Riley v. Jersey Leather Co.
| Decision Date | 20 October 1924 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 46-48.,s. 46-48. |
| Citation | 126 A. 457 |
| Parties | RILEY v. JERSEY LEATHER CO. SAME v. PEERLESS KID CO. SAME v. RUBY KID CO. |
| Court | New Jersey Supreme Court |
(Syllabus by the Court.)
Appeals from Supreme Court.
Three actions by Owen John Riley, by his next friend, Nellie Goldy, against the Jersey Leather Company, against the Peerless Kid Company, and against the Ruby Kid Company. Eroni a judgment in each case for defendant, plaintiff appeals. Reversed, and venire de novo awarded.
William C. French and Samuel T. French, both of Camden, for appellant.
Howard L. Miller, of Camden, for respondents.
These appeals are from judgments of nonsuit at the Camden circuit in three suits tried below, and argued here together; and it is stipulated that "these three cases shall be considered as one case."
At the trial the following matters of fact appeared without substantial dispute: The three defendant leather companies were in some respects co-related and interlocking. They had their plants immediately adjoining one another, and for certain purposes occupied and used in common the yard where the accident took place which is the basis of these suits. In this yard they maintained a large coal pile, which was used in common in a steam power plant, which power plant in turn furnished the three companies with power, heat, and light. The coal pile contained several hundred tons, partly hard coal and partly soft coal, and apparently extended some distance along the water front. The companies contracted with a contractor for the carting of coal from the pile to the common power plant, and the plaintiff, a young man 20 years old, was an employee of such contractor. A week or two before the accident, by reason of rain, followed by very cold weather, the top of the pile of coal froze to a depth of several feet, and in that situation both the servants of the independent contractor, and the servant of the defendant companies, took pea coal at one point from underneath the frozen crust, thereby creating a hole approximately 10 feet wide and 10 feet deep, and leaving unsupported, about 20 feet above the ground, an overhanging ledge of frozen coal. The plaintiff came to work in that yard for the first time at 2 o'clock in the afternoon of January 26, 1920. He worked "on the soft coal" carting it to the power plant, until about 5 o'clock, when it "became dark," and then prepared to leave. Then his employer, the independent contractor, requested him to "help with a couple of loads of pea coal. It was about 15 minutes later, while at that work, near the overhanging ledge of pea coal, that the ledge fell and rolled over on the plaintiff inflicting the injuries for which suit was brought.
Further and complementary evidence will be referred to in the course of the opinion.
The learned trial judge nonsuited the plaintiff upon two grounds. The first was because he considered that it "had not been shown that there had been a failure upon the part of any of these defendants in any duty owed to the plaintiff."
We are of the opinion that the nonsuit cannot be justified upon that ground.
The defendants argue in support of the nonsuit that the plaintiff was a mere "licensee, entitled only to protection from wanton and malicious negligence."
But that is not so. As we have said, the plaintiff was an employee of the contractor who had contracted with the defendants to haul the coal in their yard from the pile to their power plant, and was injured while executing the work called for by that contract. Now the rule is that where, as here, the occupier of lands engages an independent contractor to do work upon his premises, an employee of the contractor, while executing the work, is there presumably by the request of the occupier, and is an invitee and not a mere licensee. See Hardy v. D. L. & W. R. Co., 57 N. J. Law, 505, 31 A. 281, affirmed 58 N. J. Law, 205, 35 A. 1130; Dettmering v. English, 64 N. J. Law, 16, 44 A. 855, 48 L R. A. 106.
It is, of course, true that ordinarily the contractor and not the contractee is the person liable to an employee of the...
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...related to the manner in which the work is performed or to the furnishing of defective equipment. Riley v. Jersey Leather Co., 100 N.J.L. 300, 302, 126 A. 457 (E. & A.1924); cf. Meny v. Carlson, 6 N.J. 82, 98, 77 A.2d 245, 22 A.L.R.2d 1160 (1950); see Hardy v. Delaware, L. & W.R.R. Co.,57 N......
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...However, if believed, the testimony would support a finding that the general contractor was negligent. See Riley v. Jersey Leather Co., 100 N.J.L. 300, 126 A. 457 (E. & A.1924). Defendant argues that, if true, Clark's statements were made as a mere volunteer and not as its agent, so that it......
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