Rini v. State, 30087
| Decision Date | 11 September 1975 |
| Docket Number | No. 30087,30087 |
| Citation | 235 Ga. 60,218 S.E.2d 811 |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
| Parties | James Joseph RINI, alias Michael Joseph James v. The STATE. |
Telford, Stewart & Stephens, Charles W. Stephens, Gainesville, for appellant.
Jeff C. Wayne, Dist. Atty., Roland H. Stroberg, Asst. Dist. Atty., Gainesville, Arthur K. Bolton, Atty. Gen., John W. Dunsmore, Staff Asst. Atty. Gen., Atlanta, for appellee.
The defendant, James Joseph Rini, alias michael Joseph James, appeals from his conviction of murder and sentence to life imprisonment.
Essentially, he makes three arguments: (1) that the trial court erred in refusing to direct the prosecutor to produce statements of two witnesses for the state and in failing to perform an in camera inspection; (2) that the court erred in allowing defendant's character to be put in issue by admitting testimony as to the commission of criminal acts of sodomy unrelated to the murder for which he was being tried; and (3) that the court erred in allowing a detective who interrogated defendant to testify that defendant was 'very evasive' and 'would try to avoid my questions.'
The deceased, Denny Abna, age 16, was found dead in Hall County on February 2, 1975. The cause of death was three .32 caliber gunshot wounds.
Defendant's commitment hearing was held on February 21, at which Gregory Dudley and a G.B.I. agent testified for the state.
Defendant made pre-trial motions for discovery of evidence, and to suppress evidence of sodomy and homosexual activity. The district attorney complied with some of the requested discovery but the trial court overruled the motion for discovery of statements by Gregory Dudley, James Claridy and other named and unnamed witnesses, and overruled defendant's motion that the court conduct an in camera inspection.
In response to the motion to suppress evidence of sodomy and homosexuality, the district attorney stated that he had stipulated with defense counsel '. . . that I will not ask any questions involving the subject matter, but I can't control the answers of any witnesses to his questions or to my questions.' In view of this stipulation, the motion to suppress was overruled.
At trial, the defendant's roommate, gregory Dudley, testified that he, the defendant and the deceased drove James Claridy's car from the defendant's College Park apartment to Hall County where he witnessed the defendant shoot the deceased three times.
James Claridy testified that he loaned his car to the defendant, that the defendant left with Dudley and the deceased while he stayed at the defendant's apartment, that when Dudley and the defendant's returned the defendant told him that his (Claridy's) gun, a .32 caliber pistol, was in the trunk of the car, and that he then left town for several days and threw his gun in the Chattahoochee River upon his return.
On cross examination of Dudley and Claridy, defendant's counsel obtained their testimony that on February 18, 1975, they had told defense counsel that the defendant was at his apartment on the night in question (which was what defendant later testified when he took the stand). They testified that after talking to defense counsel, they decided to tell the truth to police. Defense counsel moved for production of Dudley's statement given to police in an effort to show that the statement was given to police prior to his statement to defendant's counsel, and for use in further cross examination. The motion was overruled.
After the trial defendant made a motion for post-trial inspection of the statements of Dudley and Claridy, and investigative notes relating to those witnesses, and the district attorney's and other investigator's files relating to this case. By affidavit attached to that motion, defense counsel states that after the commitment hearing on February 21 and prior to trial, Dudley stated to him in a second interview that he had told investigating officers prior to the first interview with defense counsel that he saw the defendant shoot the deceased. The trial court declined to conduct a post-trial inspection of the district attorney's file and defendant's motion for post-trial inspection was overruled.
1. The defendant enumerates that it was error for the trial court to fail to perform an in camera inspection of the state's files and error to deny production of the statements of the state's two principal witnesses, Dudley and Claridy. In support of this argument, appellant cites Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 79 S.Ct. 1173, 3 L.Ed.2d 1217; Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed. 215; Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66, 87 S.Ct. 793, 17 L.Ed.2d 737, and Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104.
In Napue, it was held that the failure of the prosecution, absent any request by the defendant, to correct testimony known to be false, denied the defendant due process of law. In Napue, the prosecution's key witness, who identified the defendant as being a participant in a robbery-murder, testified falsely that no one had promised him a reduction in his own sentence in exchange for his testimony.
Giglio followed and reaffirmed Napue. In Giglio the government's case again depended on the testimony of a key witness. His credibility was an important issue. He testified falsely as to promises made in exchange for his testimony. The conviction was reversed and a new trial was ordered. However, the Court added that a new trial would not be required where the newly disclosed evidence, although possibly useful to the defense, was not likely to have changed the verdict; i.e., the false testimony could not in any reasonable likelihood have affected the decision of the jury.
Napue and Giglio both relate to convictions based upon testimony by key witnesses, which testimony was subsequently shown to have been false in part. These decisions thus deal with convictions based upon false testimony, as opposed to discovery in criminal cases. (These two subjects are related in that without discovery by some means the falsity of the testimony cannot be shown.)
In Brady, the Court ruled that the failure of the prosecutor to produce evidence, upon request, favorable to the accused violates due process where such evidence is material to guilt or punishment, irrespective of the good or bad faith of the prosecutor. In Brady the defense requested and the prosecutor withheld a statement by a conspirator that it was he, the conspirator, who actually killed the deceased. As noted, Brady involves discovery as opposed to perjury.
In some cases, discovery and perjury may become mixed. See Giles v. Maryland, supra, which was remanded for further proceedings but in which there was no majority opinion. In Giles, a rape case defended on the basis of consent, the issue centered around the credibility of the victim, the key witness for the state on the issue of rape versus consent.
To these four decisions, a fifth should be added. Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 92 S.Ct. 2562, 33 L.Ed.2d 706, also involved alleged perjury and suppression (failure of prosecutor to permit discovery). There the Court said (408 U.S. at 795, 92 S.Ct. at 2568): 'We know of no constitutional requirement that the prosecution make a complete and detailed accounting to the defense of all police investigatory work on a case.' However, the Court said (408 U.S. at 794-795, 92 S.Ct. at 2568):
It is from these five decisions that the proper result in this case must be found. Each of those decisions involved key witnesses for the prosecution, either conspirators, the victim, or eyewitnesses to the crime, whose testimony established the defendant's guilt or described his particular conduct during the commission of the crime. Each of those cases also involved the credibility of those witnesses. Inspection of the statements of, and investigative reports of interviews with, those witnesses would not amount to a detailed disclosure of all police investigative work.
In the case before us, the key witnesses were Dudley and Claridy. The state's case depended upon their testimony. Their credibility was an important issue. If they testified falsely when they said that when they first spoke with defense counsel they had not then given the police statements incriminating the defendant, the jury was entitled to know it and Napue becomes applicable. As defense counsel has argued, the testimony shows that two people rode in Claridy's car with the victim on his last ride before he was killed with Claridy's pistol, and one person, either Claridy or the defendant, stayed at the defendant's apartment.
The state contends that defense counsel interviewed Dudley and Claridy prior to the commitment hearing, that Dudley testified against the defendant at the commitment hearing, and that the defendant thus knew that Dudley had changed his statement after the interview with defense counsel. However, if the sequence of events is as the defendant expects to show, that Dudley gave a statement to police implicating the defendant...
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