Riley v. Dem

• Decision Date: 14 February 2008
• Docket Number: No. 2006-175-Appeal.,2006-175-Appeal.
• Citation: 941 A.2d 198
• Parties: Steven RILEY v. The RHODE ISLAND DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT et al.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

941 A.2d 198

Steven RILEY v. The RHODE ISLAND DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT et al.

No. 2006-175-Appeal.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

February 14, 2008.

Robert J. Caron, Esq., for Plaintiff.

Gary. Powers, Esq., Providence, for. Defendant.

Present: WILLIAMS, C.J., FLAHERTY, SUTTELL, and ROBINSON, JJ.

OPINION

Justice FLAHERTY, for the Court.

Does the Rhode Island Constitution's guarantee of right of fishery prohibit the Legislature from granting some commercial fishermen access to some species of sea life while denying others the same rights? This is a constitutional challenge to the Rhode Island General Assembly's 2002 enactment of a limited-entry fishing licensing statutory scheme that empowered the Rhode Island Department of Environmental Management (DEM) to adopt a flexible approach to issuing new licenses for restricted species on a yearly basis.¹ Steven Riley (Riley) appeals from a Superior Court judgment in favor of DEM after Riley appealed a denial of a principal-effort license to commercially fish certain restricted species, pursuant to the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), G.L.1956 § 42-35-15.² Riley also moved in the Superior Court for declaratory relief,³ arguing that the General Assembly's enactment of G.L.1956 § 20-2.1-5⁴ was unconstitutional because it limited the issuance of "new" principal-effort and multipurpose fishing licenses while preserving the licenses of fishermen who were issued those licenses prior to December 31, 2002.⁵ Riley brought forth a barrage of constitutional challenges against the statute, as well as against Rule 7 of the Rules and Regulations Governing the Management of Marine Fisheries, that was adopted by the DEM pursuant to the General Assembly's statutory authority.⁶

The eye of this storm revolves around (1) whether the denial of a preferred license to Riley, which would grant him access to the same restricted species as other, more highly licensed fishermen, implicates a fundamental right of fishery or a fundamental right to pursue a common occupation of life, and (2) whether § 20-2.1-5 comports with the requirements of due process and equal protection under the Rhode Island and United States Constitutions. We affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.

Facts and Procedural History

This fish story began when Riley applied to DEM for a principal-effort license, which would grant him access to Rhode Island's most valuable sea fare. Riley claims he was a commercial fisherman in Rhode Island in the 1970s. He left this profession to pursue a career in engineering, and did not, renew his license thereafter. Three decades later, in February 2003, Riley, his engineering pursuits completed, decided to return to his original calling. Specifically, Riley sought a principal-effort commercial fishing license with shellfish/quahog and restricted-finfish endorsements under § 20-2.1-5. This particular license would enable Riley to have access to the restricted fisheries sectors, which included six species of finfish, one species in the shellfish category (quahogs), and one species in the crustacean category (lobster).

Before the "Commercial Fishing Licenses Act of 2002" was enacted, the state alternated between periods of "open access" in licensing and enacting moratoriums.⁷ After an intense, collaborative effort among DEM, the Intergovernmental Working Group on Fisheries Management, the Coastal Institute at the University of Rhode Island, and other affected stakeholders, the Legislature enacted legislation that enabled DEM to place "[r]estrictions on the number of license holders" and adjust the number of new licenses issued, on a yearly basis, depending on the status of the species.⁸ Section 20-2.1-2(6)(ii)(E).

According to the statute, there are three types of fishing licenses available. The entry-level license is a "Commercial fishing license" that allows for "commercial fishing in the fisheries sector, per endorsement at basic harvest and gear levels."⁹ Section 20-2.1-5(1)(i). The second type is the principal-effort license, which was Riley's preference. However, he was not eligible because:

"[d]uly licensed persons in a fishery as of December 31 of the immediately preceding year, shall be eligible to obtain a principal effort license for the fishery sector for which they were licensed on December 31 of the immediately preceding year, which principal effort license shall allow its holder to fish in a fishery sector at the full harvest and gear levels. * * * Principal effort license holders, in addition to the fishery sector of their principal effort, shall be eligible to obtain endorsements for the other fishery sectors at the full harvest and gear levels * * *." Section 20-2.1-5(1)(ii).

Eligibility for the third type of license, the "Multi-purpose license," similarly is limited to:

"[a]ll multi-purpose license holders as of December 31 of the immediately preceding year, * * * which shall allow the holder to engage in commercial fishing in all fisheries sectors at the full harvest and gear levels." Section 20-2.1-5(1)(iii).

Because Riley did not have a valid principal-effort or multipurpose license before December 31, 2002, his application was denied by the DEM. However, he was granted the less lucrative commercial fishing license, and he later secured a lobster endorsement.

Dissatisfied, on March 9, 2003, Riley filed a request that the Commercial Fishing License Review. Board (CFLRB) reconsider his application for the principal-effort license. He was told that the board had not yet been appointed; so, on May 21, 2003, Riley requested a hearing with the Administration Adjudicative Division (AAD). In June, the AAD remanded the case to the CFLRB for a hearing, which was held on July 21, 2003. After the hearing, Riley's appeal was denied by the CFLRB and the DEM. On January 21, 2004, the parties presented oral arguments before Chief Hearing Officer Kathleen Lanphear, who granted DEM's motion for summary judgment on January 26, 2004. Riley timely appealed to the Superior Court pursuant to the APA, §§ 42-35-15 and 42-35-7.

In his complaint, Riley raised, thirteen issues, including his contention that § 20-2.1-5 was unconstitutional, and the agency's denial of his desired license was in error. Among the myriad allegations set forth in his complaint, he argued that his fundamental right to earn a livelihood in a lawful calling and, his fundamental right of fishery were violated, that grandfathering old licenses while refusing to issue new licenses created two classes of peoples and denied members of one of those classes equal protection and due process, that the administrator's grant of summary judgment was arbitrary and capricious, and that the DEM regulations created a monopoly in favor of a group of fishermen, in violation of antitrust law.

The Superior Court affirmed the DEM's decision, applying a rational-basis test to the constitutional challenges because it determined that no fundamental right was implicated. The Court found that the General Assembly had legitimate goals to "[p]reserve, enhance, and allow for any necessary regeneration of the fisheries of the state, for the benefit of the people of the state, as an ecological asset and as a source of food and recreation," and limited entry was a rational way to achieve those goals. Section 20-2.1-2(1). Finally, the Court found that the antitrust claims were meritless. Riley timely appealed.

On appeal to this Court, Riley narrows his arguments to constitutional claims, and he attempts to trigger this Court's strict scrutiny of the statutory framework by arguing that denying him a principal-effort license infringes on his fundamental right to pursue a lawful calling. Riley also argues that § 20-2.1-5 implicates a fundamental right of fishery as found in the Rhode Island Constitution, denying him equal access to fish the desired species with other commercial fishermen, in violation of equal protection and due-process considerations. He argues that these statutes cannot withstand a strict-scrutiny analysis, but that even under a rational-basis analysis, they still fail because they are arbitrary and capricious and are not designed to achieve a legitimate governmental goal.

The state counters that the licensing statute and implementing regulations do not infringe upon any fundamental right and a limited-entry scheme is rationally related to the legitimate purposes outlined in § 20-2.1-2.

Standard of Review

When the decision of a trial justice or of the agency is based upon questions of law, we review those findings de novo. Johnston Ambulatory Surgical Associates, Ltd. v. Nolan, 755 A.2d 799, 805 (R.I.2000).

In passing on the constitutionality of a statute, this Court will exercise "the greatest possible caution." Cherenzia v. Lynch, 847 A.2d 818, 822 (R.I.2004) (quoting Gorham v. Robinson, 57 R.I. 1, 7, 186 A. 832, 837 (1936)). It is the petitioner's burden, to prove beyond a reasonable doubt, that the act violates a specific provision of the Rhode Island or the United States Constitutions. Cherenzia, 847 A.2d at 822 (citing City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40, 45 (R.I.1995)). In fact, there is a presumption that the statute is "valid if good upon its face, and it is presumed that the acts of the judicial body which granted it are all valid. `Omnia praesumuntur rite et solemniter else acta.' They are presumed to know the law and to have followed it in case of each necessary step." Payne & Butler v. Providence Gas Co., 31 R.I. 295, 327-28, 77 A. 145, 158 (1910). It is the duty of the Legislature, however, to act within "the textual limitations * * * that are specified in the Federal or State Constitutions." Cherenzia, 847 A.2d at 822 (quoting Sundlun, 662 A.2d at 44).

In construing provisions of the Rhode Island Constitution, our "chief purpose is to give effect to the intent of the framers." In re Advisory Opinion to Governor (Ethics Commission), 612 A.2d 1, 7 (R.I.1992) (citing State...