Riley v. Aircraft Products Mfg. Corp.
| Decision Date | 08 July 1976 |
| Citation | 353 N.E.2d 801,386 N.Y.S.2d 838,40 N.Y.2d 366 |
| Parties | , 353 N.E.2d 801 In the Matter of George RILEY, Respondent, v. AIRCRAFT PRODUCTS MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, et al., Appellants, and Special Fund for Reopened Cases, Respondent, Workmen's Compensation Board, Respondent. |
| Court | New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
William Taylor, New York City, for appellants.
John M. Cullen and George Cholet, New York City, for Special Fund for Reopened Cases, respondent.
In a workmen's compansation matter, the employer and its insurance carrier appeal. The Appellate Division had affirmed a decision of the Workmen's Compensation Board holding the carrier liable, in a proceeding in which the carrier had unsuccessfully sought to shift liability to the Special Fund for Reopened Cases (Workmen's Compensation Law, § 25--a).
The issue is whether a workmen's compensation award on an initial formal claim arising from a 1960 injury, but where there had been more recent voluntary payments or benefits to the employee on account of the injury or accident, is chargeable ultimately to the Special Fund for Reopened Cases.
There should be an affirmance. The Workmen's Compensation Law, in pertinent part, provides for Special Fund liability 'after a lapse of seven years from the date of the injury * * * and also a lapse of three years from the date of the last payment of compensation' (§ 25--a, subd. 1). The statute by its terms creates a Special Fund for 'reopened' cases in order to shift liability from the original carrier and employer to a fund specially financed (Workmen's Compensation Law, § 25--a, subd. 3). Nevertheless, there is no express requirement that there has been a formal opening of a claim or a prior formal award. Moreover, at least in the case of 'stale' initial claims, that is, claims arising from old injuries without there ever having been a formal opening or award, it is consistent with the statute's objective to shift liability to the Special Fund for an old accident and dormant compensation matter. In the instant case, however, although seven years have elapsed since the claimant's accident or injury, the fund is not liable because the employer made advance payments of compensation within three years of the present formal claim.
On September 1, 1960, claimant suffered a work-related back injury while in the employ of Aircraft Products Manufacturing Corporation. Although he received treatment at that time, claimant was not absent from work because of the injury until the 1965--1970 period, when he missed a total of 10 days. During the 1965--1970 absences he received sick pay from the employer pursuant to union contract and consequently did not seek or obtain formal workmen's compensation benefits. Also, in the summer of 1970, there were five weeks of lost work, including a vacation period. During the 1970 absences claimant received sick pay, as well as regular vacation pay from his employer.
Recognizing claimant's continuing disability his employer assigned him 'light work' from September, 1970 to April 18, 1971. He received the regular rate of pay but his hours were reduced. Finally, on April 18, 1971, claimant's back injury had deteriorated to the point where he was totally disabled. Only then did he file his initial formal claim for workmen's compensation in June of 1971.
The Workmen's Compensation Board affirmed a referee's decision finding a workrelated disability and that the employer's payment of wages during the disability was an advance payment of compensation made within three years of the claim, and, hence liability was not chargeable to the Special Fund. The Appellate Division, in an unanimous memorandum, affirmed on the ground that an initial award, regardless of how long ago the industrial accident occurred, was not payable out of the Special Fund for Reopened Cases.
The employer does not now dispute that the accident occurred or contend that there was a failure to file a timely claim. Rather, the employer and its insurance carrier contend that liability for this initial claim is properly chargeable to the Special Fund for Reopened Cases because it is 'stale', having been made over 11 years after the accident.
Special Fund liability is provided for 'after a lapse of seven years from the date of the injury * * * and also a lapse of three years from the date of the last payment of compensation' (Workmen's Compensation Law, § 25--a, subd. 1 par. (2)). Putting aside for the moment any payment of formal compensation within three years, this provision has been found to impose liability on the Special Fund in 'stale' initial claim cases like the instant one (see, e.g., Matter of Gallahan v. Papec Mach. Co., 288 N.Y. 726, 43 N.E.2d 351; Matter of Stewart v. First Nat. City Bank of N.Y., 15 A.D.2d 622, 222 N.Y.S.2d 374 mot. for lv. to app. den. 11 N.Y.2d 645, 228 N.Y.S.2d 1026 182 N.E.2d 620). These holdings are consistent with the purpose as well as the language of section 25--a. The purpose of section 25--a is to save employers and insurance carriers from liability, it has been said, for "stale' claims of injured employees, that is, those where after extended periods, there has been a recurrence of malady, a progress in disease not anticipated, or a pathological development not previously prognosticated, arising out of the injury' (Matter of Ryan v. American Bridge Co., 243 App.Div. 496, 498, 278 N.Y.S. 612, 614).
All of this notwithstanding, the Appellate Division concluded, in effect although not in so many words, that this was a compensation case opened but never closed and hence could not be charged as a 'reopened case' to the Special Fund. That court's conclusion was expressly based on language in Matter of Casey v. Hinkle Iron Works, 299 N.Y. 382, 87 N.E.2d 419.
In Matter of Casey, a matter where there had been a prior award after which the matter had been placed in 'abeyance', the court held that the case had really been closed. The court then added that Special Fund liability 'may be imposed only in a case which has been closed and is reopened by fresh application' (at p. 385, 87 N.E.2d p. 420; cf. Matter of Kiriloff v. A.G.W. Wet Wash Laundry, 293 N.Y. 222, 228, 56 N.E.2d 559, 561). The holding conformed with the statute since it, undisputedly, creates a Special Fund for 'reopened cases' (Workmen's...
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...(Matter of Casey v. Hinkle Iron Works, 299 N.Y. 382, 385, 87 N.E.2d 419 [1949] ; see Matter of Riley v. Aircraft Prods. Mfg. Corp., 40 N.Y.2d 366, 370, 386 N.Y.S.2d 838, 353 N.E.2d 801 [1976] ). Second, the case must have reopened, which often occurred due to an unanticipated change in the ......
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Am. Econ. Ins. Co. v. State
...(Matter of Casey v. Hinkle Iron Works, 299 N.Y. 382, 385, 87 N.E.2d 419 [1949] ; see Matter of Riley v. Aircraft Prods. Mfg. Corp., 40 N.Y.2d 366, 370, 386 N.Y.S.2d 838, 353 N.E.2d 801 [1976] ). Second, the case must have reopened, which often occurred due to an unanticipated change in the ......
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