Riley v. Superior Court In and For Los Angeles County

• Decision Date: 01 November 1957
• Citation: 316 P.2d 956,49 Cal.2d 305
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: Rebecca RILEY, as Administratrix of the Estate of Susan Ann. Blair, Deceased, Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR COURT of the State of California, IN AND FOR the COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Respondent. Naomi Blair Ruoff and Leon U. Everhart, Real Parties in Interest. L. A. 24622.

Page 956

316 P.2d 956

49 Cal.2d 305

Rebecca RILEY, as Administratrix of the Estate of Susan Ann. Blair, Deceased, Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR COURT of the State of California, IN AND FOR the COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Respondent Naomi Blair Ruoff and Leon U. Everhart, Real Parties in Interest.

L. A. 24622.

Supreme Court of California, In Bank.

Nov. 1, 1957.

As Modified on Denial of Rehearing Nov. 26, 1957.

Pines & Walsh, Harry A. Pines, and Roy B. Woolsey, Los Angeles, for petitioner.

No appearance for respondent.

Leon U. Everhart, Pasadena, in pro. per., and Montgomery G. Rice, Los Angeles, for real parties in interest.

CARTER, Justice.

This is a petition for a writ of certionari by Rebecca Riley, as administratrix of the estate of Susan Ann Blair, an incompetent person. By the petition, Rebecca Riley seeks to annul an order of the superior court which awarded fees and expenses to Naomi Blair Ruoff, guardian of the person and estate of Susan Ann Blair, now deceased. (This case is part of a long line of litigation see, In re Estate of Blair, 126 Cal.App.2d 759, 272 P.2d 866 (hearing denied); In re Estate of Blair, 127 Cal.App.2d 130, 273 P.2d 349; In re Estate of Blair, 132 Cal.App.2d 305, 282 P.2d 116 (hearing denied); In re Blair's Estate and Guardianship, 139 Cal.App.2d 832, 294 P.2d 521 (hearing denied); In re Estate of Blair, 42 Cal.2d 728, 269 P.2d 612.)

On August 8, 1950, Naomi Blair Ruoff was appointed and qualified as the guardian of the person and estate of Susan Ann Blair, an incompetent person. Susan Ann Blair died on May 21, 1951, and one Phoebe L. Bonnen was appointed and qualified as administratrix of her estate and letters of administration were issued to her. Phoebe L. Bonnen acted as administratrix of the decedent's estate until November 3, 1952, when she resigned and was succeeded by Rebecca Riley who has ever since acted as such administratrix.

On August 31, 1951, Naomi Blair Ruoff filed a first and final account and report of her guardianship, petition for fees and for distribution; on September 27, 1951, the court approved the account and awarded the fees prayed for $1,750 to the guardian, Naomi Blair Ruoff, and $1,800 to the guardian's attorney.

On November 15, 1951, Naomi Blair Ruoff, hereinafter referred to as guardian, petitioned the superior court to set aside its order approving the account and award of fees so that certain tax matters could be better presented.

On November 19, 1951, Rebecca Riley, hereinafter referred to as administratrix, moved for an order directing the immediate delivery to her of all assets of the deceased's estate.

On November 23, 1951, the probate court granted the guardian's petition to set aside its order of September 27, 1951.

On February 25, 1952, the administratrix filed a second petition for the immediate delivery of all assets.

On April 22, 1952, the guardian's amended supplemental report and account was filed. On May 2, 1952, the administratrix filed objections and sought to vacate the vacation order of November 23rd.

On August 5, 1952, the administratrix filed a third petition for an order directing the guardian to turn over all funds of the estate. On August 18th. the court directed the guardian to deliver the sum of $20,000 to the administratrix for tax purposes.

On January 6, 1953, a hearing was had on the amended supplemental report and account and the objections and on January 8th the court ordered all assets delivered to the administratrix except for certain sums to be retained by th guardian for miscellaneous closing expenses. The court did not pass on the amended report at this time.

On January 16, 1953, the guardian turned over to the administratrix the sum of $205,184.59.

On June 11, 1953, the court approved, with certain exceptions, the amended report.

On July 9, 1953, the guardian appealed from certain portions of the order. In re Estate of Blair, 127 Cal.App.2d 130, 273 P.2d 349.

On June 24, 1954, the guardian and administratrix entered into a stipulation which was considered by the District Court of Appeal in a later opinion (In re Blair's Estate and Guardianship, 139 Cal.App.2d 832, 834, 294 P.2d 521; hearing denied by this court on May 9, 1956).

On November 1, 1954, the guardian filed her account of closing expenses, and on December 14, 1954, the administratrix filed objections.

On March 5, 1955, the probate court made its order approving and settling the report of closing expenses, the discharge of the guardian, the exoneration of the guardian's bond, and denying the administratrix' petitions for surcharge and vacation of the order of June 11, 1953.

On March 25, 1955, the guardian filed proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law and a proposed order thereon; the administratrix filed objections. On April 11, 1955, a hearing was had on the proposals filed by the guardian and the objections filed by the administratrix. The objections were overruled and the findings, conclusions, and the order were signed by the trial court. The admininstratrix moved for a new trial which motion was denied.

On April 26, 1955, the administratrix appealed from the order which was affirmed and a petition for hearing by this court was denied (In re Blair's Estate and Guardianship, 139 Cal.App.2d 832, 294 P.2d 521).

On May 14, 1956, the remittitur issued to and was filed in the trial court.

On June 14, 1956, the guardian petitioned the court for additional fees for hereself in the sum of $3,250 and for her attorney (as guardian) the additional sum of $10,200 for services rendered since her petition of August 31, 1951. On November 27, 1956, the court granted the petition for fees although they were reduced as follows: to the guardian the sum of $3,250, and to the attorney the sum of $8,200. The court also declared a lien in favor of the guardian against the estate of the deceased ward. It is from this order that the administratrix seeks a writ of certiorari and a declararion that the fees awarded be annulled.

The administratrix contends that the probate court was without jurisdiction to entertain the guardian's petition for additional compensation for herself and the attorney or to declare a line in favor of the guardian against the estate of the deceased ward since its jurisdiction terminated with the order of March 25, 1955, approving the closing account and ordering the discharge of the guardian.

We have concluded that the contentions made by the administratrix are without merit and that the court had jurisdiction to make the order complained of. It is elementary that where a tribunal has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter, the jurisdiction continues until a final judgment is entered (Kennedy v. Industrial Acc. Comm., 50 Cal.App. 184, 191, 195 P. 267; 13 Cal.Jur.2d 602). Section 1049 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that 'An action is deemed to be pending from the time of its commencement until its final determination upon appeal, or until the time for appeal has passed, unless the judgment is sooner satisfied.' After the remittitur has gone down in accordance with the provisions of section 958 of the Code of Civil Proceudre the jurisdiction of the appellate court over the action ceases and jurisdiction is then revested in the trial court (Nuckolls v. Bank of California, 10 Cal.2d 266, 74 P.2d 264, 114 A.L.R. 708; People v. Hall, 115 Cal.App.2d 144, 251 P.2d 979; 4 Cal.Jur.2d 566). In the case at bar the additional fees had been made necessary by the action of the administratrix in appealing from the original order fixing the fees. The court could not, prior to the determination of the appeal, award fees which had not accured. Upon the remand of a case by the appellate court to the lower court, the trial court again has general...