Riley v. Bussell

Decision Date30 September 1870
Citation48 Tenn. 294
PartiesJohn D. Riley, Plaintiff in error, v. Benjamin S. Bussell.
CourtTennessee Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

FROM HAWKINS.

Appeal in error from the Circuit Court, E. E. GILLENWATERS, J., presiding.

JAMES T. SHIELDS, for Plaintiff in error.

No counsel appeared for the Defendant.

NELSON, J., delivered the opinion of the Court.

It appears from the bill of exceptions, that on the trial of this cause, the defendant inquired of the jury if any of them had suits pending in the court in which the trial was had, and six of the said jurors answered that they had suits pending in said Court, but not for trial at that term; and thereupon, the defendant moved the Court to discharge the said six jurors so having suits pending, and to appoint jurors in their stead free from exception; but the Court refused so to do, and the jurors so having suits pending, were allowed to remain on the jury, and try the cause. To this action of the Court the defendant excepted, and the question before us is whether this was error.

The right of trial by jury is as old as the common law in England, and is supposed by Worthington, in his Treatise on Juries, 27 Law Lib., 5, 6, to have been derived there from Roman jurisprudence. However greatly it may have been abused, it has been, and is, regarded as an essential element of public liberty. In the Declaration of Independence it is charged against the King that he had, in many cases, deprived the people of trial by jury; and the right, in civil and criminal cases, was afterwards secured in our National Constitution. In all our Tennessee State Constitutions, it has been declared that the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate, and the Legislature, in prescribing from time to time, the qualifications of jurors, directing the mode of their appointment of selection, and securing the rights of challenge, has endeavored to preserve the purity of this cherished institution, and to secure so far as practicable, the greatest impartiality in the administration of justice. It is our duty as a co-ordinate department of the Government, to give effect to the legislative will by fair and reasonable interpretation.

The provisions in the Code, so far as they relate to the question raised in this case, are, that the County Court of such county shall, at the first session after each term of the Circuit Court, designate twenty-five good and lawful men to serve as jurymen at the next succeeding court, that one of the jurors thus designated shall reside in each civil district into which the county is divided; that the Justices from each district may designate the juryman from that district; that no court shall appoint any person to serve as a juror more than one time in each period of twelve months; and that, in making the selection, such persons only as they know, or have good reason to believe are esteemed in the community for their integrity, fair character and sound judgment, shall...

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3 cases
  • Durham v. State
    • United States
    • Tennessee Supreme Court
    • June 9, 1945
    ... ... It should be remarked that it is immaterial that ... his case was on the 'retired' and not the trial, or ... appearance docket. See Riley v. Bussell, 48 Tenn ... 294, 295; Murphy v. State. 77 Tenn. 373; Hunt v ... State, 2 Shannon Cas. 395. And 35 C.J., 332-333 (n ... 37-39), ... ...
  • Durham v. State
    • United States
    • Tennessee Supreme Court
    • June 9, 1945
    ...It should be remarked that it is immaterial that his case was on the "retired" and not the trial, or appearance docket. See Riley v. Bussell, 48 Tenn. 294, 295; Murphy v. State, 77 Tenn. 373; Hunt v. State, 2 Shannon Cas. 395. And 35 C.J., 332-333 (n. 37-39), cites to the same effect Chicag......
  • Evans v. Buckner
    • United States
    • Tennessee Supreme Court
    • September 30, 1870

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