Riley v. Lake
| Decision Date | 01 December 1972 |
| Docket Number | No. 43004,43004 |
| Citation | 203 N.W.2d 331,295 Minn. 43 |
| Parties | Carolyn M. RILEY, Respondent, v. Henry Arthur LAKE et al., Appellants. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. Although plaintiff entered the intersection slightly before defendant, who was approaching from the right, Minn.St. 169.20, subd. 1, which gives the driver on the right the right-of-way at uncontrolled intersections when two vehicles enter the intersection at approximately the same time, is applicable when there is imminent danger of collision if both vehicles maintain their course and speed.
2. Failure to yield the statutory right-of-way is prima facie evidence of negligence. Ordinarily, the question whether the prima facie case established by failure to yield has been overcome should be decided by the jury; but where the evidence is insufficient to excuse the violation of the statute, the jury should be instructed that the violator is negligent as a matter of law.
3. Except for those rare cases where there is no dispute in the evidence and the factfinder can come to only one decision, the apportionment of causal negligence is for the jury. Under the facts of this case, we can neither find the failure to instruct that plaintiff was negligent as a matter of law to be harmless error, nor can we find as a matter of law that plaintiff was at least as negligent as defendant.
4. The amount of damages found by the jury is supported by the evidence.
Reavill, Neimeyer, Johnson, Fredin & Killen and Steven J. Seiler, Duluth, for appellants.
MacDonald & Munger, Palmer, Hood, Crassweller & McCarthy, Duluth, for respondent.
This is an appeal from an order denying defendant's motion for amended answers to the interrogatories to the jury or for judgment notwithstanding the verdict of the jury, or for a new trial and from the judgment entered pursuant to the court's order.
The case arises out of an intersection collision between a car driven by plaintiff and one driven by defendant Henry Arthur Lake and owned by his father, defendant Elmer H. Lake. Henry Arthur Lake will be referred to as the defendant hereinafter since the father is involved only because he was the owner of the car. The collision occurred on January 26, 1968, at approximately 1:55 p.m. While there was some snow and moisture on the street, the day was clear.
Dodge Street for all essential purposes of this opinion runs east and west and intersects 51st Avenue East at right angles. The intersection is unprotected by either stop signs or lights. To the southeast of the intersection there is a public works building. While the evidence is somewhat conflicting, the jury could find that this building is located about 58 feet south of Dodge Street.
Fifty-first Avenue from curb to curb is 30 feet in width. Dodge Street had no curbs, but the improved portion of the street was about 20 feet wide. Snow had been plowed on both streets, which somewhat limited the width of the driving portion. Everyone agrees that the snowbanks were not high enough to interfere with vision.
Plaintiff was traveling north on 51st Avenue. Defendant was traveling west on Dodge Street. Plaintiff testified that a person following the route she was taking would have a clear view to the east along Dodge Street for at least a city block after passing the public works building. She said she looked to her right but saw nothing approaching the intersection. There was a car parked somewhere on the driveway of the public works building, the exact location of which is not clear. Plaintiff said this car momentarily obstructed her view to the east. The drivers of both cars approached the intersection at a speed of about 25 miles per hour. Plaintiff testified that she took her foot off the accelerator as she approached the intersection but otherwise did nothing to slow down. Plaintiff did not see defendant until the moment of impact. While there is some dispute in the evidence as to where plaintiff's automobile was when the collision occurred, the jury could find that she was about 90 percent through the intersection when defendant collided with the rear right side of her car. The impact of the collision spun her car around and it came to rest against a tree near the side of the road. The jury returned a special verdict finding that plaintiff was not guilty of negligence and defendant was 100-percent responsible. They awarded plaintiff damages in the amount of $15,500. The post-trial motions were denied by the trial court.
Plaintiff's principal contentions are that she entered the intersection first and that the car parked on the driveway obstructed her view of approaching traffic on Dodge Street. While there is some dispute as to the location of the parked car, it is clear that at most it could only have obstructed her view momentarily. She admitted that after passing the buildings she had a clear view down Dodge Street for at least a block. Her testimony was:
'Q * * * Now, Mrs. Riley, heading north on 51st Avenue East, approaching the intersection of Dodge, the moment your car clears that Public Works building you have a clear view to your right down Dodge Street, have you not?
'A Yes.
'Q Practically all the way down, to the next corner.
'Q And once you clear, to be sure we understand each other, once you clear that building you can look to your right down Dodge Street practically to Superior (Street), can't you?
'A Practically, yes.
'Q And you said you looked to your right and you didn't see the Lake car at all, when you looked to your right.
'A No, I didn't.'
Her testimony as to whether the parked car obstructed her view is not persuasive. On cross-examination she testified:
'Q Do you maintain then that that car obstructed your view down Dodge Street?
'A Yes, I would have to say that it would to some extent.
'Q Well, at the time you say you made your observations to the right was that at a time when that car obstructed your view?
'A As I approached the intersection a car was there, yes, but I had to look beyond the car to see where I--
'Q Well, my question is, whether you're saying that that car obstructed your view down Dodge Street to your right.
'A Yes, a certain amount it did.
'Q And that was at the time that you made your glance to your right, that the car was obstructing your view?
'A I glanced to my right, yes.
'Q So you didn't do anything about making any observations so as to approach that intersection at a time when your view wasn't obstructed, did you?
'A Well, I slowed down.
'Q You didn't do anything about making any observations to your right as you approached that intersection at a time when your view to your right was not obstructed, did you?
(This question was not answered, due to objections.)
'Q Well, then, the only view you made to your right as you approached this intersection was when this parked automobile was obstructing your view, is that right?
'A Yes.
'Q You knew, did you not at that time, that this was an unguarded intersection?
'A Yes.
'A I understand that, yes.
'Q You understood it on that day of this accident, didn't you?
'A Yes.'
Plaintiff places considerable stress on the following statement made by defendant to Officer Robert G. Kohl at the scene of the accident:
'Q And what was the statement that you took from the driver of Vehicle number one--that would be Henry Lake?
'A The statement listed in my report as being taken from this driver was: 'I was heading in a westerly direction on Dodge Street, at about twenty-five miles per hour. I had just skidded into another vehicle a short while ago 1 and I was shook up about that. I didn't see her coming, I just wasn't paying any attention. She was almost all the way through the intersection when I hit her. That's why the rear of her car is damaged."
The trouble is that plaintiff's statement to Officer Kohl is equally damaging:
'A The statement from this driver (plaintiff) was: 'I was headed up' and I have 'North' in parentheses
The net result is that whatever can be said about defendant's failure to keep a proper lookout applies with equal force to plaintiff, in addition to which plaintiff failed to yield the right-of-way, as was her duty. She either did not look or she failed to see what was in plain sight.
Plaintiff seeks to use the negligence of defendant to excuse her failure to yield the right-of-way. This, we submit, may not be done. No one quarrels with the fact that defendant can be found guilty of negligence. That, however, does not excuse plaintiff from keeping a proper lookout and yielding the right-of-way to approaching traffic.
Next, plaintiff contends she entered the intersection first. The physical facts would bear her out, but her entry into the intersection must have occurred only a split second ahead of defendant's. Both were traveling at about the same speed. Plaintiff's car would have traveled at most about the width of Dodge Street plus the length of that part of her car which had cleared the intersection when she was struck. At the rate she was traveling, it would have taken her about 1 1/2 seconds to travel this distance. The case is governed by Minn.St. 169.20, subd. 1. Prior to 1955, this statutory provision read in part:
'The driver of a vehicle approaching an intersection shall yield the right of way to a vehicle which has entered the intersection from a different highway.
'When two vehicles enter an intersection from different highways at...
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