Rinaldi v. Gillis, CIVIL ACTION NO. 98-2301 (E.D. Pa. 3/21/2000)
| Decision Date | 21 March 2000 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 98-2301. |
| Parties | MICHAEL RINALDI, Petitioner, v. FRANK GILLIS, Warden, ET AL., Respondents. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania |
Michael Rinaldi ("Rinaldi") is a prisoner in the custody of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania ("Commonwealth"). Before the court is Rinaldi's petition for a federal writ of habeas corpus and related filings.
On November 18, 1982, a Pennsylvania jury convicted Rinaldi of first-degree murder and criminal conspiracy. Rinaldi filed post-trial motions and pursued his direct appeals until the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied his petition for allocatur on September 22, 1987.
Almost seven years later, on August 25, 1994, Rinaldi filed a petition for relief under the state Post Conviction Relief Act, 42 Pa. C.S.A. 9541 et seq. (1988) ("PCRA"). The state court heard argument on the question of whether Rinaldi's seven-year delay in filing his petition prejudiced the Commonwealth in its ability to respond to the petition or in its ability to retry the case. Following a hearing, the state court dismissed Rinaldi's PCRA petition as unreasonably and prejudicially delayed. Rinaldi appealed the dismissal to the Pennsylvania Superior Court, which affirmed the dismissal. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied allocatur.
Within one year thereafter, Rinaldi instituted this action by filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1994 & 1999 Supp.). The matter was referred to a Magistrate Judge for a Report and Recommendation. Rinaldi filed objections to the Report and Recommendation. I will dismiss the petition.
On May 19, 1980, Rinaldi, Theodore DiPretoro ("DiPretoro"), and Edward Bianculli ("Bianculli") drove to a deserted area near the Philadelphia Airport in Tinicum Township, Pennsylvania. See Pennsylvania v. Rinaldi, No. 3323-82 Trial Tr. Vol. I at 89-93 (Pa. C.P. Ct. Del. Cty. Tr. of Nov. 16, 1982) (DiPretoro testifying) [hereafter "Trial Tr. I"];1 Pennsylvania v. Rinaldi, No. 3323-82 Trial Tr. Vol. II at 81-84 (Pa. C.P. Ct. Del. Cty. Tr. of Nov. 17, 1982) (Rinaldi testifying) [hereafter "Trial Tr. II"].2 Upon arrival, the car was parked at the roadside and Rinaldi remained in the car while DiPretoro and Bianculli exited and walked into tall weeds nearby. See Trial Tr. I at 92-94; Trial Tr. II at 84. DiPretoro shot and killed Bianculli. See Trial Tr. I at 94-95; Trial Tr. II at 84. DiPretoro returned to the car, which he and Rinaldi drove back to Philadelphia. See Trial Tr. I at 95-96; Trial Tr. II at 85-86. In 1982, DiPretoro confessed to an unrelated killing and then confessed to killing Bianculli. See Trial Tr. I at 73-76. He implicated Rinaldi in the killing of Bianculli. See Trial Tr. I at 76. Rinaldi was arrested and, on July 27, 1982, was charged with murder and criminal conspiracy. See Pennsylvania v. Rinaldi, Crim. No. 3323-82, July 27, 1982 Crim. Info. (Doc. No. 2 of State Ct. Rec.).
On November 16, 1982, Rinaldi's jury trial commenced. See generally Trial Tr. I. DiPretoro testified for the Commonwealth to the effect that he and Rinaldi had agreed to kill Bianculli, and that DiPretoro had then done so. See Trial Tr. I at 84-96. Rinaldi testified on his own behalf to the effect that he had been in the car and present when DiPretoro killed Bianculli, but that he had never intended, known of, or agreed to a plan to kill Bianculli. See Trial Tr. II at 80-86. On November 18, 1982, the court charged the jury on the crimes of first-degree murder, third-degree murder, voluntary manslaughter and criminal conspiracy. See Pennsylvania v. Rinaldi, No. 3323-82 Trial Tr. Vol. III at 39-53, 59-60 & 65-68 (Pa. C.P. Ct. Del. Cty. Tr. of Nov. 18, 1982) [hereafter "Trial Tr. III"]. On November 18, 1982, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on the counts of first-degree murder and criminal conspiracy and not guilty on the remaining two counts. See id.
Rinaldi filed post-trial motions, which were denied. See Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 5 (Doc. No. 1) [hereafter "Pet."]; C.P. Ct. Del. Cty. May 23, 1983 Order (Doc. No. 13 of State Ct. Rec.). On June 6, 1983, Rinaldi was sentenced to life in prison. See Cert. of Imposition of J. of Sent. No. 3323-82 (Doc. No. 15 of State Ct. Rec.). Rinaldi then appealed his conviction to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania. On January 25, 1985, that appeal was denied. See Pet. at 4 9. Rinaldi's judgment of conviction became final when the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Rinaldi's motion for allocatur on September 22, 1987. See Pet. at 5 9.
On August 25, 1994, Rinaldi filed a petition for state post-conviction relief under the Pennsylvania Post Conviction Relief Act, 42 Pa. C.S.A. 9541 et seq. (1988), Act of Apr. 13, 1988 P.L. 1988-47, 3 in I Gen. Laws of Assembly of Pa. 336 (1988) ("PCRA"). See Pet. at 5. The Commonwealth responded, arguing that consideration of Rinaldi's state petition was procedurally barred under 42 Pa. C.S.A. 9543(b) (1988) because the petition was unreasonably and prejudicially delayed. See Commw. Ans. to State Ct. Pet. at 1-4 (Doc. No. 17 in State Ct. Rec.). The Commonwealth argued that the delay of seven years had prejudiced its ability both to respond to the motion and to retry Rinaldi. See id. The Common Pleas Court considered briefs and oral argument on the question and dismissed the petition as unreasonably and prejudicially delayed. See Pennsylvania v. Rinaldi, C.P. Ct. Del. Cty. Mar. 15, 1995 Order, No. 3323-82 (Doc. No. 21 of State Ct. Rec.). Neither the order nor the supporting subsequent opinion addressed the merits of petitioner's claims. See id.; see also Pennsylvania v. Rinaldi, C.P. Ct. Del. Cty. Jan. 25, 1996 Op. (Doc. No. 27 of State Ct. Rec.). The Superior Court affirmed the order of the Common Pleas Court, over one dissent. See Pet. at 5-6 11; Pennsylvania v. Rinaldi, No. 01260 Phila. 1995 Pa. Super. June 26, 1996 Op. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Rinaldi's motion for allowance of appeal. See Pet. at 6 11(c); Pennsylvania v. Rinaldi, No. 0721 E.D. Alloc. Dock. 1996 Pa. S.Ct. May 9, 1997 Order.
On May 1, 1998, Rinaldi filed a petition for a federal writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1994 & Supp. 1999). See Pet. (Doc. 1). The petition alleges three grounds for relief: first, denial of due process due to the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on accessory-after-the-fact liability; second, that petitioner's trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to request an instruction on accessory-after-the-fact liability; and third, that trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to call witnesses who would impeach DiPretoro. See Pet. at 8. The Commonwealth answered the petition, arguing that the court should not reach the merits of Rinaldi's claims for two reasons: first, Rule 9(a) following 2254 permits the court to bar a petition as unreasonably and prejudicially late without consideration of the merits of the claims; and second, the state court procedural bar of the Rinaldi's PCRA petition precludes federal consideration of the merits of his claims. See Resp. Ans. to Pet. at 4-13 (Doc. No. 4) [hereafter "Ans."]. Rinaldi filed a reply brief. See Pet'r Reply to Resp. Ans. to Pet. (Doc. No. 5) [hereafter "Reply"]. The matter was referred to a Magistrate Judge for Report and Recommendation, which was filed on August 31, 1999. See Doc. No. 6. Rinaldi filed objections thereto on September 13, 1999. See Doc. No. 7. Having reviewed the records and all filings, I will dismiss the petition for the reasons which follow.
The Commonwealth argues first that Rule 9(a) following 28 U.S.C. § 2254 should preclude federal review of the merits of Rinaldi's claims.3 The Commonwealth argues further that federal review of the merits of Rinaldi's claims is precluded by the state court's reliance on 42 Pa. C.S.A. 9543(b) to dismiss the state petition on procedural grounds.4 Because I find the latter persuasive, I do not address the former.
Pursuant to 2254, the court has a duty to "entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1994 & 1999 Supp.).
No application shall be granted, however, unless "the applicant has exhausted the remedies available" in the state courts. See 2254(b)(1)(A). A petitioner has not exhausted his state court remedies until he has "fairly presented" each claim in his petition to each level of the state courts, including the highest state court, empowered to consider it. See Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 351 (1989); Evans v. Court of Comm. Pls., 959 F.2d 1227, 1230 (3d Cir. 1992). In order to "fairly present" a claim to the state courts, the petitioner "must present a federal claim's factual and legal substance to the state courts in a manner that puts them on notice that a federal claim is being asserted." See McCandless v. Vaughn, 172 F.3d 255, 261 (3d Cir. 1999).
In this matter, the Commonwealth admits that the two claims of ineffective assistance of counsel were presented to the state courts. See Ans. at 2-3 14. The exhaustion requirement will not bar consideration of a claim where "the State, through counsel, expressly waives the requirement." See 2254(b)(3). Therefore, I find that the ineffective assistance of counsel claims have been exhausted.
The Commonwealth denies, however, that the claim of trial court error was fairly presented to the state courts. See Ans. at 2-3 14. Nevertheless, "[w]hen a claim is not exhausted because it has not been `fairly presented' to the state courts, but state procedural rules bar the applicant from seeking further relief in state courts, the exhaustion requirement is satisfied because there is `an absence of...
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