Riley v. Elkhart Cmty. Sch.

• Decision Date: 22 July 2016
• Docket Number: No. 15-3166,15-3166
• Citation: 829 F.3d 886
• Parties: Janet A. Riley, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. Elkhart Community Schools, Defendant–Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

829 F.3d 886

Janet A. Riley, Plaintiff–Appellant

v.Elkhart Community Schools, Defendant–Appellee.

No. 15-3166

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Argued April 11, 2016

Decided July 22, 2016

Robin G. Remley, Attorney, Law Offices of Robin Remley, LLC., Crown Point, IN, for Plaintiff–Appellant.

Brent R. Borg, Attorneys, Church, Church, Hittle & Antrim, Fishers, IN, Monica J. Conrad, Attorney, Church, Church, Hittle & Antrim, Merriville, IN, Alexander P. Pinegar, Attorney, Church, Church, Hittle & Antrim, Noblesville, IN, for Defendant–Appellee.

Before Bauer and Williams, Circuit Judges, and Adelman,^* District Judge.

Bauer

, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff-appellant, Janet Riley, sued defendant-appellee, Elkhart Community Schools (“ECS”), for discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e

(“Title VII”), discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 (“ADEA”), and violation of her equal rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Riley roots her causes of action in ECS's failure to promote her to various positions during her career as a teacher with the school district. The district court granted summary judgment for ECS on all claims, based on procedural bars and insufficient evidence. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

ECS has employed Riley, an African-American female, as a teacher since 1980. She has served in multiple capacities during her tenure. Currently, she teaches business education at Elkhart Central High School and leads evening and summer adult education classes. She has an administrator's license and is pursuing her doctorate in education. In 2010, she was named the ECS Teacher of the Year.

From 2005 through 2013, Riley unsuccessfully applied for twelve different positions with ECS. Seven positions are relevant to this appeal. In 2007, Riley applied for an assistant principal position at Elkhart Memorial High School. ECS hired Carey Anderson, who is white. In 2008, Riley again applied for an assistant principal position, this time at Central High School. ECS hired Andrew Bridell, who is white. In 2009, Riley applied for two more assistant principal positions, one at Northside Middle School, the other at Memorial High School. ECS hired Mary Wisniewski, who is white, for the position at Northside Middle School; it hired Krista Hennings, who is African-American, for the position at Memorial High School.

In 2010, ECS posted two academic dean positions, but did not advertise them as administrative positions. Riley did not apply for these positions; ECS hired two white males under the age of 40 for the openings. In both 2010 and 2013, Riley applied for the coordinator position of the Blazer Connection program, an after-school tutoring program. In both instances, ECS hired white males. Finally, in the spring of 2012, Riley again applied for two open assistant principal positions, one at Central High School and the other at Memorial High School. ECS appointed a committee to screen potential candidates. The screening committee reviewed the candidates and made recommendations to the superintendent. The committee chose Riley for an interview, but recommended Jason Gratsy, a white male under 40, and JaNeva Adams, an African-American female under 40, for the openings. The committee noted that Gratsy and Adams performed better in their interviews than Riley; ECS ultimately hired Gratsy and Adams.

On May 12, 2011, Riley filed an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission charge against ECS, claiming that race, sex, and age discrimination were the reasons that ECS had not promoted her to any of the positions for which she had applied. The EEOC sent Riley a right to sue letter on April 26, 2012.

On July 24, 2012, Riley filed a pro se complaint in federal court alleging discrimination, harassment, libel, defamation, and retaliation by ECS. On August 8, 2012, Riley filed an amended complaint, alleging violations of Title VII race and sex discrimination, ADEA age discrimination, and violation of equal rights under § 1981

. She filed both incarnations of the complaint in the Southern District of Indiana, which transferred the case to the Northern District of Indiana, where both parties reside.

Riley retained counsel on November 26, 2012, and the parties agreed on January 16, 2013, to have a magistrate judge adjudicate the dispute. On May 13, 2015, ECS moved for summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment for ECS on all counts, dismissing some claims on procedural grounds, and dismissing the remaining claims because Riley had failed to produce sufficient evidence.

Riley appealed.

II. DISCUSSION

First, like the district court, we winnow down Riley's bevy of claims to those which we will assess on their merits. The other claims fail for procedural reasons. Some claims appear in her original complaint but not in the amended complaint; an amended complaint supersedes any prior complaint, and becomes the operative complaint. See Anderson v. Donahoe , 699 F.3d 989, 997 (7th Cir. 2012)

(citations omitted). So any claim in Riley's original complaint not included in her amended complaint is extinguished. Id. These include her claims of hostile work environment and disparate treatment.

Riley argues that we should be lenient towards her because she drafted the original and amended complaints without assistance of an attorney. See, e.g. , Ambrose v. Roeckeman , 749 F.3d 615, 618 (7th Cir. 2014)

(citations omitted) (“[w]e have repeatedly emphasized that pro se petitions ... should be held to standards less stringent than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys”). However, while Riley did draft her complaints pro se , she has had counsel since November 2012. Since retaining counsel, she has never moved to amend her complaint. Having had counsel for over three years, and ample opportunity to amend her complaint, she is not entitled to the usual pro se leniency.

Additionally, some of Riley's claims are time-barred. Both Title VII claims and ADEA claims must be filed within 300 days of the alleged discriminatory act or unlawful practice. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(e)(1)

(Title VII statute of limitations); 29 U.S.C. § 626(d)(1)(B) (ADEA statute of limitations). Section 1981

claims must be filed within four years of the alleged discriminatory act. 28 U.S.C. § 1658 ; Campbell v. Forest Pres. Dist. of Cook Cty., Ill. , 752 F.3d 665, 667–68 (7th Cir. 2014) (citing Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co. , 541 U.S. 369, 382–83, 124 S.Ct. 1836, 158 L.Ed.2d 645 (2004) ). Here, Riley filed her first charge of discrimination—her EEOC complaint—on May 12, 2011. Any Title VII or ADEA violation related to an incident occurring before July 16, 2010 (300 days before the filing), and any alleged § 1981 violation related to an incident occurring before May 12, 2007 (four years before the filing), are therefore time-barred. This eliminates Riley's Title VII claims relating to the positions for which she applied in 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, and 2009. It also eliminates her § 1981 claims related to the position for which she applied in 2005 and 2006. The district court ruled that Riley's § 1981 failure to promote claims relating to four assistant principal positions for which she applied in 2007, 2008, and 2009 were also time-barred. This was incorrect: the claims were brought within the four-year statute of limitations period.

When the dust settles, these four § 1981

claims as well as three Title VII claims remain. All of these causes of action are for failure to promote. The § 1981 claims relate to the following positions: (1) assistant principal available in 2007; (2) assistant principal available in 2008; (3) assistant principal at Central High School available in 2009; and (4) assistant principal at Memorial High School available in 2009. The Title VII claims relate to the following positions: (1) the academic dean positions available in 2010; (2) the Blazer Connection coordinator position available in 2010;¹ and (3) the assistant principal positions available in 2012.

The district court correctly held that Riley failed to produce sufficient evidence for any of these claims to survive summary judgment. We review the grant of summary judgment de novo , construing the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, Riley. E.g. , Chaib v. Geo Group, Inc. , 819 F.3d 337, 340 (7th Cir. 2016)

. Summary judgment is appropriate and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law where “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) ; accord.

Boss v. Castro , 816 F.3d 910, 916 (7th Cir. 2016). Here, summary judgment for ECS on these claims is appropriate because Riley either failed to produce evidence entirely or produced evidence that did not create a triable issue of fact under the relevant legal framework.

To proceed to trial on a failure to promote claim, a plaintiff either must produce “sufficient direct or circumstantial evidence that [the employer's] promotion decisions were intentionally discriminatory or make an indirect case of discrimination” under the burden-shifting method of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green , 411 U.S. 792, 802–04, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973)

. Adams v. City of Indianapolis , 742 F.3d 720, 735 (7th Cir. 2014). Here, Riley has chosen the indirect path. Under this rubric, Riley must first produce evidence of a prima facie case for failure to promote; if she does so, ECS must then produce evidence of “a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the employment action” ; if the employer produces evidence of a legitimate reason, the plaintiff must then produce evidence that the employer's “stated reason is a pretext.” Simpson v. Beaver Dam Cmty. Hosps., Inc. , 780 F.3d 784, 790 (7th Cir. 2015)

(citing McDonnell Douglas , 411 U.S. at 802–04, 93 S.Ct. 1817 ).

To demonstrate a prima facie case for failure to promote, a plaintiff must produce evidence showing that: (1) she was a member of a protected class; (2) she was qualified for the position...