A.J.R. v. State

• Decision Date: 23 January 2014
• Docket Number: No. 46A03–1306–JV–243.,46A03–1306–JV–243.
• Citation: 3 N.E.3d 1000
• Parties: A.J.R., Appellant–Respondent, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee–Petitioner.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

3 N.E.3d 1000

A.J.R., Appellant–Respondent,

v.STATE of Indiana, Appellee–Petitioner.

No. 46A03–1306–JV–243.

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

Jan. 23, 2014.

L. Scott Pejic, DiMartino & Pejic, LLP, Michigan City, IN, Attorney for Appellant.

Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, Justin F. Roebel, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.

OPINION

ROBB, Judge.

Case Summary and Issues

A.J.R. appeals the juvenile court's adjudication of A.J.R. as a delinquent based on conduct that would be criminal mischief, cruelty to animals, and aiding, inducing, or causing criminal mischief if committed by an adult. He raises three issues on appeal: (1) whether admission of certain testimony given by a police officer without notice from the State that the officer would testify as a skilled witness was an abuse of discretion; (2) whether there was sufficient evidence to prove A.J.R. shot two cattle; (3) assuming he shot the cattle, whether there was sufficient evidence to prove his acts constituted mutilation or torture of an animal. We hold that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the officer's testimony, and the evidence is sufficient to prove A.J.R. shot two cattle and to sustain his adjudications for criminal mischief. However, concluding A.J.R.'s actions did not constitute mutilation or torture of an animal, we reverse his adjudications for cruelty to an animal. Accordingly, we affirm in part and reverse in part.

Facts and Procedural History

On the evening of November 28, 2012, seventeen-year-old A.J.R. and fourteen-year-old C.C. were cruising the county roads of LaPorte County while coyote hunting. The two teenagers had gone hunting together approximately thirty times before. On this particular occasion, the boys were hunting with a semi-automatic AR–15–style rifle, which was a gift from C.C.'s father. During the outing, they observed several coyotes but had no success in killing one. The boys left their hunting location driving A.J.R.'s black Jeep and turned onto County Road 500 South. They came upon a pasture of cattle, at which point A.J.R. said “let's shoot those cows.” Transcript Vol. I at 101. A.J.R. turned the vehicle around, positioning the driver's side of the vehicle nearest to the pasture. He picked up C.C.'s rifle, leaned out the driver's side window, and fired two shots into a herd of cattle.

A.J.R. then turned left onto County Road 425 West and approached another cattle pasture on the passenger's side of the vehicle. A.J.R. stopped the vehicle and told C.C. to shoot the cattle. C.C. took the rifle and fired one shot out of the passenger window at a cow approximately ten yards away, striking it in the head.

The cattle in both pastures were owned by Glen Minich, who lives nearby. Minich was home that evening and heard what sounded like gunshots coming from close-by. Minich walked out to his porch and saw a dark-colored vehicle driving slowly down the road. He observed the vehicle stop next to one of his cattle lots and heard one gunshot ring out from that direction. After the shot, the vehicle drove away.

Minich and his wife first drove to the cattle lot on County Road 500 South and found that two of their cattle had been shot. Both cows were lying on the ground: the first had a wound on its head and the other had no visible wound but was moaning and unresponsive. Both cattle were deceased within thirty minutes of the incident.

While driving to the location of the second shooting, Minich saw a dark-colored Jeep driving down the road and followed it. The Jeep eventually pulled over, and Minich identified A.J.R. as the driver. Minich had a brief conversation with A.J.R. during which A.J.R. denied shooting the cattle. Minich obtained the Jeep's license plate number and called the police.

The same evening, both A.J.R. and C.C. made statements to the police. C.C. was interviewed first. He initially denied any knowledge of the incident but later admitted to shooting one of the cattle and also implicated A.J.R. A.J.R. was interviewed later and initially denied any knowledge of the incident; however, after he was informed C.C. made a statement, A.J.R. admitted to driving the vehicle when the cattle were shot.

On December 9, 2012, the State alleged A.J.R. was a delinquent juvenile based on acts that, if committed by an adult, would constitute one count of aiding, inducing, or causing criminal recklessness, a Class D felony; two counts of criminal recklessness, Class D felonies; three counts of cruelty to an animal, Class D felonies; two counts of criminal mischief, Class A misdemeanors; and one count of aiding, inducing, or causing criminal mischief, a Class A misdemeanor. A two-day fact-finding hearing was held on May 10 and May 17, 2012. On May 20, 2012, the juvenile court issued an order finding the State had met its burden of proving A.J.R. committed two counts of cruelty to an animal, two counts of criminal mischief, and aiding, inducing, or causing criminal mischief. Accordingly, A.J.R. was adjudicated a delinquent on those counts. The court ordered A.J.R. to serve a thirty-day suspended jail sentence and probation and to complete fifty hours of community service. A.J.R. filed a motion to correct error, which was denied. This appeal followed. Additional facts will be supplied as necessary.

Discussion and Decision

I. Skilled Witness Testimony

A.J.R. challenges the juvenile court's admission of opinion testimony offered by LaPorte County Sheriff's Deputy Troy Ryan at the fact-finding hearing. The admission of evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial court, and the trial court's ruling is reviewed only for an abuse of discretion. Hale v. State, 976 N.E.2d 119, 123 (Ind.Ct.App.2012). An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court's decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances. Id.

Indiana Evidence Rule 701 provides that lay witnesses may provide testimony in the form of opinions or inferences, so long as the testimony is “(a) rationally based on the perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a clear understanding of the witness's testimony or the determination of a fact in issue.” This rule encompasses persons whom the courts have labeled “skilled witnesses.” Kubsch v. State, 784 N.E.2d 905, 922 (Ind.2003). A skilled witness is a person who possesses specialized knowledge short of that necessary to be declared an expert under Indiana Evidence Rule 702 but beyond that possessed by an ordinary juror. Id. “Skilled witnesses not only can testify about their observations, they can also testify to opinions or inferences that are based solely on facts within their own personal knowledge.” Hawkins v. State, 884 N.E.2d 939, 944 (Ind.Ct.App.2008) (citation omitted), trans. denied. It is within the trial court's discretion to determine whether a witness is qualified to give an opinion. Id.

Officer Ryan was on duty the night of the incident and investigated the area where the two shootings occurred. Officer Ryan testified that he was a member of the Emergency Response Team, and as part of that duty, he handled and was familiar with military-style equipment such as the M–16 rifle. He testified that he was familiar with the AR –15 style of rifle used in the shootings, because it and the M–16 are “pretty much the same platform.” Tr. Vol. I at 58. At the scene of the first shooting, he observed two .233 caliber shell casings—the same caliber used in C.C.'s rifle—located in the road near the pasture. Officer Ryan testified that based on the location of the shell casings and the way assault rifles eject shell casings, it was his opinion that the shots were more likely fired from the driver's side than the passenger's side of a westbound-facing vehicle. A.J.R. essentially makes two arguments against the admission of Officer Ryan's opinion testimony. First, he asserts that the admission of such testimony without prior notice from the State deprived A.J.R. of his constitutional right to a fair fact-finding hearing. Second, he contends there was insufficient foundation to allow Officer Ryan's skilled witness testimony.

First, A.J.R. asserts that it was fundamentally unfair to permit Officer Ryan to offer skilled witness testimony without the State providing advance notice to him. He alludes to his general right to receive a fair fact-finding hearing. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ....”); see also In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 30–31, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1966) (holding the Due Process Clause applies to juvenile delinquency proceedings). However, A.J.R. offers no additional authority that would lead us to believe explicit notice of skilled witness testimony is constitutionally required to facilitate a fair trial. He provides no citation to a statute, evidentiary rule, trial rule, or court decision supporting his argument, and we are aware of none. We note, as the juvenile court did, that Officer Ryan was identified as an investigating officer on the scene, and A.J.R. did have notice that Officer Ryan was a potential State's witness. ¹ A.J.R.'s attorney was able to conduct effective cross-examination of Officer Ryan, and A.J.R.'s claim that a lack of more specific notice hindered his ability to present an adequate defense is weakened by the fact that he did not request a continuance. Admission of Officer Ryan's opinion testimony did not deprive A.J.R. of his right to due process and a fair fact-finding hearing.

Alternatively, A.J.R. argues Officer Ryan's opinion testimony was inadmissible due to lack of foundation. Specifically, A.J.R. asserts Officer Ryan's testimony was not “rationally based on [his] perception,” Ind. Evidence Rule 701, because he did not actually witness the position of the vehicle or the rifle when the shots were fired. We disagree with the contention that a proper foundation was not laid....