Riggle v. State

• Decision Date: 16 July 2020
• Docket Number: Court of Appeals Case No. 20A-CR-357
• Citation: 151 N.E.3d 766
• Parties: Tyler Wesley RIGGLE, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

151 N.E.3d 766

Tyler Wesley RIGGLE, Appellant-Defendant,

v.STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.

Court of Appeals Case No. 20A-CR-357

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

Filed July 16, 2020

Attorney for Appellant: Philip R. Skodinski, South Bend, Indiana

Attorneys for Appellee: Curtis T. Hill, Jr., Attorney General of Indiana, Caroline G. Templeton, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana

Friedlander, Senior Judge.

[1] Tyler Riggle appeals his conviction of unlawful possession of a syringe, a Level 6 felony.¹ We affirm.

[2] In July 2018, Riggle was found lying face down near the entrance to the Four Winds Casino, which is located in St. Joseph County on tribal land of the Pokagon Tribe. Riggle was blue-gray in color, unresponsive with very shallow, occasional breathing, and his eyes had rolled back in his head. Police officers arrived on the scene and administered a dose of Narcan. Medics arrived, administered a second dose of Narcan, and prepared to transport Riggle to the hospital. For the medics' safety, one of the officers performed a pat-down search of Riggle prior to him being transported. In Riggle's front pants pocket, the officer found a syringe containing liquid, two empty syringes, a metal spoon, a cotton swab, and a cellophane wrapper. Subsequent testing revealed that the liquid in the syringe contained heroin.

[3] Based upon this incident, the State charged Riggle with unlawful possession of a syringe, a Level 6 felony. A jury convicted Riggle of this offense, and the court sentenced him to 464 days. Riggle now appeals.

[4] Riggle contends the State's evidence was not sufficient to support his conviction. His argument is two-fold: (1) Riggle asserts the State's evidence was insufficient to establish that his criminal offense was governed by state law; and (2) he claims that the State did not prove he is non-Indian.² We address these claims in turn.

[5] When we review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of the witnesses. Sandleben v. State , 29 N.E.3d 126 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied . Instead, we consider only the evidence most favorable to the verdict and any reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. Id. If there is substantial evidence of probative value from which a reasonable fact-finder could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, the verdict will not be disturbed. Labarr v. State , 36 N.E.3d 501 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015).

1. Territorial Jurisdiction

[6] Noting the offense occurred on Pokagon tribal property, Riggle argues the State's evidence was insufficient to establish it had jurisdiction over this offense. Particularly, Riggle claims the State's witness, who testified concerning whether state law applied in this case, did not qualify as an expert.

[7] Territorial jurisdiction is the authority of the State to prosecute a person for an act committed within the State's territorial boundaries. Ortiz v. State , 766 N.E.2d 370 (Ind. 2002) ; see Ind. Code § 35-41-1-1(b)(1) (2009) (a person may be convicted of crime under Indiana law if either conduct or result that is element of offense, or both, occur in Indiana). Although territorial jurisdiction is not necessarily thought of as an element of the offense, the State is required to prove it beyond a reasonable doubt. Ortiz , 766 N.E.2d 370.

[8] Evidence Rule 702 concerns expert witness testimony and provides:

(a) A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if the expert's scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.

(b) Expert scientific testimony is admissible only if the court is satisfied that the expert testimony rests upon reliable scientific principles.

[9] Evidence Rule 701, on the other hand, provides: "If a witness is not testifying as an expert, testimony in the form of an opinion is limited to one that is: (a) rationally based on the witness's perception; and (b) helpful to a clear understanding of the witness's testimony or to a determination of a fact in issue." Rule 701 encompasses persons whom the courts have labeled "skilled witnesses." A.J.R. v. State , 3 N.E.3d 1000, 1003 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). A skilled witness is a person who possesses specialized knowledge short of that necessary to be declared an expert under Evidence Rule 702 but beyond that possessed by an ordinary juror. Id. Not only can skilled witnesses testify about their observations, but also they can testify to opinions or inferences that are based solely on facts within their own personal knowledge. Hawkins v. State , 884 N.E.2d 939 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied . It is within the trial court's discretion to determine whether a witness is qualified to give an opinion. Id.

[10] Here, the State never contended its witness, Sergeant Schaaf, was an expert. Therefore, his opinion must be examined under Rule 701. Accordingly, as indicated by the rule, the Sergeant's opinion must be rationally based on his perception of the facts—this simply means that the opinion must be one that a reasonable person could normally form from the perceived facts, which are facts received by the witness directly through any of his own senses. Satterfield v. State , 33 N.E.3d 344 (Ind. 2015).

[11] At trial, once the State rested, defense counsel moved for a judgment on the evidence on the basis that the State's evidence was not "sufficient to establish the crime alleged and defined by statute." Tr. Vol. 2, p. 73. After response by the State, the court denied the motion and asked defense counsel if he had another basis for the motion. Counsel responded that "the only other basis is whether or not the offense occurred in the State of Indiana or whether it occurred on an Indian[ ] reservation." Id. The court then clarified:

THE COURT: So your argument is that the Pokagon Tribe, the Indian tribe, is a separate, distinct nation, and that had this offense occurred on tribal land that the proper venue or for[u]m would have been the tribal courts; is that your argument in a nutshell?

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Yes, basically yes.

THE COURT: And that the State lacks jurisdiction to prosecute this case because the crime, Possession of Syringe, was committed not in the State of Indiana but in the Pokagon Nation?

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Yes.

Id. at 75.

[12] Over defense objection, the court allowed the State to reopen its case and recall one of its witnesses to address the defense motion. The State recalled Sergeant Schaaf, an officer with the Pokagon Band Tribal Police Department. As the State began to question Sergeant Schaaf, defense counsel objected to his testimony on the basis that there was "no indication that he's an expert on tribal jurisdiction and law." Id. at 89. The court ruled, "I guess the objection would be sustained" and instructed the State to "lay a better foundation." Id. at 89, 90. The State then questioned Sergeant Schaaf as follows:

Q How long have you been a law enforcement officer for Pokagon?

A Over five years.

Q And have you received any training or experience related to the enforcement of laws on Pokagon property?

A Yes. We have an extensive field training process I was put through which lays a basic foundation. In terms of specialized training, the U.S. Attorney's Office up in Grand Rapids puts on a class called Criminal Jurisdiction in Indian Country which provides information as to specific jurisdiction considerations when enforcing law on reservation land.

Q Did you take that class?

A I did.

Q And based upon your knowledge from that class, can you describe to the jury what that means as far as imposing the law on Pokagon land?

A It's a complicated situation. There's a lot of moving parts as far as it goes. In any given case we have three courts that may have jurisdiction or may not have jurisdiction over a matter. There's the Pokagon Tribal courts. There is[sic] the state courts of Michigan or Indiana respectively depending on where we're working. And there's also the federal courts. We take into account whether the suspect is [N]ative or non-[N]ative, the victim is Native or non-Native, and the specific offense that's in question to determine which court has exclusive jurisdiction or concurrent jurisdiction over that particular case.

* * * * * * *

Q If Mr. Riggle was not a [N]ative to the Pokagon property, would there be any ability to prosecute him under the tribal laws for a victimless offense?

A There would not be. The Pokagon Tribal Court and any tribal court for that matter has no criminal jurisdiction over a non-[N]ative person.

Q So describe how – we started talking about being sworn in multiple jurisdictions. How does that relate to your ability to enforce the laws of the State of Indiana on a non-[N]ative person?

A We are special deputies in the County of St. Joseph, and that's an authority bestowed onto us by the current sheriff. That special deputization is the only tool that we have to enforce [the] law on a non-[N]ative person outside of our federal jurisdiction.

* * * * * * *

Q So in the case of unlawful possession of a syringe, where would the jurisdiction lie for that based upon your training?

A State court.

Id. at 90-91, 92.

[13] Defense counsel lodged no further objection to Sergeant Schaaf's testimony, and cross examined him, in part, as follows:

Q Are any of these principles laid down in cases or statutes?

A Yes. Specifically the fact that a tribal court does not have criminal jurisdiction over a non-[N]ative, that's based on case law to the best of my understanding.

* * * * * * *

Q Where in the Pokagon law does it say that it doesn't apply to a non[-][N]ative?

A It would be a case law situation rather than —

Q Case law from where?

A I would have to look it up. It was part of our training. I don't have all the case law memorized.

* * * * * * *

Q I'm asking you about what you were taught when you were taught by

...