Rinefierd v. Blum

• Decision Date: 19 January 1979
• Citation: 66 A.D.2d 351,412 N.Y.S.2d 526
• Parties: Application of Herman RINEFIERD, Jr., Petitioner, v. Barbara BLUM, Acting Commissioner, New York State Department of Social Services and John L. Lascaris, Commissioner, Onondaga County Department of Social Services, Respondents.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 526

412 N.Y.S.2d 526

66 A.D.2d 351

Application of Herman RINEFIERD, Jr., Petitioner, v. Barbara BLUM, Acting Commissioner, New York State Department of Social Services and John L. Lascaris Commissioner, Onondaga County Department of Social Services, Respondents.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department.

Jan. 19, 1979.

Onondaga Neighborhood Legal Services, Inc., Syracuse, for appellant (Frank A. Clark, Syracuse, of counsel).

Louis J. Lefkowitz, Atty. Gen., Albany, for respondent Blum (Anne Meadvin, Asst. Atty. Gen., Syracuse, of counsel).

James H. Hughes, Chief Welfare Atty., Syracuse, for respondent Lascaris (John A. Barnaba, Syracuse, of counsel).

Before MOULE, J. P., and CARDAMONE, SIMONS, DILLON and HANCOCK, JJ.

CARDAMONE, Justice:

On December 8, 1975 Herman Rinefierd entered a nursing home at age 85. Nine months later he sold his home and in October, 1976 distributed the nearly $20,000 to his five sons. A year later his son, Herman Rinefierd, Jr., the petitioner, applied for medical assistance on behalf of his then 87-year old father. The local agency denied the application on the ground that the senior Rinefierd had transferred assets at a time when he had a medical need in order to qualify for medical assistance. A Fair Hearing was held and the acting State Commissioner affirmed the local agency's determination. This Article 78 proceeding followed in which petitioner urges that there is no evidence that the transfer was made in order to qualify for medical assistance and that Social Services Law § 366, subd. (1) par. (e) violates the supremacy clause and is, therefore, unconstitutional. We confirm the determination for the reasons which follow.

At the time when the application for assistance was made section 366 of the Social Services Law stated that medical assistance shall be given to a person requiring it and who "has not made a voluntary transfer of property (i) for the purpose of qualifying for such assistance . . . A transfer of property made within one year prior to the date of application shall be presumed to have been made for the purpose specified in subparagraph (i)".

In order to deny medical assistance there had to be proof that the senior Rinefierd had transferred his property for the purpose of qualifying for medical assistance. The then statutory one-year presumption (now eighteen months, L.1978, Ch. 612, § 1) may not be relied upon in this case because there is no proof to show that the transfer was made less than one year prior to the application for assistance. However, there is sufficient proof, without the presumption, that the transfer was made for the purpose of qualifying for assistance. At the time when the senior Rinefierd sold his home and distributed the proceeds he had an established medical need demonstrated by the fact that at age 86 he had already spent the preceding nine or ten months in a nursing home. Nothing in the record suggests that there was any hope of his leaving the nursing home where, by the time of the Fair Hearing, his monthly expenses had escalated to two thousand dollars. We are satisfied that the Commissioner's determination that these assets were transferred in order to qualify for medical assistance finds sufficient support in the record (Matter of McMamus, App.Div.1978, 410 N.Y.S.2d 655). We need spend no more time on this issue since petitioner's counsel states in a December 9, 1978 letter directed to this Court that petitioner does not question the substantiality of the evidence relied upon by respondents in denying his application.

We turn to petitioner's argument that Social Services Law § 366 subd. (1) par. (e) violates federal law. It is his contention that eligibility to participate in the New York State Medical Assistance Plan must be determined by federal standards and that, since the New York transfer of property statute allows the local agency to consider assets no longer actually available to the applicant, it is not consistent with the less stringent federal standards.

Were section 366 subd. (1) par. (e) to conflict with the Federal Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. § 1396 et seq.) and the regulations promulgated thereunder, it would violate the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution (Art. VI, cl. 2). To the extent that the state statute and regulations conflict with the Social Security Act and regulations thereunder, the former must yield to the latter (Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282, 286, 92 S.Ct. 502, 30 L.Ed.2d 448; Aitchison v. Berger, D.C., 404 F.Supp. 1137, affd. 538 F.2d 307 (CCA 2d), cert. den. 429 U.S. 890, 97 S.Ct. 246, 50 L.Ed.2d 172; Owens v. Roberts, D.C., 377 F.Supp. 45, 55; Longey v. Philbrook, D.C., 438 F.Supp. 264, at 267; see, also, Schaak v. Schmidt, D.C., 344 F.Supp. 99, 103; Wilczynski v. Harder, D.C., 323 F.Supp. 509; Matter of Boines v. Lavine, 44 A.D.2d 765, 766, 354 N.Y.S.2d 252, 253, lv. to app. den. 34 N.Y.2d 519, 359 N.Y.S.2d 1026, 316 N.E.2d 884, app. dismd., 419 U.S. 1040, 95 S.Ct. 528, 42 L.Ed.2d 317).

The New York State Medical Assistance Plan is partially funded by federal grants awarded under Title XIX of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. § 1396 et seq.). Eligibility to participate in the State Medical Assistance program is governed by federal statutes and regulations. In order to qualify for federal funds a state plan must "include reasonable standards . . . for determining eligibility for and the extent of medical assistance under the plan which (A) are consistent with the objectives of this subchapter, (B) provide for taking into account only such income and resources as are, as determined in accordance with standards prescribed by the Secretary, available to the applicant or recipient and . . . . as would not be disregarded (or set aside for future needs) in determining his eligibility for such aid, assistance, or benefits (under such plan), . . ." (42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17)). The Secretary's Rules and Regulations concerning conditions of eligibility for medical assistance are promulgated under the authority of 42 U.S.C. § 1302. The Rules clearly provide that only those resources actually available to an applicant are to be considered in determining eligibility (45 CFR Part 435, formerly Part 448), (see, also, Matter of Dumbleton v. Reed, 40 N.Y.2d 586, 588, 388 N.Y.S.2d 893, 894, 357 N.E.2d 363, 365).

It is settled law that state transfer of assets statutes which assume assets are available to recipients when, in fact, such assets are not available violate the Supremacy Clause (Buckner v. Maher, D.C., 424 F.Supp. 366, affd. Maher v. Buckner, 434 U.S. 898, 98 S.Ct. 290, 54 L.Ed.2d 184; Matter of Shook v. Lavine, 49 A.D.2d 238, 374 N.Y.S.2d 187). Other states' transfer of property statutes have been struck down by federal courts (Udina v. Walsh, D.C., 440 F.Supp. 1151; Buckner v. Maher, D.C., 424 F.Supp. 366; Owens v. Roberts, D.C., 377 F.Supp. 45). Unlike the New York statute, however, those statutes disqualified an applicant solely because of a transfer. Social Services Law § 366 subd. (1) par. (e) denied assistance Only where the transfer is made for the purpose of qualifying for medical assistance.

Section 366 plainly is...