Riley v. State

• Decision Date: 21 March 2003
• Citation: 875 So.2d 352
• Parties: McGregory Ladale RILEY v. STATE of Alabama.
• Court: Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

875 So.2d 352

McGregory Ladale RILEY v. STATE of Alabama.

CR-01-1530.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.

March 21, 2003.

Rehearing Denied May 16, 2003.

Certiorari Denied September 19, 2003.

Jeffrey Todd Stearns, Brewton, for appellant.

William H. Pryor, Jr., atty. gen., and H. Clay Barnett III, asst. atty. gen., for appellee.

Alabama Supreme Court 1021406.

COBB, Judge.

On December 12, 2001, McGregory Ladale Riley was convicted of murder, a violation of § 13A-6-2(a)(1), Ala.Code 1975. On February 12, 2002, the trial court sentenced him to life in prison. On March 4, 2002, Riley filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied by operation of law on April 13, 2002, 60 days after the pronouncement of sentence. See Rule 24.4, Ala. R.Crim. P. This appeal followed. The evidence adduced at trial revealed the following: On December 30, 2000, Riley and Jomika Williams, his girlfriend, were at her apartment after returning from her sister's house; they began to argue. Williams asked Riley to leave. Riley agreed to leave the apartment and took some of his clothes to his truck. When Riley reentered the apartment to retrieve another bag, he discovered Williams standing in the den with a knife. In response, Riley went to the kitchen to get a knife. Riley testified that he was afraid of Williams because she had threatened to kill him with a knife on several prior occasions. Williams swung the knife at Riley, who swung his knife at her and stabbed her. Riley dropped his knife on the floor, and he retrieved another one from the kitchen. Riley stabbed Williams in the chest, and she fell to the floor. Riley stabbed her again.

After stabbing Williams, Riley drove to a grocery store and bought a bottle of Tylenol. He returned to the apartment and swallowed 150 Tylenol pills in an apparent suicide attempt. When this suicide attempt failed, Riley again tried to kill himself by consuming antifreeze. This attempt also failed. The next morning when Riley awoke, he telephoned his sister and the police, stating that he had killed Williams. Police arrived at the apartment. They found the victim lying on the floor and Riley sitting on the sofa eating a piece of sausage.

Williams was found dead; a knife blade was protruding from her chest and she had suffered nine stab wounds. Dr. Arthur Wolf testified that three of the stab wounds were serious, and that any one of the three wounds could have caused her death. Four knives were recovered from the scene. Riley advances three arguments on appeal. We address each in turn.

I.

Riley claims that the trial court erred when it denied his Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), motion. Specifically, he argues that the prosecutor improperly struck veniremember no. 4 and that the prosecutor's stated reasons for doing so were pretextual. Riley argues that "the State offered a highly suspect reason with no underlying race neutral basis." (Riley's Brief, 13.)

The record reflects that the prosecution used six of its nine peremptory strikes to exclude nonwhite veniremembers. After Riley's trial counsel entered a Batson objection alleging that the prosecutor's strikes were racially motivated, the trial court held that Riley had established a prima facie case of racial discrimination. The trial court then required the prosecutor to state his reasons for the strikes. The prosecutor gave the following reason for striking veniremember no. 4:

"Is a black male who is the approximate age and size and even appearance of the Defendant. He's employed at Container Corporation. His wife is employed at the Department of Human Resources. When they reviewed our juror list, the Department of Human Resources suggested that we not use Mr. [C.] as a juror in a case that the State of Alabama was prosecuting."

(R. 92.)

The trial court asked the prosecutor if the contact person at the Department of Human Resources ("DHR") provided a reason for the suggestion. The prosecutor responded that the person at DHR did not state why he or she believed that the veniremember should not serve as a juror. Riley did not request further information regarding the DHR's suggestion. The trial court denied the Batson challenge as to veniremember no. 4, but stated that it had strong reservations about whether the State's reasons for striking the veniremember were sufficient. Riley argues on appeal that the trial court erred by accepting the prosecutor's reason, which, Riley says, did not have a race-neutral underlying basis.

"The party alleging racially discriminatory use of peremptory challenges bears the burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. Ex parte Branch, 526 So.2d 609, 622 (Ala.1987). Once a prima facie case has been established, a presumption is created that the peremptory challenges were used to discriminate against black jurors. Id. at 623. Where the prosecutor is required to explain his peremptory strikes, he or she must offer `"a clear, specific, and legitimate reason for the challenge which relates to the particular case to be tried, and which is nondiscriminatory. However, this showing need not rise to the level of a challenge for cause."' McLeod v. State, 581 So.2d 1144, 1155 (Ala.Cr.App.1990), quoting Ex parte Branch, 526 So.2d at 623. (Emphasis in Branch; citation omitted.) Once the responding party has articulated a race-neutral reason or explanation for eliminating the challenged jurors, the moving party can offer evidence showing that the reason or explanation is merely a sham or pretext. Ex parte Branch, 526 So.2d at 624. When the trial court has followed this procedure, its determination will be overturned only if that determination is `clearly erroneous.' Id. at 625."

Burgess v. State, 811 So.2d 557, 572-73 (Ala.Crim.App.1998), aff'd in pertinent part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 811 So.2d 617 (Ala.2000).

"Within the context of Batson, a `race-neutral' explanation `means an explanation based on something other than the race of the juror. At this step of the inquiry, the issue is the facial validity of the prosecutor's explanation. Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor's explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race neutral.' Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 360, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 1866, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991). `In evaluating the race-neutrality of an attorney's explanation, a court must determine whether, assuming the proffered reasons for the peremptory challenges are true, the challenges violate the Equal Protection Clause as a matter of law.' Id. `[E]valuation of the prosecutor's state of mind based on demeanor and credibility lies "peculiarly within the trial judge's province."' Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 365, 111 S.Ct. at 1869."

Allen v. State, 659 So.2d 135, 147 (Ala. Crim.App.1994). However, "the reasons given for striking a juror are not required to rise to the level justifying a challenge for cause." Pollard v. State, 549 So.2d 593, 596 (Ala.Crim.App.1989), citing Ex parte Lynn, 543 So.2d 709 (Ala.1988).

We acknowledge that "a prosecutor's exercise of a peremptory challenge of a black venireperson based solely upon the recommendation of a law enforcement officer is highly suspect. However, the underlying basis for the recommendation may supply a racially neutral reason for the exercise of a peremptory challenge." Robinson v. State, 560 So.2d 1130, 1133 (Ala.Crim.App.1990). This Court has upheld as race-neutral the reasons given by the prosecutor for striking black members of the venire that were based upon information obtained from law-enforcement officers because that information supplied a racially neutral reason for a peremptory challenge. See Sistrunk v. State, 599 So.2d 87 (Ala.Crim.App.1992); McLeod v. State, 581 So.2d 1144 (Ala.Crim.App.1990); and Robinson v. State, 560 So.2d 1130 (Ala.Crim.App.1989).

Although the Department of Human Resources is not a law-enforcement agency, it is an agency that can provide prosecutors valuable information regarding potential jurors, including information regarding owed child support, elder abuse, child abuse, criminal history, and domestic violence. Quite often, the information DHR has will be confidential, thereby preventing full disclosure to the prosecutors and, in turn, to the trial court of the facts underlying DHR's juror recommendation. The confidentiality of this information will also inhibit the prosecutor's ability to question the prospective juror on the subject. See, e.g., Ex parte Bird, 594 So.2d 676, 683 (Ala.1991) ("[T]he failure of the State to engage in any meaningful voir dire on a subject of alleged concern is evidence that the explanation is a sham and a pretext for discrimination.") (citing Ex parte Branch, 526 So.2d 609, 623 (Ala.1987)).

The trial court is in the best position to evaluate the circumstances surrounding a peremptory strike, particularly in light of the fact that it has an insight to the prosecutor's state of mind based on demeanor and credibility. While it certainly would be preferable if a prosecutor could give at least a general explanation of the information supplied by DHR, sometimes that will be impossible because of the confidential nature of the information. It is preferable in those cases for the prosecutor to know that the information is confidential and to relay that fact to the trial judge, unlike in this case.

Nonetheless, although the prosecutor in this case stated that the information underlying DHR's recommendation was unknown, rather than that it could not be known because of its confidential nature, we find that the prosecutor's reasons for striking veniremember no. 4 were facially race-neutral. As the State points out, "`[T]he issue is the facial validity of the prosecutor's explanation. Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor's explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race neutral.'" Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768, 115 S.Ct. 1769, 131 L.Ed.2d 834 (1995)(quoting Hernandez v. New...