Riley v. Interstate Bus. Men's Accident Ass'n

• Decision Date: 17 May 1915
• Docket Number: No. 30028.,30028.
• Citation: 152 N.W. 617
• Parties: RILEY v. INTERSTATE BUSINESS MEN'S ACCIDENT ASS'N.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

152 N.W. 617

RILEY

v.INTERSTATE BUSINESS MEN'S ACCIDENT ASS'N.

No. 30028.^a1

Supreme Court of Iowa.

May 17, 1915.

Appeal from District Court, Linn County; Milo P. Smith, Judge.

Action to recover on an accident policy. Judgment for the defendant. Plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.Tourtellot & Donnelly, of Cedar Rapids, and Edwards, Longley & Ransier, of Waterloo, for appellant.

Dunshee & Haines, of Des Moines, for appellee.

GAYNOR, J.

This is an action brought in equity by the plaintiff to enforce the making and collection of an assessment on the members of defendant association, and the payment to the plaintiff of the proceeds, to an amount not exceeding $5,000. The action is predicated on the fact that the husband of the plaintiff died while a member in good standing, that his death was brought about through external, violent, and accidental means, and that, by the terms of the policy, plaintiff is entitled to the relief prayed for. The defendant demurred to the petition of the plaintiff, and this demurrer was sustained, and judgment entered for the defendant dismissing plaintiff's petition. The facts alleged in the petition to which the demurrer was interposed, are substantially as follows: That on the 5th day of August, 1911, the defendant executed and delivered to one John N. Riley a certificate of membership in its association; that this certificate provided that he was entitled to such benefits as may be provided in and by the articles of incorporation and by-laws of said association in force and effect at the time of the accident. That by the acceptance of the certificate, he agreed to the several provisions and conditions of said articles and by-laws. The articles and by-laws so far as material to this case, are set out in the petition, and are as follows:

“Death Indemnity. In case of the death of a member resulting from bodily injuries effected solely by external, violent and accidental means, and without intervening cause within six months of the happening of the accident, the association will pay to the beneficiary nominated by the member in writing, filed with the secretary-treasurer during the life of the member (the beneficiary must be the surviving wife or heir of the member), the proceeds of one assessment of $2.00 on each member in good standing but not to exceed the sum of five thousand dollars.”

“Limitation of Risk. The association does not assume any liability for accidental injury sustained while the member is in any degree under the influence of intoxicating liquor; nor for disability or death resulting from the voluntary or involuntary taking of poison; nor resulting from the voluntary or involuntary inhalation of illuminating or other gas; nor if the occasion of the accident be disease, bodily or mental infirmity, fits, vertigo, sleepwalking, medical or surgical treatment (except operations rendered necessary by reason of accidental injury, and performed within twenty-six weeks from the date of the accident); or voluntary act of the member in exposing himself to appreciable and unnecessary danger; nor if the accident occur in an altercation, fight or brawl provoked by the member; nor if the accident occur while the member is violating the law; nor if the accident is effected by the discharge of firearms unless the discharge be witnessed by some person other than the member; nor unless the body of the member be recovered and the undertaker's return be filed with other proofs, except in cases where the body is not recovered and the accidental character of the event resulting in death is proven by eyewitnesses.”

The petition further alleges that on the 16th day of January, 1912, the said John N. Riley died at Thompson, Iowa, from the effects of poison taken at Germania under the following circumstances: Riley was a conductor on a branch of the Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway, and at the time of his death was 47 years old. While upon one of his trips and at the town called Germania, he was taken with pain in the stomach, and went to see one Dr. Waud, who also ran a drug store. He left his train about 5:25 p. m., and was due to leave Germania at 5:45. When he left the train, he instructed the brakemen to have everything ready, and that he would leave on time. He got some medicine from the doctor in a graduate, and came back to his train at 5:40. When he returned, he said his legs were weak; that he would go into the coach and sit down. He started out of the depot and he got to the bay window in front of the depot and took hold of the ledge. After he started from town on his train, he complained of his legs hurting him. He said, “Boys, what do you suppose the old doctor gave me?” When he got up, he started having convulsions and became unconscious. A doctor was called at Buffalo Center. They started from Buffalo Center with the doctor, but stopped at Thompson, where Riley died. A coroner's inquest was held, and the coroner's jury returned a verdict of death by poisoning. The doctor who attended him stated in the proofs of loss, which were attached to the petition, that Riley died of cramp asphyxia from strychnine poisoning. There are other statements in the proofs of loss by other parties to the effect that the poisoning was accidental. It does not appear from the petition, though, that these parties had any personal knowledge of the taking of the medicine or the circumstances under which it was taken. The allegations of the proof of loss were made a part of the petition, and, in the words of the pleader:

“He died from the effects of poison accidentally taken at Germania, under the circumstances fully and at length set out in the claims and proofs of death.”

These are all the facts, touching the death of Riley, referred to in the petition, and these are the facts upon which the plaintiff bases her right to recover for the death of Riley under this certificate. From these facts, the ultimate fact appears that Riley died from the effect of strychnine poison, taken at the time and under the circumstances detailed in the petition.

[1] The contention of the plaintiff is that the defendant is liable under its policy for accidental death. It will be noticed, from a reading of the articles of incorporation and by-laws, that the defendant did not undertake to indemnify the plaintiff in the event her husband should meet with an accidental death, but the undertaking was to indemnify plaintiff in the event his death was produced by accidental means. There is a difference between an accidental result and an accidental cause. The result may not have been anticipated, could not have been foreseen, was not intended. The immediate cause of the result may have been the voluntary and intentional act of the party suffering the unanticipated result. This distinction is clearly made in Feder v. I. St. M. A., 107 Iowa, 538, 78 N. W. 252, 43 L. R. A. 693, 70 Am. St. Rep. 212. In that case, the defendant was suffering from consumption. He went to Denver for his health. The change of climate and medical care had a beneficial effect upon him, and he seemed to be constantly improving. During the day of his death, he appeared as well as usual. He was about to leave his apartments. Preparatory to leaving, he undertook to close a shutter. He stood upon a chair and reached towards the shutter. As he did so, the blood began to flow from his mouth. He died in a few minutes. The cause of his death was hemorrhage from a ruptured artery, and it is said:

“The evidence would have authorized the conclusion that the rupture of the artery was due to the disease from which he was suffering. There is no evidence that he fell, slipped, or lost his balance, or that the shutter moved at his touch more or less readily than he expected. Or, in other words, there was nothing done or occurred which he had not foreseen and planned, except the rupture of the artery and the consequences which resulted.”

It was there held that while the result which followed his act was not the usual result of such an effort, and was unusual and unexpected, yet it is said:

“Although a result may not be designed, foreseen, or expected, yet if it be the natural and direct effect of acts voluntarily done, or of conditions voluntarily assumed, it cannot be said to be accidental.”

Thus it is apparent that to entitle one to recover, under a policy like the one in question, it is not sufficient to show that the death was accidental. Death is the result of some precedent act or condition. It is traceable to some cause. It is not sufficient, to make the cause accidental, that it appear that the resulting death was unanticipated, unforeseen, and not expected as a result of the act done. It must appear that that which happened to produce the result happened through accident, in order that the proper foundation may be laid for the recovery. The policy provides recovery in the event of death, but only where death results from bodily injuries effected solely by external, violent, and accidental means.

This brings us to the consideration of the first question in this case, and that is, Do the facts alleged in the petition show an accidental cause for the death, or do the facts show the death, which, though accidental, was not produced by accidental means?

It appears from the petition that Mr. Riley, immediately before taking the poison, was suffering from a pain in the stomach; that he went to a doctor, who was also a druggist or operating a drug store, and was given by this doctor a dose of medicine in a graduate glass. After taking this medicine, it appeared that he was taken with convulsions and became unconscious, and died within about an hour after the taking; that this medicine was, in fact, strychnine; that he died from cramp asphyxia, from strychnine poisoning. We narrow the inquiry, then, to those provisions of the contract relied on, which deal with the conditions attending Riley's death. We take up the first proposition, Did the death result...