Hendrickson v. Pocha, K-B

• Decision Date: 25 October 1990
• Docket Number: K-B,No. 90-208,90-208
• Citation: 799 P.2d 1095,245 Mont. 217
• Parties: Shane HENDRICKSON, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Todd A. POCHA, andar M Ranch, Defendants and Respondents.
• Court: Montana Supreme Court

Page 1095

799 P.2d 1095

245 Mont. 217

Shane HENDRICKSON, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Todd A. POCHA, and K-Bar M Ranch, Defendants and Respondents.

No. 90-208.

Supreme Court of Montana.

Submitted on Briefs Aug. 23, 1990.

Decided Oct. 25, 1990.

James A. Manley, Manley Law Office, Polson, for plaintiff and appellant.

Steven S. Carey, Garlington, Lohn & Robinson, Missoula, for defendants and respondents.

HARRISON, Justice.

This is an appeal from summary judgment entered against the plaintiff in favor of both defendants by the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, in and for the County of Missoula. We affirm the District Court's grant of summary judgment.

Issue on review:

Whether the District Court erred in granting summary judgment.

This case involves an accident which occurred on Montana Highway 200, near mile post 25, between Missoula and Great Falls on February 24, 1988 at approximately 8:15 a.m. At the time of the accident, plaintiff, Shane Hendrickson, was an experienced long-haul truck driver. Defendant K-Bar M Ranch (K-Bar) owned a ranch along the highway where the accident occurred. Defendant Pocha was employed by K-Bar at the time.

Hendrickson, whose vehicle rear-ended Pocha's vehicle, sued for damages.

Montana Highway 200 is a busy east-west, two-lane highway. It is the major route for long-haul trucks between Missoula and Great Falls.

On February 24, 1988, Hendrickson left Dixon at approximately 5:30 a.m., bound for Great Falls. His truck was fully loaded with lumber. Plaintiff testified that his truck had new tires and was in excellent mechanical condition.

At approximately 8:15 a.m. on the morning of the accident, Pocha was pulling a round bale feeder with K-Bar's Ford tractor for approximately two miles on the highway to get to another section of the ranch to feed cattle. Pocha testified by affidavit that he did this approximately six or seven times a week. Pocha pulled onto the highway approximately four-tenths of a mile west of the bridge where the accident occurred. Pocha was traveling at an undetermined slow rate of speed heading in an easterly direction, toward the bridge.

Shortly thereafter, Hendrickson drove his semi-truck over the top of Greenough Hill approximately one-half mile from the bridge and heading east as well. Hendrickson testified by affidavit that as he came over the hill he did not see the Pocha vehicle because of contours in the road, and the positions of the respective vehicles. Hendrickson stated in his deposition that when he first saw the Pocha vehicle he was "probably less than a quarter of a mile" from it.

Both parties agree that the accident could not be avoided by either pulling into the other lane due to an on-coming logging truck or by pulling onto the right shoulder of the road due to its steep terrain.

Hendrickson described what happened as follows:

[A]nd then I seen the tractor just before then, and then I jumped on the brakes and I geared down a couple of times, but as I said before, I was doing approximately 50 miles an hour, and I had a full load on, and there just wasn't enough distance in between to stop. (Emphasis added.)

Indeed Hendrickson was unable to stop before striking the Pocha vehicle from behind. Both agree that on the morning of the accident the sky was blue and the roads were clear and dry.

Hendrickson filed his complaint May 6, 1988. Following service of process, defendants filed their answer and counterclaim August 2, 1988. Hendrickson filed a reply to the counterclaim August 5, 1988.

On June 14, 1989, following discovery, defendants moved for summary judgment. The motion was briefed, argued, and on October 12, 1989, the District Court entered summary judgment on the issue of liability in favor of defendants. There being no dispute as to the damages awardable to defendants, judgment was entered in favor of defendants on February 15, 1990.

Notice of entry of judgment was filed February 21, 1990. Hendrickson filed his notice of appeal March 6, 1990.

Upon appeal, the only question is whether there is a genuine factual issue concerning the respective negligence of the parties involved. Hendrickson maintains that in granting summary judgment the District Court incorrectly concluded that the defendants had sustained their burden of demonstrating a complete absence of any genuine issue of material fact.

Ordinarily issues of negligence are not susceptible to summary adjudication. Hendrickson v. Neiman (1983), 204 Mont. 367, 665 P.2d 219. We must be extremely cautious in reviewing grants of summary judgment in this area for the issues involved in a determination of negligence are better resolved at trial.

The purpose of Rule 56, M.R.Civ.P., is to dispose of those actions which fail to raise genuine issues of material fact, thereby eliminating the burden and expense of an unnecessary trial. VanUden v. Hendricksen (1980), 189 Mont. 164, 615 P.2d 220.

The burden upon the moving party as stated in Rule 56(c), M.R.Civ.P., is:

The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.

To satisfy its burden of proof, the movant must provide the court with evidence which clearly indicates what the truth is, and which excludes any real doubt as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. VanUden at 167, 615 P.2d at 222.

Once the movant has discharged its burden of proof under Rule 56(c), M.R.Civ.P., it becomes incumbent upon the party opposing the motion to come forward with substantial evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact. Rule 56(e), M.R.Civ.P.; Riley v. Carl (1981), 191 Mont. 128, 622 P.2d 228.

Here, both plaintiff and defendants filed briefs and other supporting documents, including sworn affidavits, with defendants' motion for summary judgment.

This Court finds that there is no issue of material fact in this case and summary judgment was properly granted. The evidence shows that Pocha did not violate a single traffic law in operating his vehicle when the collision occurred. On the other hand, the evidence clearly shows that Hendrickson violated every law on the books that pertains to a vehicle overtaking another with a possibility of passing it.

Whether Pocha was driving his farm vehicle at 5 to 10 miles per hour, or 20 or 30 miles per hour, makes no difference as to Hendrickson's negligence. Pocha was lawfully upon the highway and Hendrickson owed a duty to Pocha to avoid striking his vehicle while it was lawfully on the highway.

Hendrickson violated the following statutes in causing the collision:

Section 61-8-303, MCA. Under this statute, it was Hendrickson's duty to operate his vehicle on the public highway in a careful and prudent manner, and at a rate of speed no greater than was reasonable and proper under the conditions existing in the point of operation, and he was required to drive his truck so as not to unduly or unreasonably endanger the life, limb, property or other rights of persons entitled to the use of the street or highway. Further, under this statute, he was required to drive at an appropriate reduced speed when approaching a hill crest, or when a special hazard existed with respect to other traffic then on the highway.

Section 61-8-323, MCA. Under this statute, the driver of a vehicle overtaking another vehicle proceeding in the same direction is required to pass to the left thereof at a safe distance, and may not again drive to the right side of the roadway until safely clear of the...