Ringer v. State
| Decision Date | 03 November 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 45A04–1403–CR–129.,45A04–1403–CR–129. |
| Citation | 23 N.E.3d 50 (Table) |
| Parties | Gage Patrick RINGER, Appellant–Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee–Plaintiff. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Alison L. Benjamin, Paul G. Stracci, Thiros & Stracci, P.C., Merrillville, IN, Attorneys for Appellant.
Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, Indianapolis, IN, Brian Reitz, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.
BRADFORD
, Judge.
On August 29, 2013, a grand jury indicted Appellant–Defendant Gage Patrick Ringer on charges of Class A felony rape, Class A felony criminal deviate conduct, Class B felony criminal confinement, and Class C felony criminal confinement after his ex-fiancee, B.T., reported that Ringer had, while armed with a knife, sexually assaulted her. On August 31, 2013, Ringer was arrested in connection with the above-stated charges. He was subsequently released from custody after he posted bond. On October 23, 2013, Appellee–Defendant the State of Indiana (the “State”) filed a motion requesting that the trial court order Ringer to submit to a buccal swab. The trial court granted the State's motion on January 30, 2014, over Ringer's objection. The trial court, however, stayed the order to allow Ringer to pursue the instant interlocutory appeal.
Ringer contends on appeal that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering him to submit to a buccal swab. Specifically, Ringer argues that the swab would constitute an unreasonable violation of his constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and seizures. Concluding otherwise, we affirm.
On or about April 1, 2013, B.T. reported to local law enforcement that she had been sexually assaulted by Ringer. Specifically, B.T. reported that Ringer, while armed with a knife, confined her and forced her to engage in both oral and vaginal sexual intercourse. B .T. also submitted to a sexual assault examination at a local hospital shortly after the sexual assault occurred.
On August 29, 2013, a grand jury indicted Ringer on charges of Class A felony rape, Class A felony criminal deviate conduct, Class B felony criminal confinement, and Class C felony criminal confinement. That same day, a warrant was issued for Ringer's arrest, and he was arrested on August 31, 2013. Ringer subsequently posted bond and was released from custody on September 16, 2013.
On October 23, 2013, the State filed a motion requesting that the trial court order Ringer to submit to a buccal swab.1 The State sought the buccal swab in order to compare the sample with sexual assault kit evidence that had been collected from the victim in connection with the instant matter. Ringer filed an objection to the State's motion on October 30, 2013. On January 30, 2014, following a hearing, the trial court granted the State's motion and ordered Ringer to submit to a buccal swab. The trial court, however, stayed the order to allow Ringer to pursue an interlocutory appeal.
Ringer subsequently requested that the trial court certify its order for interlocutory appeal. The trial court granted Ringer's request and certified its order on March 4, 2014. Ringer then requested permission from this court to file an interlocutory appeal. On May 16, 2014, we granted Ringer's request and accepted jurisdiction over the instant interlocutory appeal.
Ringer contends that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering him to submit to a buccal swab. Specifically, Ringer argues that the trial court erroneously determined that the buccal swab constituted a reasonable search under both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution
. The State, for its part, contends that the trial court acted within its discretion in ordering Ringer to submit to a buccal swab.
Balding v. State, 812 N.E.2d 169, 173 (Ind.Ct.App.2004)
(internal citation omitted). “Thus, the character of the intrusion into [a defendant's] privacy [is] minimal because the procedure itself [is] noninvasive and pain free.” Id. Both the United States Supreme Court and the Indiana Supreme Court have acknowledged that although a buccal swab is relatively noninvasive, it nonetheless constitutes a “search” for the purpose of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. See
Maryland v. King, 133 S.Ct. 1958, 1968–69 (2013) ; Garcia–Torres v. State, 949 N.E.2d 1229, 1232 (Ind.2011). “We review de novo a trial court's ruling on the constitutionality of a search.” Garcia–Torres, 949 N.E.2d at 1232 (citing Campos v. State, 885 N.E.2d 590, 596 (Ind.2008) ).
The Fourth Amendment provides that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches or seizures shall not be violated.” The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. Burkes v. State, 842 N.E.2d 426, 429 (Ind.Ct.App.2006)
, trans. denied.
To say that the Fourth Amendment applies here is the beginning point, not the end of the analysis. “[T]he Fourth Amendment's proper function is to constrain, not against all intrusions as such, but against intrusions which are not justified in the circumstances, or which are made in an improper manner.” [Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 768 (1966)
.] “As the text of the Fourth Amendment indicates, the ultimate measure of the constitutionality of a governmental search is ‘reasonableness.’ “ Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652, 115 S.Ct. 2386, 132 L.Ed.2d 564 (1995). In giving content to the inquiry whether an intrusion is reasonable, the Court has preferred United States v. Martinez–Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560–561, 96 S.Ct. 3074, 49 L. Ed .2d 1116 (1976) (citation and footnote omitted).
In some circumstances, such as “[w]hen faced with special law enforcement needs, diminished expectations of privacy, minimal intrusions, or the like, the Court has found that certain general, or individual, circumstances may render a warrantless search or seizure reasonable.” Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 330, 121 S.Ct. 946, 148 L.Ed.2d 838 (2001)
. Those circumstances diminish the need for a warrant, either because “the public interest is such that neither a warrant nor probable cause is required,” Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 331, 110 S.Ct. 1093, 108 L.Ed.2d 276 (1990), or because an individual is already on notice, for instance because of his employment, see [Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 616 (1989) ], or the conditions of his release from government custody, see Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 126 S.Ct. 2193, 165 L.Ed.2d 250 (2006), that some reasonable police intrusion on his privacy is to be expected. The need for a warrant is perhaps least when the search involves no discretion that could properly be limited by the “interpo[lation of] a neutral magistrate between the citizen and the law enforcement officer.” Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 667, 109 S.Ct. 1384, 103 L.Ed.2d 685 (1989).
.
While a significant government interest does not alone suffice to justify a search, the government interest must outweigh the degree to which the search invades an individual's legitimate expectations of privacy. Id. at 1977
.
In considering those expectations ... the necessary predicate of a valid arrest for a serious offense is fundamental. “Although the underlying command of the Fourth Amendment is always that searches and seizures be reasonable, what is reasonable depends on the context within which a search takes place.” New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337, 105 S.Ct. 733, 83 L.Ed.2d 720 (1985)
. “[T]he legitimacy of certain privacy expectations vis-a-vis the State may depend upon the individual's legal relationship with the State.” Vernonia School Dist. 47J, 515 U.S., at 654, 115 S.Ct. 2386.
In King, the United States Supreme Court held that the search effected by a buccal swab of an individual falls within the category of cases “this Court has analyzed by reference to the proposition that the ‘touchtone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness, not individualized suspicion.’ “ Id. at 1970 (quoting Samson, 547 U.S. at 855 n. 4
).
Even if a warrant is not required, a search is not beyond Fourth Amendment scrutiny; for it must be reasonable in its scope and manner of execution. Urgent government interests are not a license for indiscriminate police behavior. To say that no warrant is required is merely to acknowledge that “rather than employing a per se rule of unreasonableness, we balance the privacy-related and law enforcement-related concerns to determine if the intrusion was reasonable.” [McArthur, 531 U.S. at 331
]. This application of “traditional standards of reasonableness” requires a court to weigh “the promotion of legitimate governmental interests” against “the degree to which [the search] intrudes upon an individual's privacy.” Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300, 119 S.Ct. 1297, 143 L.Ed.2d 408 (1999).
The Court concluded that the taking of a buccal swab to collect an individual's DNA following a lawful arrest was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 1980. In coming to this conclusion, the Court found that forcing an individual to submit to a buccal swab after being arrested was reasonable because it served the legitimate government interest that law enforcement officers need a safe and accurate way to identify persons and possessions which t...
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