 S.W.3d at 218 (citation omitted). “An ambiguity exists when there is duplicity, indistinctness, or uncertainty in the meaning of the language in the policy.” Seeck, 212 S.W.3d at 132. “This rule is especially applicable where insurance is first ‘granted’ and is then followed by provisions limiting or avoiding liability.” Rice v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 301 S.W.3d 43, 47 (Mo. banc 2009) (citation omitted). When determining whether an ambiguity exists, “ ‘[w]ords or phrases in an insurance contract must be interpreted by the court in the context of the policy as a whole and are not to be considered in isolation.’ ” Fanning, 412 S.W.3d at 364 (citing Miller v. Ho Kun Yun, 400 S.W.3d 779, 784 (Mo.App.W.D.2013) ).
“To test whether the language used in the policy is ambiguous, the language is considered in the light in which it would normally be understood by the lay person who bought and paid for the...
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