Ringstaff v. Howard
Decision Date | 28 September 1989 |
Docket Number | No. 87-7573,87-7573 |
Citation | 885 F.2d 1542 |
Parties | Terry Kent RINGSTAFF, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Dale HOWARD and The Attorney General of the State of Alabama, Don Siegelman, Respondents-Appellees. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit |
Janie Baker Clarke, Montgomery, Ala., for petitioner-appellant.
Cecil G. Brendle, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Montgomery, Ala., for respondents-appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court of the Middle District of Alabama.
Before RONEY, Chief Judge, TJOFLAT, HILL, FAY, VANCE, KRAVITCH, JOHNSON, HATCHETT, ANDERSON, CLARK, EDMONDSON, and COX, Circuit Judges.
This appeal is from the district court's denial of habeas relief to convicted murderer Terry Kent Ringstaff. A divided panel of this Court determined that Ringstaff's right to a speedy trial had been violated when the State delayed prosecuting him pending a decision by the Alabama Supreme Court on the validity of Alabama's death penalty statute, a portion of which had been struck as unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court just nine days after Ringstaff's arrest in this case. Ringstaff v. Howard, 861 F.2d 644 (11th Cir.1988). The full court voted to hear this case in banc and vacated the prior panel opinion. Ringstaff v. Howard, 861 F.2d at 650 (in banc ). The in banc court now affirms the denial of relief on the ground that the State could legitimately wait until the critical issue of the continued validity of Alabama's death penalty law was settled. This being so, Ringstaff was required to show he actually suffered from the delay, which he has failed to do.
The key to the decision in this case is whether the defendant had to show prejudice from the delay in bringing him to trial. If he had to make such a showing, he loses. If he does not have this burden, he wins. In Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), the Supreme Court established a four-part balancing test for evaluating claims of the denial of the constitutional right to a speedy trial. The factors to be weighed are: (1) length of delay; (2) reason for delay; (3) defendant's assertion of the right; and (4) prejudice to defendant. Id. at 530, 92 S.Ct. at 2191. Under Barker the length of the delay must be "presumptively prejudicial" in order to trigger an inquiry into the other three factors. The defendant does not have to show actual prejudice by delay, however, if the first three factors weigh heavily against the Government. United States v. Mitchell, 769 F.2d 1544, 1547 (11th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1066, 106 S.Ct. 819, 88 L.Ed.2d 792 (1986).
In this case, the length of delay was concededly sufficient to require further inquiry. Ringstaff was brought to trial and convicted of murder some 23 months following his arrest, a period which this Court assumes raises Sixth Amendment concerns, although there is no precise time for the constitutional right to a speedy trial to be implicated. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 521, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 2187, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972) () The district court held, and the State does not now dispute, that the delay of 23 months was "presumptively prejudicial" and that Ringstaff asserted his speedy trial right five months after he was arrested. Thus, the focus here is on the reason for the delay. If the reason weighed heavily against the Government, defendant would not have to prove prejudice.
Seven of the 23 months are attributable to the defendant's request for a psychiatric evaluation and are excused from the speedy trial computation. United States v. O'Bryant, 775 F.2d 1528 (11th Cir.1985). Nine of the remaining 16 months involve a decision by the Government to wait until the Alabama Supreme Court rendered its decision in Beck v. State, 396 So.2d 645 (Ala.1980). In that case, the Alabama Supreme Court held that the provision in the State's death penalty statute prohibiting lesser offense instructions--struck down as unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court in June 1980--could be severed from the rest of the statute. Until the Beck decision, the validity of the State's entire capital statutory scheme was in doubt. As the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals stated, the Government exercised "commendable caution and circumspection rather than rushing ahead" when it chose not to proceed to trial against Ringstaff on capital murder charges pending a resolution of the issue. Ringstaff v. State, 451 So.2d 375, 381 (Ala.Crim.App.1984), cert. denied, No. 83-652 (Ala., June 1, 1984). Had the Government pursued the prosecution, it faced the possibility that Ringstaff would have been convicted of capital murder under a statute later determined to be invalid. It would then have been forced to retry Ringstaff, a particularly inefficient use of resources, especially where it is likely that Ringstaff would have been convicted at least of the very same charge from which he now appeals.
Just as the courts have found reasonable the delay while pretrial motions and interlocutory appeals are resolved, it was reasonable for the Government to wait until this very important issue of law was settled before bringing Ringstaff to trial. See United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302, 106 S.Ct. 648, 88 L.Ed.2d 640 (1986) ( ); Government of the Virgin Islands v. Burmingham, 788 F.2d 933 (3d Cir.1986) ( ); United States v. Guerrero, 756 F.2d 1342, 1349-50 (9th Cir.1984) (per curiam) (, )cert. denied, sub nom. Booth v. United States, 469 U.S. 934, 105 S.Ct. 334, 83 L.Ed.2d 270 (1984); United States ex rel. Fitzgerald v. Jordan, 747 F.2d 1120 (7th Cir.1984) (, )cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1056, 105 S.Ct. 2120, 85 L.Ed.2d 484 (1985); United States v. Herman, 576 F.2d 1139 (5th Cir.1978) ( ). See also Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 97 S.Ct. 2034, 52 L.Ed.2d 651 (1977) ( ).
These cases all hold that if the delay had occurred because the legal issue was being determined by pretrial procedures in this case, that delay would be justified in the speedy trial context. Where the issue was being promptly pursued in other litigation, it was not unreasonable for the Government to wait, rather than to attempt to litigate the issue in this case, and necessarily every other capital murder case pending, in order to forestall an automatic speedy trial problem.
There is no evidence that the delay was due to bad faith or a dilatory purpose by the Government. See Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. at 316, 106 S.Ct. at 656. The dissent asserts that the Government's motive was to increase the likelihood that Ringstaff would receive the death penalty and that this motive was an improper maneuver to gain some "tactical advantage" over the defense. It speculates that the trial court may have been hesitant to sentence a defendant to death because of the uncertainty surrounding Alabama law prior to Beck. The district court made no finding of fact that such was the State's motive and the allegation is not supported by the evidence. This is not a case where the Government delayed to harass the defendant or to specifically interfere with the defense, such as delaying the trial to prevent a particular witness from testifying. United States v. Avalos, 541 F.2d 1100, 1113 (5th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 970, 97 S.Ct. 1656, 52 L.Ed.2d 363 (1977); cf. Arrant v. Wainwright, 468 F.2d 677, 681 (5th Cir.1972) (, )cert. denied, 410 U.S. 947, 93 S.Ct. 1369, 35 L.Ed.2d 613 (1973). Rather, the Government merely waited to see if it could legally proceed with a capital murder prosecution.
The courts should not lightly dispense with the actual prejudice requirement because to do so necessarily results in the "severe remedy of dismissal of the indictment." Barker, 407 U.S. at 522, 92 S.Ct. at 2187. That is, the three Barker factors must indeed weigh heavily against the Government before prejudice should be presumed. Indeed, in Barker itself there was a five-year delay between the defendant's arrest and trial with much of that time attributable to the State's desire to wait until the conviction of a co-defendant whose testimony was believed necessary to the defendant's conviction. Although noting that the delay was "too long a period," the Court nonetheless proceeded to the analysis of whether the defendant had been prejudiced by it, ultimately concluding he had not.
Where the delay was not the result of bad faith or a deliberate attempt to "hamper the defense," and was a reasonable and efficient use of judicial resources, a defendant is required to show he suffered actual prejudice in order to prevail. The Court in Barker identified three interests which the speedy trial right was designed to protect: "(i) to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (ii) to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and (iii) to limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired."...
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