Ringer v. Municipal Court of Modesto Judicial Dist., Stanislaus County

• Decision Date: 03 December 1959
• Citation: 175 Cal.App.2d 786,346 P.2d 881
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Ralph DeWitt RINGER, Petitioner and Appellant, v. MUNICIPAL COURT OF the MODESTO JUDICIAL DISTRICT, COUNTY OF STANISLAUS, State of California, Respondent. Civ. 9784.

Page 881

346 P.2d 881

175 Cal.App.2d 786

Ralph DeWitt RINGER, Petitioner and Appellant, v. MUNICIPAL COURT OF the MODESTO JUDICIAL DISTRICT, COUNTY OF STANISLAUS, State of California, Respondent.

Civ. 9784.

District Court of Appeal, Third District, California.

Dec. 3, 1959.

A. M. Frad, Modesto, for appellant.

Frederick W. Reyland, Jr., County Counsel, David G. Dunford, Clayton M. Ham. Deputy County Counsel, Modesto, for respondent.

WARNE, Justice pro tem.

This is an appeal from a judgment denying a writ of prohibition to restrain the respondent court from trying appellant on a charge of a violation of section 502 of the Vehicle Code, a misdemeanor.

Appellant was arrested and placed in the county jail of Stanislaus County and thereafter released on bail. Admittedly the alleged violation did not occur in the presence of the arresting officer. Thereafter a complaint was filed against appellant, but no warrant of arrest was issued thereon or served. However appellant voluntarily appeared before the court, was arraigned, entered a plea of not guilty and demanded a jury trial. At his arraignment appellant stated that he did not desire counsel. Later, however, appellant obtained counsel and objected to the jurisdiction of the respondent court on the ground that he had not been lawfully arrested. The objection was overruled, and the case was set for trial. Appellant then petitioned the superior court of Stanislaus County for a writ of prohibition to stay further proceedings which was denied, and this appeal followed.

Appellant contends that under the provisions of section 1427 of the Penal Code, in a case such as this it is mandatory that a warrant of arrest be issued and that an arrest be made on such warrant in order to vest the court with jurisdiction over him.

We have concluded that there is no merit in this contention. The offense is one in which the respondent court had jurisdiction of the subject matter, and when the appellant voluntarily appeared in person before the respondent court, was arraigned, pleaded not guilty and demanded a jury trial, the court obtained jurisdiction over him regardless of the requirements of section 1427 of the Penal Code.

As stated in Strand v. Schmittroth, 9 Cir., 251 F.2d 590, 600: 'A multitude of cases indicate that, if the accused be brought personally before a court which has jurisdiction of the subject matter, he may be tried, convicted, sentenced and imprisoned. It makes no difference by what means, rightful or wrongful, his body was brought into court * * *' The following cases are cited in support of the above statement. (See footnote 21.) People v. Pratt, 78 Cal. 345, 20 P. 731 (illegal extradition from Japan); Ex Parte Ah Men, 77 Cal. 198, 19 P. 380 (irregular arrest); Nelson v. State, 115 Neb. 26, 211 N.W. 175 (Arrest without warrant); In re Johnson, 167 U.S. 120, 17 S.Ct. 735, 42 L.Ed. 103 (Illegal arrest). (See also De La Maza v. United States, 9 Cir., 215 F.2d 138, holding that where the defendant pleads to the merits of a criminal action he waives all objection to the illegality of the arrest.)

And in People v. Youders, 96 Cal.App.2d 562, 568, 215 P.2d 743, 747, the court held: 'Even though the defendant may have been brought before the trial court by illegal proceedings, this does not deprive that court of jurisdiction.' Citing People v. Pratt, 78 Cal. 345, 20 P. 731.

Further it has been held that the only purpose of issuing a warrant of arrest is to bring the defendant before the court. McGilvery v. State, 50 Okl.Cr. 376, 298 P. 312; People v. Hagan, 138 Misc. 771, 247 N.Y.S. 374.

In the instant case the respondent court had jurisdiction of the subject matter, and the appellant voluntarily appeared before that court and, as heretofore stated, was arraigned, pleaded not guilty and demanded a jury trial. Under such circumstances we are unable to perceive why the alleged irregularity in the manner of his arrest entitles him to immunity from trial for the offense charged in the complaint. The court, as pointed out in Nelson v. State, supra, might have caused a warrant to be issued for the arrest of appellant at that time, but that was unnecessary because he was already in court. A defendant who has been subject to illegal arrest should not, by virtue of such illegality, gain immunity from punishment for the offense for which he was arrested. People v. Valenti, 49 Cal.2d 199, 316 P.2d 633. Hence the issuance of a warrant of arrest and the service thereof in the instant case would have been an idle act.

Appellant further contends that since he did not know a...