Riner v. Riek

• Decision Date: 07 March 1933
• Docket Number: No. 22402.,22402.
• Citation: 57 S.W.2d 724
• Parties: RINER v. RIEK.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

57 S.W.2d 724

RINER v. RIEK.

No. 22402.

St. Louis Court of Appeals. Missouri.

March 7, 1933.

Appeal from St. Louis Circuit Court; Robert W. McElhinney, Judge.

"Not to be published in State Reports."

Action by Verneal Riner, an infant, by Mary Mobley, her next friend, against A. O. Riek. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.

Affirmed.

Walter Wehrle, of St. Louis, for appellant.

J. M. Brown and Ephrim Caplan, both of St. Louis, for respondent.

SUTTON, Commissioner.

This is an action for damages for personal injuries sustained by plaintiff, in a collision between an automobile, in which she was riding as a passenger or guest, driven by Thomas C. Riner, and an automobile driven by defendant. The collision occurred near midnight at the intersection of Skinker boulevard and Waterman avenue, in the city of St. Louis. Skinker boulevard runs north and south, and is about sixty feet wide at the place where the collision occurred. Waterman avenue, which runs east and west, runs into Skinker boulevard from the east, and does not continue beyond Skinker on the west. At the time of the collision defendant was driving south on Skinker boulevard.

According to the plaintiff's evidence, the Riner car, in which plaintiff was riding as a passenger or guest, was going west on Waterman avenue, and had passed from Waterman into Skinker, and was about to turn south on Skinker in the center of the intersection when the collision occurred. The Riner car had made a stop at the intersection before coming into Skinker. Another car, driven by Henry Lefton, which was going north on Skinker at the time, on approaching Waterman, stopped to let the Riner car pass in front of it. Before the Riner car passed into Skinker, plaintiff, and other occupants of the car, looked to the north and saw no car approaching. Lefton also looked to the north and saw no car approaching. The Riner car was traveling about fifteen miles per hour at the time of the collision. Skinker boulevard was fairly well lighted at the intersection, and was clear of traffic except the cars above mentioned. The weather was clear. Defendant's car did not carry any lights burning. Defendant did not sound a horn or give any other warning signal on approaching the point of collision. The Riner car was a small Ford, and the defendant's car was a large Hudson. Each car swerved, but only slightly, when within about four feet of each other, and the right-hand side of the Ford car, which was about to turn south, locked with the left-hand side of the Hudson car, which was going due south, and the Hudson car dragged the Ford car about fifteen feet before stopping.

According to the defendant's evidence, he was driving south on Skinker at about twenty or twenty-five miles per hour. He did not stop, slow down, or give any warning, and did not attempt to swerve his car or put on his brakes until he was practically upon the Ford car. His brakes were in good order, and, under the conditions then existing, he could have stopped his car in a distance of about twenty-five feet. The lights on the Ford were burning. There was nothing to interfere with his vision, but he did not see the Ford until it was within four feet of him. The Riner car came out of Waterman and entered Skinker without stopping or slowing down, and without giving any warning or signal, traveling at twenty-five to thirty-five miles per hour. Defendant's car carried headlights. Defendant was operating his car south on Skinker a few feet from the west curb at the time of the collision. There was a stop sign on Waterman at Skinker. As soon as he saw the Riner car was not going to stop, he immediately applied his brakes and swerved his car to the right against the west curb of Skinker, and, at the time the Riner car ran into his left-hand side, his car was practically at a standstill.

The trial, with a jury, resulted in a verdict and judgment for plaintiff for $850, and defendant appeals.

Norman D. Rosenfeld, a witness for plaintiff, who was a passenger or guest in the Riner car at the time of the collision, testified, on cross-examination by defendant, that he had filed a suit against the defendant for personal injuries sustained in the collision. Defendant thereupon sought to show by the witness, on further cross-examination, the amount for which the suit was brought. This was objected to by the plaintiff, and the action of the court in sustaining the objection is assigned as error here. It is well-recognized law that any fact, such as the interest, bias, or motive of a witness, affecting his credibility, may be shown on cross-examination, but the extent to which the cross-examination may go must be left largely to the discretion of the trial court. Koenig v. Union Depot R. Co., 173 Mo. 698, loc. cit. 722, 73 S. W. 637; Stillwell v. Patton, 108 Mo. 352, loc. cit. 363, 18 S. W. 1075; Sommer v. Continental Portland Cement Co., 295 Mo. 519, 246 S. W. 212; State v. Decker, 161 Mo. App. 396, 143 S. W. 544; Nestlehut v. City of De Soto (Mo. App.) 202 S. W. 425; State ex rel. National Ammonia Co. v. Daues, 320 Mo. 1234, 10 S.W.(2d) 931. So, in the present case, it was competent for the defendant to show on cross-examination of the plaintiff's witness that he had filed a suit for damages against defendant arising out of the same matter complained of in the suit on trial. State v. Decker, 161 Mo. App. 396, loc. cit. 398, 143 S. W. 544. It was also competent to show the amount sued for. We think the exclusion of this fact, however, may not be regarded as reversible error, in view of the fact that the jury were given the information that the witness had brought the suit, and the facts testified to by the witness were amply shown by other witnesses. Nestlehut v. City of De Soto (Mo. App.) 202 S. W. 425.

Defendant assigns error upon the admission in evidence of Ordinance No. 34015 of the city of St. Louis. The ordinance was objected to in the court below on the ground that it was not pleaded, and the same objection is insisted upon here. The ordinance introduced was in fact pleaded according to its provisions, but it appears to have been mistakenly referred to as No. 2457 in the pleading. There is no showing that the defendant was in any way prejudiced by this inadvertence in pleading the ordinance.

Moreover, the ordinance relates to signal lamps required to be...