Riley v. Carl, 80-128
| Decision Date | 05 February 1981 |
| Docket Number | No. 80-128,80-128 |
| Citation | 622 P.2d 228,191 Mont. 128,38 St.Rep. 83 |
| Court | Montana Supreme Court |
| Parties | Tom RILEY and Patricia Riley, Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. Fred G. CARL, James L. Lee, County of Missoula, William Wills, a/k/a Bill and Wills, Inc., Defendants and Appellants. |
Boone, Karlberg & Haddon, Missoula, Robert L. Deschamps, III, County Atty., Missoula, for defendants and appellants.
Milodragovich, Dale & Dye, Balyeat, Kammerer & Rodli, Missoula, for plaintiffs and respondents.
Defendants Wills and Missoula County appeal from an order of the Fourth Judicial District Court, Missoula County, declaring Blixit Creek Road a county road subject to the duty of maintenance by Missoula County.
Blixit Creek Road is located near Potomac, Montana, in Missoula County. The road was first assigned a county road number in 1965, and was continuously maintained by the county from that time until January, 1977. Missoula County formally accepted the road for maintenance in 1974 because it had been platted and in existence prior to 1960.
Until 1978, William Wills, as an individual, and Wills Inc. of which William Wills was a corporate officer, owned the land traversed by Blixit Creek Road. Wills was aware of and materially benefitted from Missoula County's maintenance of the road and apparently acquiesced in the general public's use of the road until 1976.
In 1976 William Wills erected private road signs on Blixit Creek Road. Missoula County ceased its maintenance operations on the road in part because of the presence of the signs. This suit resulted from the subsequent deterioration of the road's condition in the spring of 1978.
In August, 1977, Tom and Patricia Riley purchased land accessible only via Blixit Creek Road. The Riley's plans to build a home on the land the following spring were frustrated by the impassibility of the road. The Rileys therefore initiated this action on March 29, 1978.
Plaintiff's complaint was twice amended. Wills, Inc. was first named as a party defendant under the second amended complaint filed August 18, 1978. Wills, Inc. had previously transferred its interests in the affected property by deeds recorded March 2, 1978. The resulting owners of an undivided eighty percent interest in the property have not been joined and are not parties to this action.
The complaint in its final form alleged breach of contract and misrepresentation against sellers Carl and Lee; a statutory duty to maintain and estoppel from cessation of roadway maintenance against the County of Missoula; and a prescriptive easement against William Wills a/k/a Bill Wills and Wills Inc. The sellers in turn filed a cross-complaint against Wills, alleging the county's prescriptive title to the road and estoppel against Wills, and seeking indemnity.
The matter came to hearing on motions for summary judgment. The District Court found from the undisputed facts all elements necessary to establish prescriptive county title to Blixit Creek Road, and to estop the County of Missoula and Wills from denying said county ownership. Based on its findings, the District Court denied Missoula County's motion for summary judgment; granted seller's motion for summary judgment declaring Blixit Creek Road a county road; and granted Wills' motion for summary judgment as to the complaint and the indemnity assertion of seller's cross-complaint.
Appellants attack on appeal the District Court's denial of the county's motion for summary judgment and granting of sellers' motion for summary judgment.
We note at the outset that the denial of the county's motion for summary judgment is properly reviewable at this time. Although the order denying the motion was...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Cechovic v. Hardin & Associates, Inc.
...on that subject? A summary judgment order is interlocutory, but is appealable after a final judgment is rendered. Riley v. Carl (1981), 191 Mont. 128, 131, 622 P.2d 228, 230. Our standard of review of a district court's summary judgment ruling is de novo. Spain-Morrow Ranch, Inc. v. West (1......
-
Hendrickson v. Pocha, K-B
...the motion to come forward with substantial evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact. Rule 56(e), M.R.Civ.P.; Riley v. Carl (1981), 191 Mont. 128, 622 P.2d 228. Here, both plaintiff and defendants filed briefs and other supporting documents, including sworn affidavits, with defenda......
-
Glastonbury Landowners Ass'n v. O'Connell (In re O'Connell)
...Adams, 444 P.3d at 419. 24. Cechovic v. Hardin & Assoc., Inc., 902 P.2d 520, 528 (Mont. 1995) (emphasis added) (citing Riley v. Carl, 622 P.2d 228, 230 (Mont. 1981)). 25. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(B) (2018); Wellness Int'l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1940 (2015). 26. See Welln......
-
Thomas v. Hale
...matter must come forward with substantial evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact. Rule 56(e), M.R.Civ.P.; Riley v. Carl (1981), 191 Mont. 128, 622 P.2d 228. Further, the non-moving party must set forth specific facts and cannot simply rely upon their pleadings, nor upon speculati......