Riley v. Lee

• Decision Date: 25 May 1889
• Citation: 11 S.W. 713,88 Ky. 603
• Parties: RILEY v. LEE et al.
• Court: Kentucky Court of Appeals

11 S.W. 713

88 Ky. 603

RILEY v. LEE et al.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

May 25, 1889

Appeal from circuit court, Owen county; WARREN MONTFORT, Judge.

"To be officially reported."

Action by O. V. Riley against George S. Lee and others. Plaintiff appeals.

T. R Gordon and J. J. Landram, for appellant.

E. E Settle and Lindsay & Botts, for appellees.

BENNETT J.

The appellant's petition and amended petition charge the appellees, as the owners and publishers of a newspaper known as the "Owenton News," in Owen county, Ky. with having maliciously procured and published, for the purpose of defaming, degrading, and holding up to ridicule and contempt the appellant, a writing which was false, and known by them to be false, as follows: "Whereas O. V. Riley did make representations to me that it would be impossible for my sister Bettie Threlkeld to secure the position of teacher of the school in the Cedar Hill district, when at the very time that he made the assertion a bona fide contract with the trustees of said school had been made in which she was positively engaged to teach said school, and whereas the disappointment occasioned by this misrepresentation of his caused my sister's mind to be sorely troubled during her late illness, causing her to despair, and assisting the ravages of disease to undermine her constitution, and further considering the fact that his sister had applied for the same school, I regard this conduct in him as uncalled for ungentlemanly, and detestable, as his statement was fallacious. [Signed] A. E. THRELKELD, M. D." The lower court sustained demurrers to the petition and amended petition, setting up the foregoing matters. From this ruling the appellant has appealed.

The sole question to be determined is: Are the matters charged in the petition and amended petition libelous? There is a material difference between slander and libel. Many things are actionable when written or printed and published that are not actionable if spoken, as the following cases show: In Clement v. Chivis, 9 Barn. & C. 172, it is said "There is a marked distinction in the books between oral and written slander. The latter is premeditated, and shows design. It is more permanent, and calculated to do a much greater injury, than slander merely spoken." In McClurg v. Ross, 5 Bin. 218, it is said: "Words are often spoken in heat, in haste, and with very little reflection or ill intention, and frequently forgotten or repented of as soon as spoken; but writing requires deliberation, and is therefore more injurious to the character attacked. We are apt to suppose that before a man reduces an accusation to writing he has satisfied himself of the truth of it; and, if he has not satisfied himself, his conduct is certainly very reprehensible. Besides, the scandal is more permanent and more widely diffused, so that whether we consider the injury itself, or the mind of the person by whom the injury is committed, a libel is entitled to less allowance than a slander by words." In Stow v. Converse, 3 Conn. 325, 342, it is said: "It is because the imputations are written, and may circulate extensively, and never be forgotten, that the law respecting libels is so different as it is from the rules relative to verbal slander." In view of the fact that newspapers generally, as the chroniclers of current events, public measures and the acts of public men, are circulated everywhere, and read by all classes, as seekers of such information, and which the publishers and editors endeavor to impress upon the readers are true, and which are seldom rejected as absolutely false, but generally received as probably true, or as containing at least some truth, and as those papers are preserved for years and years, and whose attacks upon personal character may be reproduced at any time to wreck honorable old age, or be thrown in the teeth of his descendants, in order to gratify personal spite, or to subserve partisan ends, the reason for the distinction between libel and slander in reference to newspapers is intensified. The following cases illustrate the rule for libel as distinguished from the rule for slanderous words spoken: Cropp v. Tilney, 3 Salk. 225: "Scandalous matter is not necessary to make a libel. It is enough if the defendant induces an ill opinion to be had of the plaintiff, or make him contemptible and ridiculous." Villers v. Monsley, 2 Wils. 403: To publish a writing of another which "tends to hinder mankind from associating or having intercourse with him" is libelous. Woodard v. Dowsing, 2 Man. & R. 74: "That which tends to disgrace," if written and published, is a libel. " Forbes v. King, 1 Dowl. 672: "Undoubtedly to write of a man what will degrade him in society is actionable. " Parmiter v. Coupland, 6 Mees. & W. 105: "A publication without justification or lawful excuse, which is calculated to injure the reputation of another by exposing him to hatred, contempt, or ridicule, is a libel. " Dexter v. Spear, 4 Mason, 115, Judge STORY: "Any publication, the tendency of which is to degrade and injure another person, or bring him into contempt, ridicule, or hatred, * * * is a libel. " Dunn v. Winters, 2 Humph. 513: "Any writing or printing, * * * tending to injure the character of an individual, or diminish his reputation, is a libel. " Colby v. Reynolds, 6 Vt. 489: Any written publication concerning another that "tends to render his situation in society uncomfortable and irksome, * * * or tends to impair his standing in society as a man of rectitude and...