Ring v. Motor Vessel Cape Clear

• Decision Date: 10 February 1964
• Docket Number: No. 28060.,28060.
• Citation: 226 F. Supp. 709
• Parties: John P. RING, Libelant, v. The British MOTOR VESSEL CAPE CLEAR, etc., Lyle Shipping Company, Ltd., et al., Respondents. Jones Stevedoring Company, a corporation, Respondent Impleaded.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of California

226 F. Supp. 709

John P. RING, Libelant, v. The British MOTOR VESSEL CAPE CLEAR, etc., Lyle Shipping Company, Ltd., et al., Respondents.

Jones Stevedoring Company, a corporation, Respondent Impleaded.

No. 28060.

United States District Court N. D. California, S. D.

February 10, 1964.

Goldstein, Brann & Stern, E. Robert Wallach, Walkup & Downing, San Francisco, Cal., for libelant.

Lillick, Geary, Wheat, Adams & Charles, San Francisco, Cal., for respondent.

Taylor & Porter, John F. Porter, San Francisco, Cal., for impleaded respondent Jones Stevedoring Co.

OLIVER J. CARTER, District Judge.

Libelant, Ring, is a longshoreman, employed by impleaded respondent, Jones Stevedoring Company ("Jones"), who has sued respondent Lyle Shipping Company, Ltd. ("Lyle") for injuries allegedly sustained by him while working aboard Lyle's vessel M.S. Cape Clear.¹ The libel states a claim based on negligence and unseaworthiness. Lyle impleaded Jones for indemnification of any losses it may sustain from Ring's claim, including expenses such as attorney's fees and costs in defending against Ring based on an implied in fact warranty by Jones to perform stevedoring services on the vessel in a safe, workmanlike and proper manner. Jones cross-claimed against Lyle asking indemnity from Lyle "for all expenses of defense, proctor's fees, other costs, and for such other relief as may be proper,"² in the event Jones was not found liable to Lyle. Lyle excepted to the cross-claim asking that it be stricken for failure to state a cognizable claim in admiralty.

The cross-claim alleges that Jones performed stevedoring services aboard Lyle's vessel pursuant to a contract for the benefit of Lyle, and that under the provisions of said contract Lyle undertook and agreed "to furnish a safe, reasonable, seaworthy, and otherwise proper vessel, in such a condition to avoid and prevent accidents and injuries to anyone aboard, including libelant, thereby resulting in damages to respondent impleaded (Jones) as hereinafter alleged."³ Then follows the allegation that Jones has incurred and will incur "expenses in defense of petitioner's (Lyle's) claim and petition, including court costs, proctor's fees and other reasonable and necessary expenses of defense."⁴ The parties agree that there was no formal, express contract, written or oral, setting forth the rights, duties and liabilities of the parties. There was only an oral agreement by Jones with Lyle's representative to unload certain cargo from the vessel.⁵ In argument Jones conceded that whatever warranties flow from this agreement must be implied in fact in accordance with custom, practice and usage of the maritime trade or business out of which the agreement grew. The basic premise of Jones' cross-claim is that certain warranties or obligations flow from the shipowner (Lyle) to the stevedore (Jones) by reason of the nature of the oral stevedoring contract in which there were no express provisions as to how the work was to be done, or in what condition the vessel or its cargo was.

Lyle argues that there is no warranty running from the shipowner to the stevedore, and, particularly, none such as claimed by Jones in its cross-claim. For the reasons hereinafter stated the exception should be sustained and the cross-claim stricken.

It is now clear in the longshoreman-shipowner-stevedore type of suit that whatever warranties or obligations run between the parties to the stevedoring relationship (ordinarily the shipowner and the stevedore) are contractual in nature. Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124, 76 S.Ct. 232, 100 L.Ed. 133; Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co. v. Nacirema Operating Co., 355 U.S. 563, 78 S.Ct. 438, 2 L.Ed.2d 491. This is true even though there is no direct contractual relationship between the shipowner and the stevedore. Crumady v. The Joachim Hendrik Fisser, 358 U.S. 423, 79 S.Ct. 445, 3 L.Ed.2d 413 (the shipowner may be the third party beneficiary of a stevedoring contract between a charterer of the vessel and a stevedore). See also Drago v. A/S Inger, Cir. 2, 1962, 305 F.2d 139. Most judicial consideration of this general relationship has been directed toward the warranties and obligations running from the stevedore to the shipowner. There has been very little discussion of the warranties or obligations running from the shipowner to the stevedore, and what has been said has never dealt directly with the problem here under discussion. In Weyerhaeuser, supra, the Supreme Court said, "If in that regard respondent (stevedore) rendered substandard performance which led to foreseeable liability of petitioner (shipowner), the latter was entitled to indemnity absent conduct on its (shipowner's) part sufficient to preclude recovery." (355 U.S. 567, 78 S.Ct. 440-441, 2 L.Ed.2d 491) The cases treat with the problem in the context of whether some conduct by the shipowner would preclude recovery by the shipowner in the shipowner's indemnity action against the stevedore. See Calmar Steamship Corp. v. Nacirema Operating Co., Cir. 4, 1959, 266 F.2d 79; Drago v. A/S Inger, Cir. 2, 1962, 305 F.2d 139; Pettus v. Grace Line Inc., Cir. 2, 1962, 305 F.2d 151; Shenker v. United States, Cir. 2, 1963, 322 F.2d 622, and Hugev v. Dampskisaktieselskabet International, D.C., S.D., Cal., 1959, 170 F.Supp. 601, affirmed ...