Riley v. Standard Oil Co. of New York

• Decision Date: 31 May 1921
• Parties: RILEY v. STANDARD OIL CO. OF NEW YORK.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

231 N.Y. 301

132 N.E. 97

RILEY

v.STANDARD OIL CO. OF NEW YORK.

Court of Appeals of New York.

May 31, 1921.

Action by Arthur F. Riley, an infant, by Eleanor D. Riley, his guardian ad litem, against the Standard Oil Company of New York. From a judgment of the Appellate Division (191 App. Div. 490,181 N. Y. Supp. 573) reversing a judgment of the Trial Term entered upon a verdict in favor of the plaintiff and dismissing the complaint, plaintiff appeals.

Judgment of Appellate Division modified in so far as it directed dismissal and in so far as it failed to direct a new trial, and as so modified affirmed, with costs to abide the event.

McLaughlin, J., Hiscock, C. J., and Chase, J., dissenting.

Appeal from Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second department.

G. F. Hickey, of New York City, and Lawrence T. Gresser, for appellant.

A. F. Van Thun, Jr., of Brooklyn, Percy G. King, and John J. Barry, of Brooklyn, for respondent.

ANDREWS, J.

Driving directly towards his master's mill, his master's truck loaded with his master's goods for which his master had sent him, his only purpose to deliver them as his master had commanded, with no independent object of his own in mind, Million, a chauffeur employed by the defendant, ran over the plaintiff, negligently, as the jury have said with some evidence to support their finding. Therefore the complaint should not have been dismissed, unless we can say as a matter of law that at the moment of the accident this chauffeur was not engaged in the defendant's business. We reach no such conclusion.

There could be no debate on this subject were not the essential facts obscured or modified by other circumstances.It appears, however, that the chauffeur had been ordered to go from the mill to the freight yards of the Long Island Railroad, about 2 1/2 miles away, obtain there some barrels of paint, and return at once. After the truck was loaded, Million discovered some waste pieces of wood. He threw them on the truck, and on leaving the yards turned, not towards the mill, but in the opposite direction. Four blocks away was the house of a sister, and there he left the wood. This errand served no purpose of the defendant, nor did the defendant have knowledge of or consent to the act of the chauffeur. Million then started to return to the mill. His course would lead him back past the entrance to the yards. Before he reached this entrance, and when he had gone but a short distance from his sister's house, the accident occurred.

A master is liable for the result of a servant's negligence when the servant is acting in his business; when he still is engaged in the course of his employment. It is not the rule itself but its application that ever causes a doubt. The servant may be acting for himself. He may be engaged in an independent errand of his own. Reilly v. Connable, 214 N. Y. 586, 108 N. E. 853, L. R. A. 1916A, 954, Ann. Cas. 1916A, 656. He may abandon his master's service permanently or temporarily. While still doing his master's work he may be also serving a purpose of his own. Quinn v. Power, 87 N. Y. 535, 41 Am. Rep. 392. He may be performing his master's work but in a forbidden manner. Cosgrove v. Ogden, 49 N. Y. 255, 10 Am. Rep. 361. Many other conditions may arise.

No formula can be stated that will enable us to solve the problem whether at a particular moment a particular servant is engaged in his master's business. We recognize that the precise facts before the court will vary the result. We realize that differences of degree may produce unlike effects. But, whatever the facts, the answer depends upon a consideration of what the servant was doing, and why, when, where, and how he was doing it.

A servant may be ‘going on a frolic of his own, without being at all on his master's business.’ He may be so distant from the proper scene of his labor, or he may have left his work for such a length of time, as to evidence a relinquishment of his employment. Or the circumstances may have a more doubtful meaning. That the servant is where he would not be had he obeyed his master's orders in itself is immaterial, except as it may tend to show a permanent or a temporary abandonment of his master's service. Should there be such a temporary abandonment the master again becomes liable for the servant's acts when the latter once more begins to act in his business. Such a re-entry is not affected merely by the mental attitude of the servant. There must be that attitude coupled with a reasonable connection in time and space with the work in which he should be engaged. No hard and fast rule on the subject either of space or time can be applied. It cannot be said of a servant in charge of his master's vehicle who temporarily abandons his line of travel for a purpose of his own that he again becomes a servant only when he reaches a point on his route which he necessarily would have passed had he obeyed his orders. He may choose a different way back. Doubtless this circumstance may be considered in connection with the other facts involved. It is not controlling.

We are not called upon to decide whether the defendant might not have been responsible had this accident occurred while Million was on his way to his sister's house. That would depend on whether this trip is to be regarded as a new and independent journey on his own business, distinct from that of his master (Story v. Ashton, L. R. 4 Q. B. 476; McCarthy v. Timmins, 178 Mass. 378, 59 N. E. 1038,86 Am. St. Rep. 490), or as a mere deviation from the general route from the mill and back. Considering the short distance and the little time involved, considering that the truck when it left the yards was loaded with the defendant's goods for delivery to its mill and that it was the general purpose of Million to return there, it is quite possible a question of fact would be presented to be decided by a jury. At least, however, with the wood delivered, with the journey back to the mill begun, at some point in the route Million again engaged in the defendant's business. That point, in view of all the circumstances, we think he had reached. Jones v. Weigand, 134 App. Div. 644,119 N. Y. Supp. 441.

The judgment of the Appellate Division must be modified in so far as it directs the dismissal of the complaint and in so far as it fails to direct a new trial, and as so modified affirmed, with costs to abide the event.

McLAUGHLIN, J. (dissenting).

This action was brought to recover damages for personal injuries. The plaintiff had a verdict for a substantial amount, upon which judgment was entered. An appeal was taken to the Appellate Division (191 App. Div. 490,181 N. Y. Supp. 573), where the same was unanimously reversed, and the complaint dismissed. The appeal to this court followed.

The defendant, on the 27th day of January, 1919, was and for some time prior thereto had been the owner of an autotruck which was operated by a chauffeur by the name of Million. Assuming that there was sufficient evidence to go to the jury on the question of Million's negligence, then the sole question presented is whether the defendant is responsible therefor. In determining this question there is substantially no dispute between the parties as to the material facts involved. On the day named Million was directed by the defendant to take the truck from its factory to a freight yard of the Long Island Railroad, some 2 1/2 miles distant, there take from a railroad car several barrels of paint, place the same upon the truck, and return at once to the factory. He did as directed so far as loading the barrels of paint upon the truck was concerned, then, having discovered some wood in the railroad car, placed that upon the truck, and drove it several blocks in an opposite direction from the factory to the residence of his sister. He there unloaded the wood, turned the truck around, and started back over the same route which he had previously passed, but before reaching the yard ran over the plaintiff, inflicting upon him very serious injuries.

The case was sent to the jury with instructions that, the wood having been delivered, and the truck being headed towards the yard where Million had to go in order to reach defendant's factory, ‘he had resumed his master's service,’ whatever may have been his relation to the master while he was on his way to deliver the wood.

The Appellate Division reversed the judgment and dismissed the complaint, upon the ground, as appears from the opinion delivered, that the uncontradicted facts showed, at the time the accident occurred, Million was not acting within the scope of his employment, or in furtherance of the master's business,but instead was on a personal errand which defendant had no...