Riley v. Bell

• Decision Date: 14 October 1915
• Docket Number: No. 22769.,22769.
• Citation: 184 Ind. 110,109 N.E. 843
• Parties: RILEY, City Clerk, v. BELL.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

184 Ind. 110

109 N.E. 843

RILEY, City Clerk,

v.BELL.

No. 22769.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

Oct. 14, 1915.

Appeal from Superior Court, Marion County; John C. Ruckelhaus, Special Judge.

Action by Joseph E. Bell against Thomas A. Riley, City Clerk. Upon judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals, and plaintiff moves to dismiss. Appeal dismissed.

W. D. Bynum, Albert E. Cottey, Leroy J. Keach, and Dixson H. Bynum, all of Indianapolis, for appellant. Paul G. Davis and William A. Pickens, both of Indianapolis, for appellee.

COX, J.

[1] There is involved in this appeal the question of the validity of an ordinance passed by the common council of the city of Indianapolis August 24, 1914, vetoed by the mayor and duly passed over his veto September 27, 1914. This ordinance sought to provide for revising, codifying, indexing, and publishing the ordinances of the city and to authorize appellant, as city clerk, to employ two lawyers to do the work under the direction of the department of law of the city. It was designated General Ordinance No. 25 of 1914. The lower court adjudicated the ordinance to be void on the ground that it was an invasion of the rights of the executive department of the city as established by the law under which the city takes its powers. From that judgment, this appeal is brought.

Appellee has interposed against the decision of the cause on the question raised a verified motion to dismiss the appeal. In this motion it is made to appear that on August 16, 1915, the common council passed, and the mayor duly signed and approved, another ordinance similar in all respects to the former one, except that the appointment of the codifiers was vested in the mayor. The latter ordinance contained a repealing clause repealing all ordinances and parts of ordinances in conflict with or in the purview of it, and expressly repealing General Ordinance No. 25 of 1914. It was provided that it should take effect and be in full force and effect from and after its approval by the mayor. Thus it appears that the real controversy involved in the appeal has been removed, and that the question on which the decision of this court is invoked has become a purely academic one.

[2] That this court will not decide mere moot questions, but will dismiss the appeal when it is shown that no actual controversy is involved, is well settled. The appeal will not be entertained for the sole purpose of determining who shall pay the costs. Ogborn v. City of New Castle (1912) 178 Ind. 161, 98 N. E. 869, and cases there cited; Kieselbach v. Feurer (No. 22686, this term) 109 N. E. 842;Crawfordsville Trust Co. v. Ramsey (1913) 55 Ind. App. 40, 100 N. E. 1049, 102 N. E. 282, and cases there cited.

[3] Counsel for appellant concede that the concrete matter in...