Rignach v. United States
| Decision Date | 11 January 2017 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. 16-24394-CIV-GAYLES,CASE NO. 14-20401-CR-GAYLES |
| Parties | KARIN L. RIGNACH, Movant, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida |
This matter is before the Court upon Movant's pro se motion to vacate, filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2255 and the memorandum of law in support thereof, attacking the constitutionality of her sentence for conspiracy to commit money laundering, entered following a guilty plea in case no. 14-Cr-20401-Gayles.
This cause was referred to the undersigned for consideration and report pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1)(B),(C); S.D.Fla. Local Rule 1(f) governing Magistrate Judges; S.D. Fla. Admin. Order 2003-19; and Rules 8 and 10 Governing Section 2255 Cases in the United States District Courts.
No order to show cause was issued because, on the face of the motion, together with the underling criminal record, it is evident the Movant is not entitled to any relief. See Rule 4, Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings.1
In issuing this report, the undersigned has carefully reviewedand considered the instant motion, (CV-DE#1), the memoradum of law in support of the motion (CV-DE#4), the Presentence Investigation Report ("PSI"), the PSI Addenda, the Statement of Reasons ("SOR"), the transcripts of the change of plea and sentencing hearings (CR-DE#64; CR-DE#65), and all relevant portions of the underlying criminal file.
Construing the §2255 motion liberally, as afforded pro se litigants pursuant to Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972), the Movant raises the following grounds for relief: (1) that Amendment 794 to U.S.S.G. §3B1.2, which took effect on November 1, 2015, after Movant's sentencing hearing, applies to her case and makes her eligible for a minor-role reduction to her sentence; and (2) that her counsel was ineffective for not requesting a minor role reduction at sentencing and for not requesting a continuance of the sentencing hearing so she can benefit from Amendment 794. (CV-DE#4).
Briefly, the Movant was charged with one count of conspiracy to commit money laundering.(CR-DE#3). Movant pled guilty. (CR-DE#49; CR-DE#64). Prior to sentencing, a PSI was prepared, which revealed that the base offense level was set at 20, pursuant to U.S.S.G. §2S1.1(a)(2), which provides that an offense involving money laundering has a base offense level of eight (8) plus the number of offense levels from the table in §2B1.1 corresponding to the value of the funds. (PSI ¶27). Because Movant was accountable for $276,960, her base offense level was increased by twelve (12) levels pursuant to §2B1.1(b)(1)(G), totaling 20. (PSI ¶27). An additional six-level increase was added to the base offense level pursuant to §2S1.1(b)(1) and an additional two-level increase wasadded to the base offense level pursuant to §2S1.1(b)(2)(B). (PSI ¶¶28, 29). Thus, the adjusted offense level was 28. (PSI ¶33). The probation officer recommended a three-level adjustment for acceptance of responsibility pursuant to §3E1.1(a) and §3E1.1(b). (PSI ¶¶35, 36). The total offense level was 25. (PSI ¶37).
Regarding the role assessment, the probation officer found that Movant and her codefendant were equally culpable in the conspiracy. (PSI ¶23). They conspired together to launder illegal drug proceeds for unindicted co-conspirators in Peru, and they were each responsible for the seizure of funds which amounted to $276,960. (PSI ¶23). The probation officer did not recommend an aggravating or mitigating role adjustment either for Movant or for her codefendant. (PSI ¶23).
The probation officer determined that Movant had zero criminal history points, resulting in a criminal history category I. (PSI ¶40). Based on a total offense level of 25 and a criminal history category I, the Movant's advisory guideline range was between 57 months imprisonment at the low end, and 71 months imprisonment at the high end. (PSI ¶71). Statutorily, Movant faced a term of imprisonment from 0 to 20 years, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1956(a)(1). (PSI ¶70).
Prior to sentencing, Movant filed a sentencing memorandum, asking the court for a downward variance from the recommended guideline sentence based on her family circumstances, assistance to the government, and a combination of other factors. (CR-DE#55).
The sentencing hearing was held on March 31, 2015. (CR-DE#61). Review of the Statement of Reasons and of the transcript of the sentencing hearing, reveals that the district court adopted the presentence investigation report without change and imposed a sentence below the advisory guideline range, finding that adownward variance was appropriate. (SOR; CR-DE#65:27). Thereafter, the court sentenced Movant to a total term of thirty (30) months imprisonment, followed by two (2) years of supervised release. (CR-DE#65:28; CR-DE#63).
The judgment was entered by the clerk on March 31, 2015. (CR-DE#63). Movant did not appeal her conviction and sentence. Therefore, for purposes of the federal one-year limitations period, Movant's judgment of conviction in the underlying criminal case became final on April 14, 2015, fourteen (14) days after the entry of the judgment, when the time for filing a notice of appeal expired. Thus, Movant's instant motion, which was executed2 on October 10, 2016, is outside the one-year statutory limitations period.
Because collateral review is not a substitute for direct appeal, the grounds for collateral attack on final judgments pursuant to §2255 are extremely limited. A prisoner is entitled to relief under §2255 if the court imposed a sentence that (1) violated the Constitution or laws of the United States, (2) exceeded its jurisdiction, (3) exceeded the maximum authorized by law, or (4) is otherwise subject to collateral attack. See 28 U.S.C. §2255(a); McKay v. United States, 657 F.3d 1190, 1194 n.8 (11th Cir. 2011).
The Eleventh Circuit has promulgated a two-part inquiry that a district court must consider before determining whether a movant's claim is cognizable. First, a district court must find that "a defendant assert[ed] all available claims on direct appeal." Frady, 456 U.S. at 152; McCoy v. United States, 266 F.3d 1245, 1258 (11th Cir. 2001); Mills v. United States, 36 F.3d 1052, 1055 (11th Cir. 1994). Second, a district court must consider whether the type of relief the movant seeks is appropriate under §2255. This is because "[r]elief under 28 U.S.C. §2255 is reserved for transgressions of constitutional rights and for that narrow compass of other injury that could not have been raised in direct appeal and would, if condoned, result in a complete miscarriage of justice." Lynn, 365 F.3d at 1232-33 (quoting Richards v. United States, 837 F.2d 965, 966 (11th Cir. 1988) (internal quotations omitted)); see also Spencer v. United States, 773 F.3d 1132, 1138 (11th Cir. 2014) (en banc), cert denied, 135 S.Ct. 2836 (2015). The Spencer court noted that a misapplication of the sentencing guidelines can never rise to the level of a fundamental "miscarriage of justice" necessary to make a §2255 claim cognizable. Spencer, 773 F.3d at 1143-44.
If a court finds a claim brought pursuant to §2255 to be valid, the court "shall vacate and set the judgment aside and shall discharge the prisoner or resentence him or grant a new trial or correct the sentence as may appear appropriate." 28 U.S.C. §2255(b). To obtain this relief on collateral review, a movant must "clear a significantly higher hurdle than would exist on direct appeal." Frady, 456 U.S. at 166, 102 S.Ct. at 1584 ().
Section 2255 further provides that unless "the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoneris entitled to no relief," the court shall "grant a prompt hearing thereon, determine the issues and make findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect thereto." 28 U.S.C. §2255(b). However, "if the record refutes the applicant's factual allegations or otherwise precludes habeas relief, a district court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing." Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474, 127 S.Ct. 1933, 167 L.Ed.2d 836 (2007). See also Aron v. United States, 291 F.3d 708, 715 (11th Cir. 2002) (). As indicated by the discussion below, the motion and the court records here conclusively show that Movant is entitled to no relief, therefore, no evidentiary hearing is warranted.
In addition, the party challenging the sentence has the burden of showing that it is unreasonable in light of the record and the §3553(a) factors. United States v. Dean, 635 F.3d 1200, 1209-10 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing United States v. Talley, 431 F.3d 784, 788 (11th Cir. 2005)); see also United States v. Bernal-Benitez, 594 F.3d 1303, 1320 (11th Cir. 2010); United States v. Bostic, 645 Fed.Appx. 947, 948 (11th Cir. 2016) (unpublished). The Eleventh Circuit recognizes "that there is a range of reasonable sentences from which the district court may choose," and ordinarily expect a sentence within the defendant's advisory guideline range to be reasonable. Talley, 431 F.3d 784.
The standard for a successful claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was established in the two-pronged Strickland3 test, which requires a movant to prove both deficient performance and prejudice to be entitled to relief. Performance is "measuredagainst an objective standard of reasonableness under the prevailing professional norms." Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 381, 125 S.Ct. 2456, 2462, 162 L.Ed. 2d 360 (2005) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). To prove deficient performance, a movant must identify specific acts or omissions by counsel that are so serious "that counsel was...
To continue reading
Request your trial