Ringer v. Byrne

• Decision Date: 31 May 1938
• Docket Number: Case Number: 27944
• Citation: 80 P.2d 212,1938 OK 375,183 Okla. 46
• Parties: RINGER, Adm'r v BYRNE et al
• Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

1938 OK 375

80 P.2d 212

183 Okla. 46

RINGER, Adm'rvBYRNE et al

Case Number: 27944

Supreme Court of Oklahoma

Decided: May 31, 1938

Syllabus

¶0 1. APPEAL AND ERROR--Correct Judgment not Disturbed Though Based on Erroneous Reasons.

Under section 252, O. S. 1931 (12 Okla. St. Ann. sec. 78), if on the entire record the judgment of the trial court is correct, it will not be disturbed on appeal, no matter bow erroneous the reasons on which such determination was based.

2. HOMESTEAD--Probate Homestead of Widow Remains Exempt From Claims of Husband's Creditors Even After Her Death Leaving no Minor Child.

Under the statutes of this state. the homestead established by husband and wife passes to the widow upon the death of her husband free from all debts or obligations of the husband, except liens attaching as provided by law, and retains its exempt character after the death of the widow, leaving no minor child.

Appeal from District Court, Carter County; J. I. Goins, Judge.

Action by W. W. Ringer, special administrator of the estate of Cassius L. Byrne, against Cassius A. Byrne et al. Judgment for defendants, and plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

Wm. G. Davisson, for plaintiff in error.

J. B. Moore, for defendants in error.

HURST, J.

¶1 This is an action to recover possession of certain residence property in Ardmore and to subject it to the payment of unpaid debts of Cassius L. Byrne, deceased. The action arose under the following circumstances: The property was acquired by, and title was taken in the name of, Cassius L. Byrne in 1904. Thereafter a house was built on the premises and was occupied by Cassius L. Byrne and Lyddia E. Byrne as their homestead from 1904 until July, 1927, when Cassius L. Byrne died. After his death, his widow continued to occupy the property as her homestead until May, 1935, when she died. Cassius L. Byrne died intestate and left as his sole heirs his widow and one adult son, Cassius A. Byrne. The widow was appointed administratrix of the estate of her husband, Cassius L. Byrne, and continued to act until shortly before her death, when she resigned and her son was appointed administrator to succeed her. While it does not appear that the county court made an order setting the property over to the widow as a homestead, it does appear that in the inventory and at least two annual reports the property was referred to as "homestead," and these reports were approved by the county court. At the time of the widow's death, the property was being occupied by her, her son, and his wife as a home.

¶2 After the death of the widow, the creditors of Cassius L. Byrne, whose debts had not been fully paid, filed a petition in the county court asking the sale of the residence property for the purpose of paying the debts. The son filed objections, and thereupon the creditors filed an application asking that the authority of Cassius A. Byrne, as administrator over the property, be suspended and that a special administrator be appointed to file suit to determine title to said property and subject it to the payment of the unpaid debts of Cassius L. Byrne, deceased. This application was sustained and the plaintiff, W. W. Ringer, was appointed special administrator and given authority to institute this action. Thereupon lie commenced this action, and in the petition he referred to the property as homestead property of Cassius L. and Lyddia E. Byrne, and alleged that "the homestead rights of said property terminated upon the death of the said Lyddia E. Byrne, there being no minor children surviving, that said property immediately became subject to be applied to the payment of the indebtedness of the estate of Cassius L. Byrne, deceased." The prayer of the petition was that said property be decreed to be the property of the estate of Cassius L. Byrne, for possession of same, quieting title against Cassius A. Byrne, and for a further decree that the property is subject to be sold by the county court for the purpose of paying the debts of Cassius L. Byrne.

¶3 The defendant answered claiming (a) that the property having been acquired with the money of Lyddia E. Byrne, same was held in trust for her by Cassius L. Byrne; (b) that said property, being occupied as the homestead of Cassius L. Byrne and wife prior to his death, and by the widow after his death, was free from all debts of Cassius L. Byrne; (c) that defendants and Lyddia E. Byrne agreed that if they would come to Ardmore and take care of her, the property would become theirs, and by complying with said requirements, Lyddia E. Byrne conveyed to them the equitable title, and they thereby acquired ownership of said property; (d) that Cassius A. Byrne inherited said property, if the title was not acquired by him during the lifetime of his mother.

¶4 The cause was tried to the court without a jury, and judgment was rendered for the defendants, the court finding that the property constituted the homestead of Cassius L. Byrne and his wife during his life, and her homestead after his death, and that the property was held in trust by Cassius L. Byrne for Lyddia E. Byrne by reason of the fact that the house was built oil the premises with her money. The judgment was based on the latter ground. From that judgment this appeal was taken.

¶5 1. We think there is serious doubt as to whether defendants are entitled to prevail on the theory of resulting trust as found by the trial court. See 65 C. J. 428, sec. 188; Restatement of the Law of Trusts, sec. 454, p. 1385; Bogert oil Trusts and Trustees, sec. 455, p. 1371; Four Rivers Milt. Orchard Co. v. Wood (1924, Ark.) 266 S. W. 75. But we need not definitely determine the correctness of that theory for the. reason that the same result must be reached upon another theory advanced by defendants. It is held that under section 252, O. S. 1931 (12 Okla. St. Ann. sec. 78), if oil the entire record the judgment of the trial court is correct, it will not be disturbed on appeal, no matter how erroneous the reasons on which such determination was based. City of Tulsa v. Thomas (1923) 89 Okla. 188, 214 P. 1070; Douglas v. Douglas (1936) 176 Okla. 378, 56 P.2d 362.

¶6 2. Under the view we take of this matter, the decisive question Is this: The property having passed as a probate homestead to Lyddia H. Byrne after the death of her husband, did it remain free and clear from the debts of her husband, or did it become subject to such debts upon her death, leaving no minor child?

¶7 Plaintiff argues that after the death of the widow, the homestead right terminated and the property became subject to the debts of her husband, relying principally upon Manning v. Dosher (1934) 167 Okla. 368, 29 P.2d 966. On the other hand, defendants argue that the homestead, having once passed to the widow free and clear from her husband's debts, does not become subject to such debts upon her death, and rely upon First Nat. Bank v. Scott (1996) 178 Okla. 175, 62 P. 2d 511. We find no conflict between these cases, and are of the opinion that the Scott Case is controlling here. It must be remembered that the exemption laws given to the head of a family and the homestead rights of a surviving spouse or minor children constitute two distinct policies in this state. In re Gardner's Estate (1926), 122 Okla. 26, 250 P. 490. The former is commonly referred to as the "constitutional homestead" and is created by article 12 of the state Constitution. The latter is commonly called the "probate...