Rio Grande Co v. Vinet

• Decision Date: 09 December 1889
• Citation: 10 S.Ct. 155,33 L.Ed. 400,132 U.S. 478
• Parties: RIO GRANDE R. CO. v. VINET. 1
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

132 U.S. 478

10 S.Ct. 155

33 L.Ed. 400

RIO GRANDE R. CO. v. VINET.¹

December 9, 1889.

[Statement of Case from pages 478-480 intentionally omitted] Geo. L. Bright, for plaintiff in error.

Gus. A. Breaux, for defendant in error.

Mr. Justice FIELD, after stating the facts as above, delivered the opinion of the court.

The question presented for our consideration is whether property of a debtor, brought within the custody of the circuit court of the United States by seizure under process issued upon its judgment, remains in its custody to be applied in satisfaction of the judgment notwithstanding the subsequent death of the debtor, or is removed by such death from the jurisdiction of the circuit court, and passes under the control of the probate court of the state, to be disposed of in the administration of the assets of the deceased. To this question we have no doubt the answer must be that the property remains in the custody of the circuit court of the United States, to be applied to the satisfaction of the judgment under which it was seized. The jurisdiction of a court of the United States, once obtained over property by being brought within its custody, continues until the purpose of the seizure is accomplished, and cannot be impaired or affected by any legislation of the state, or by any proceedings subsequently commenced in a state court. This exemption of the authority of the courts of the United States from interference by legislative or judicial action of the states is essential to their independence and efficiency. If their jurisdiction could in any particular be invaded and impaired by such state action, it would be difficult to perceive any limit to which the invasion and impairment might not be extended. To sanction the doctrine for which the executor appointed by the probate court of the parish of Orleans contends, would be to subordinate the authority of the federal courts in essential attributes to the regulation of the state,—a position which is wholly inadmissible. The principle declared in Freeman v. Howe, 24 How. 450, and in Buck v. Colbath, 3 Wall. 334, both of which have, from their importance, attracted special attention from the profession, in effect determines the question presented here. In the first of these cases the marshal had levied a writ of attachment, issued from the circuit court of the United States for the district of Massachusetts, upon certain property which was subsequently taken from his possession by the sheriff of the county of Middlesex, in that state, under a writ of replevin issued from a state court, and the question presented was whether the sheriff was justified in thus taking the property from the marshal's possession, or whether the marshal had the right to retain it. The court held that the property was, by its attachment under process of the federal court, brought within the custody of that court and under its jurisdiction; that it could not be taken from that custody by any tribunal of the state; and that, if a conflict in the assertion of jurisdiction in such case arose, the determination of the question rested with the federal court; observing that 'no government could maintain the administration or execution of its laws, civil or criminal, if the jurisdiction of its judicial tribunals were subject to the determination of another.' In the second of the above cases (Buck v. Colbath, 3 Wall. 334) this court referred to the decision in Freeman v. Howe, and, after stating that, when first announced, it had taken the profession generally by surprise, said that the court was clearly satisfied with the principle upon which the decision was founded,—'a principle,' it added, 'which is essential to the dignity and just authority of every court, and to the comity which should regulate the relations between all courts of concurrent jurisdiction. That principle is that, whenever property has been seized by an officer of the court by virtue of its process, the property is to be considered as in the custody of the court and under its control for the time being; and that no other court has a right to interfere with that possession, unless it be some court which may have a direct supervisory control over the court whose process has first taken possession, or some superior jurisdiction in the premises.' The doctrine of Freeman v. Howe was thus reaffirmed, with a statement of the limitation to which, in its application, it was subject, by allowing suits against officers and others for seizing the property of strangers, which did not invade the custody of the court over the property. With the property in custody, so long as it continues, no other tribunal can interfere, though, but for such custody, possession of it might be taken under process from state courts. Covell v. Heyman, 111 U. S. 176, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 355.

In Riggs v. Johnson Co., 6 Wall. 166, which came from the circuit court for the district of Iowa, and was before us at December term, 1867, this doctrine finds illustration. There the plaintiff had obtained judgment in the circuit court against the county upon certain of its bonds. Execution, issued upon the judgment, was returned unsatisfied. Thereupon he applied to the circuit court for a mandamus upon the supervisors of the county to compel the levy of a tax for the payment of the judgment. An alternative writ was issued commanding the supervisors to assess the tax, or show cause to the contrary, on a day designated. The supervisors appeared on the return-day, and alleged that they had been enjoined by proceedings in a state court from assessing a tax for that purpose, and that they could not do so without being guilty of contempt and becoming liable to punishment. To this return the plaintiff demurred on several grounds, and among others, that the state court had no jurisdiction, power, or authority to prevent him from using the process of the circuit court to collect its judgment, and that the decree for an injunction rendered in the state court was no bar to his application for relief. The court overruled the demurrer, and decided...