Rinsky v. Tr.S Of Boston Univ., Civil Action No. 10cv10779-NG

• Decision Date: 27 December 2010
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 10cv10779-NG
• Parties: KARINA RINSKY, Plaintiff, v. TRUSTEES OF BOSTON UNIVERSITY, TRUDY ZIMMERMAN, JUDITH PERLSTEIN, BRENDA KRAUS, TOWN OF BROOKLINE., and RUTHANN DOBEK, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts

KARINA RINSKY, Plaintiff,

v. TRUSTEES OF BOSTON UNIVERSITY, TRUDY ZIMMERMAN, JUDITH PERLSTEIN, BRENDA KRAUS, TOWN OF BROOKLINE., and RUTHANN DOBEK, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 10cv10779-NG

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

Dated: December 27, 2010

GERTNER, D.J.:

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION............................................................. -1-

II. BACKGROUND............................................................ -2-

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW......................................................... -5-

IV. DISCUSSION............................................................ -5-

A. Count I: Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (against all defendants)........................ -5-

B. University Defendants-State Action................................................ -6-

C. The Town Defendants-"Person"................................................ -9-

D. Dobek............................................................ -11-

E. Count Ii: Violation of MCRA (against all defendants).................................... -12-

F. Exclusive Remedy............................................................ -13-

G. Threats, Intimidation, and Coercion................................................ -14-

H. Count III: Assault and Battery (against Zimmerman, Perlstein, Kraus, and Dobek)........................................................................ -16-

I. Count IV: Civil Conspiracy (against Zimmerman, Perlstein, Kraus, and Dobek)........................................................................ -17-

J. Count VI: Negligence (against the University defendants)......................-18-

K. Count VII: Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress (against the University defendants)............................................................ -19-

L. Count VIII: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (against Zimmerman, Perlstein, Kraus, and Dobek)....................................-20-

M. Count IX: Breach of Contract (against BU)....................................-20-

N. Count X: Violation of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (against BU, Zimmerman, Perl stein, and Kraus)............ -22-

V. CONCLUSION................................................-23-

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Karina Rinsky ("Rinsky"), a former Boston University ("BU") social work student, has filed suit against two different groups of defendants involved with her internship at the Town of Brookline's Senior Center ("the senior center"). She sues her on-site supervisor Ruthann Dobek ("Dobek") and the Town of Brookline ("Brookline"), collectively known as the "Town defendants." Since her internship was a requirement of her Boston University ("BU") Master's program, she also sues her BU supervisors Trudy Zimmerman ("Zimmerman"), Judith Perlstein ("Perlstein"), Brenda Kraus ("Kraus"), and BU, collectively known as the "University defendants." Rinsky claims that the defendants dismissed her allegations of unwelcome touching by a senior center client, forced her to continue to work alone with this client, and, in so doing, became complicit in her continued sexual harassment. Both the University defendants and the Town defendants have filed motions to dismiss (documents ##3, 13), seeking to eliminate all but one of the ten counts Rinsky alleges.

Taking Rinsky's allegations as true, as I must at this stage, I accept the following: Rinsky's senior center supervisors assigned her to interact with a client who "would continuously force himself on [her] physically, hugging her, touching her and otherwise making physical contact with her person, including touching her breasts and rear end." Compl. ¶ 31 (document #1-1). She reported this harassment to both Dobek and her BU supervisors. Dobek responded by assigning Rinsky to go to the client's room "alone, on numerous occasions, " id. at ¶ 36, and telling her to "treat her humiliating sexual harassment... as a 'learning experience' for her career in social work and that she should just 'go with it, '" id. at ¶ 43. Similarly, her BU supervisors stated that "if she brought up issues of sexual harassment at 'problem resolution meetings' designed to discuss internship issues, she would be demonstrating her lack of commitment to the social work profession." Id. at ¶ 58.

One the one hand, I surely recognize that a social worker's job often requires her to deal with people who present mental and physical challenges. On the other hand, the plaintiff was only a student, not yet a social worker; students are likewise entitled to work and educational environments free of sexual harassment and unwanted sexual touching. How to reconcile the these issues is precisely what needs to be litigated in the case at bar, and cannot be resolved on a motion to dismiss. For the reasons I discuss below, Defendants' Motions to Dismiss (docket #s 13 and 3) are GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

II. BACKGROUND¹

Rinsky was a social work student at BU from August 2006 through May 2007. As part of her Masters in Social Work ("MSW") requirements, she interned at the senior center duringthe 2006-2007 school year. The senior center was run by Brookline's Council on Aging, and Dobek was Rinsky's on-site supervisor. In addition, three people from BU--Zimmerman, Perlstein, and Kraus monitored Rinsky's internship. Starting at some point during the school year and continuing until April 19, 2007, a mentally challenged client ("Client B") began to continuously touch Rinsky's breasts and buttocks and stalk her in the parking lot. When Rinsky reported Client B's harassment, Dobek belittled Rinsky's complaint, telling her that it was a "learning experience." Compl. ¶ 43. Furthermore, Dobek assigned Rinsky to work with Client B on a regular basis, alone in Client B's residence. Rinsky asked for "a reasonable accommodation that she not be placed alone with Client B, and provided a structured environment for her interactions with Client B, " id. at ¶ 44, but Dobek denied this request until April 2007, mere days before the internship ended. It was only then that Dobek offered Rinsky a schedule change to avoid contact with Client B.

As the internship progressed and Rinsky continued to complain to Dobek that Client B was touching her, Dobek's evaluations of her became increasingly negative. Rinsky reported Client B's sexual harassment and Dobek's response to her BU supervisors (Zimmerman, Perlstein, and Kraus). While they instructed her to file a complaint with the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination ("MCAD"), they also told her that if she brought up her sexual harassment at problem resolution meetings, she would be demonstrating a "lack of commitment to the social work profession." Id. at ¶ 58. They did not transfer Rinsky to another internship or take any action to ensure that she would not be required to continue interacting with Client B.² Eventually, BU informed Rinsky that she had failed to maintain the requisite grades during her first semester, even though the handbook required a certain grade point average only at graduation, not each semester. See id at ¶ 80. On or around May 20, 2007, BU officials held a Status Review, during which Rinsky contested her performance evaluations. Nonetheless, the University dismissed her. Then, one year after she had left the program, a BU academic employee revealed in a class entitled, "Couples, " privileged student information, referring to Rinsky as an example of a person who had "committed unethical conduct." Id. at ¶ 74.³

Rinsky has now sued Dobek, her BU supervisors (Zimmerman, Perlstein, and Kraus), BU, and Brookline. She alleges ten different causes of action, nine of which are challenged in motions to dismiss filed by the University defendants and the Town defendants. Her ten claims are as follows:

Count I: Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, against all defendants

Count II: Violation of Massachusetts Civil Rights Act ("MCRA"), Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 12, §§ 11H, against all defendants

Count III: Assault and Battery, against Zimmerman, Perlstein, Kraus, and Dobek

Count IV: Civil Conspiracy, against Zimmerman, Perlstein, Kraus, and Dobek

Count V: Invasion of Privacy, against BU (not contested in University defendants' Motion to Dismiss)

Count VI: Negligence, against BU, Zimmerman, Perlstein, and Kraus

Count VII: Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress ("NIED"), against BU, Zimmerman, Perlstein, and Kraus

Count VIII: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress ("IIED"), against Zimmerman, Perlstein, Kraus, and Dobek

Count IX: Breach of Contract, against BU

Count X: Violation of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, against BU, Zimmerman, Perlstein, and Kraus

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

When ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept all well-pleaded facts as true and make all reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs favor. Gargano, 572 F.3d at 48-49. The Court may take into account documents "central to plaintiffs' claim" or "sufficiently referred to in the complaint" without converting a motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment. Watterson v. Page, 987 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1993). To survive defendants' motion to dismiss, Rinsky's complaint must allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Count I: Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (against all defendants)

Three essential elements for an action under § 1983 are that the alleged conduct 1) is committed by a "person, " 2) "under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, " and 3) "subjects, or causes to be subjected, " a person to "the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws." 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1996). In this case, the...