Riley v. City of Liberty

Decision Date30 July 2013
Docket NumberNo. WD 75879.,WD 75879.
Citation404 S.W.3d 434
PartiesWilliam RILEY, Deceased; Vicki Riley and Landon Riley, Respondents, v. CITY OF LIBERTY, Missouri and Midwest Public Risk of Missouri, Appellants.
CourtMissouri Court of Appeals

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Stacey L. Dungan, Kansas City, MO, for respondents.

Kip A. Kubin, Leawood, KS, for appellants.

Before Special Division: JOSEPH M. ELLIS, Presiding Judge, GARY D. WITT, Judge and ROBERT CLAYTON III, Special Judge.

GARY D. WITT, Judge.

William Riley (Riley) was employed by the City of Liberty, Missouri (Liberty), as a Deputy Fire Chief for the fire department. In the early morning hours of October 6, 2004, Riley suffered a fatal incident of cardiac arrest while at home. His widow, Vicki Riley (Vicki) 1 filed a timely claim with the Missouri Division of Workers' Compensation seeking death and funeral benefits. The Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) denied the claim, finding that Riley's death did not arise out of or in the course of his employment. Vicki appealed, and the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission (“Commission”) found that Riley indeed suffered an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment with the fire department. The Commission granted an award of weekly death benefits, and the City of Liberty and its insurance carrier, Midwest Public Risk of Missouri (MPRM), appeal.2 For reasons explained more fully below, we affirm.

Factual and Procedural Background 3

William Riley was a deputy fire chief working for the City of Liberty, Missouri, in 2004. Riley had previously been a firefighter for the City of Kansas City, Missouri for twenty-five years before retiring from that department with the title of Division Chief in December, 2002. On August 4, 2003, he was hired by Liberty as the Deputy Fire Chief/Emergency Medical Services (“EMS”) Director for the fire department.

As the Deputy Fire Chief, Riley's duties were primarily administrative and included negotiating with the firefighter's union and handling all personnel issues within the department, such as training, hiring, and supervising employees. He was also working on a large project involving the outsourcing of the EMS billing to a private company. Additionally, he was responsible for implementing a severe weather plan and coordinating it with other city officials based on a federal grant. He attended monthly meetings of the Mid–America Regional Council in conjunction with his responsibility to coordinate emergency preparedness. He was also required to respond to and assist with all fires occurring within Liberty.

As the Director of EMS, Riley was also in charge of Liberty's medical ambulance system, which accounted for eighty percent of the fire department's business. His EMS responsibilities included managing the narcotics and medical supplies stored on the premises, a job that required that he be on-call to restock ambulances since he alone had access to certain supplies. Riley also habitually attended meetings of the Liberty City Council, which met every Monday night. In addition, he was the liaison between the department and a local physician designated as the medical director for the EMS system. Riley's duties essentially kept him on call at all times. He carried a pager and listened to the dispatch radio even while at home.

On the morning of October 5, 2004, Riley was at work and had a heated discussion with Captain Gary Birch (“Birch”) regarding an earlier incident involving a police dispatcher named Jo Ann Fuller. Captain Michael Compton (“Compton”) testified that after the conversation, Riley appeared angry, was red-faced and that it took Compton forty-five minutes to calm him down. Compton testified that Riley thought Birch had questioned his judgment regarding a situation. Around lunch time, Riley had lunch with his wife, Vicki. Riley then responded to a medical emergency call while either with his wife or with Captain Richie Cunningham (“Cunningham”).4 After arriving on the scene, Riley assisted another fireman in loading a man onto a stretcher and removing him from the building into the ambulance. There is some discrepancy as to whether the man was large or average sized and as to whether he had to be carried up a flight of stairs. Upon their return to the station, witnesses testified that Riley did not appear “well.” Riley reportedly said that he thought perhaps he had eaten something that was causing him to feel badly. He told several co-employees that he was “a little tired, but okay.” Riley then proceeded to use the station's treadmill. Cunningham, who had worked as a paramedic for more than twenty years, testified that instead of having a reddened face on the treadmill, Riley looked pale, sweaty, and ashen after exercising. Cunningham further testified that looking gray and having indigestion were signs of undergoing a heart attack.

At the close of his shift, Riley called his wife to say he would be home late because he was dealing with personnel issues. He left the station around 5:15 p.m. but did not arrive home until about 7:00 p.m. There is no evidence as to where he went or what he did during that intervening time. When he arrived home, Riley declined to eat his favorite dinner and told his wife that he had been dealing with personnel issues and did not feel like eating or talking about it. He went to bed around 10:00 p.m. He appeared white and his behavior was abnormal in that he usually played with their eight-year-old son, Landon, after arriving home in the evenings.

At about 2:00 a.m., he and his wife were awakened by Landon, who had had a nightmare. Vicki left the bedroom to sleep in her son's room. When Vicki returned at around 4:00 a.m., she found Riley sitting in a chair holding his head saying that his head and throat hurt. Riley requested some hot tea and ibuprofen. Vicki got the two things for him. Riley then took the pain medicine and drank some tea but then seized and went into cardiac arrest.

Vicki immediately called 9–1–1 and then Birch. Birch arrived on the scene while paramedics were still there. Riley was pronounced dead soon thereafter. At the time of his death, Riley was forty-six years old. He did not smoke cigarettes or drink alcohol. He was moderately overweight, but ran for exercise on a treadmill every day. The coroner determined that Riley died of “cardiac arrhythmia related to an acute coronary syndrome.”

On June 3, 2005, Vicki filed a timely claim for benefits. On January 14, 2012, following a trial, the ALJ denied Vicki's claim for benefits, finding that Riley did not suffer an accident on October 5, 2004, nor did he die from occupational disease associated with his job. On November 14, 2012, the Commission reversed the decision of the ALJ, finding that the events of October 5, 2004, “resulted in an increased demand on employee's heart, which culminated in ischemia,5 which deteriorated to heart failure in the hours leading up to his death early the following morning.”

Further facts are set forth below as necessary.

Standard of Review

Our standard of review is governed by section 287.495. 1,6 which provides:

The court, on appeal, shall review only questions of law and may modify, reverse, remand for rehearing, or set aside the award upon any of the following grounds and no other:

(1) That the commission acted without or in excess of its powers;

(2) That the award was procured by fraud;

(3) That the facts found by the commission do not support the award;

(4) That there was not sufficient competent evidence in the record to warrant the making of the award.

Liberty challenges the award pursuant to subsections (3) and (4) above. “A court must examine the whole record to determine if it contains sufficient competent and substantial evidence to support the award, i.e., whether the award is contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence.” Hampton v. Big Boy Steel Erection, 121 S.W.3d 220, 222–23 (Mo. banc 2003) (citation omitted). “An award that is contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence is, in context, not supported by competent and substantial evidence.” Id. at 223.

Nothing requires this Court to review the evidence and all reasonable inferencesdrawn from the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commission's decision. The whole record is considered to determine if there is sufficient competent and substantial evidence to support the Commission's award. A reviewing court considers whether the Commission could have reasonably made its findings, and reached its result, upon consideration of all the evidence before it.

This Court defers to the Commission's factual findings and recognizes that it is the Commission's function to determine credibility of witnesses. This Court may not substitute its judgment on the evidence, and when the evidence before an administrative body would warrant either of two opposed findings, the reviewing court is bound by the administrative determination, and it is irrelevant that there is supportive evidence for the contrary finding.

Hornbeck v. Spectra Painting, Inc., 370 S.W.3d 624, 629 (Mo. banc 2012) (citations and quotation marks omitted).

However, [w]hen an administrative agency decision is based on the agency's interpretation and application of the law, we review the administrative agency's conclusions of law and its decision de novo. Mo. Veterans Home v. Brown, 374 S.W.3d 359, 365 (Mo.App. W.D.2012) (citation omitted).

Analysis

In its sole point relied on, Liberty contends that the Commission erred in its finding that Riley sustained an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment that resulted in his death. Liberty maintains that there was no substantial and competent evidence to support the Commission's factual findings that Riley suffered an accident while at work and that the facts as found do not support the award. Liberty further contends that the fatal cardiac arrest that Riley suffered while at home was the result of a personal health condition and not...

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