Rios v. Beard

• Decision Date: 24 August 2015
• Docket Number: No. 2:14-cv-2600 GGH P,2:14-cv-2600 GGH P
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California
• Parties: JUAN CARLOS RIOS, Petitioner, v. JEFFREY BEARD, Warden, Respondent.

JUAN CARLOS RIOS, Petitioner, v. JEFFREY BEARD, Warden, Respondent.

No. 2:14-cv-2600 GGH P

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

August 24, 2015

ORDER AND FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner challenges a judgment of conviction entered against him on April 2, 2012 in the Sacramento County Superior Court on charges of second degree robbery (Cal. Penal Code §211) with a prior conviction. He seeks federal habeas relief on the following grounds: (1) petitioner was deprived of effective assistance of trial counsel when funds for a handwriting expert were disallowed by the court; (2) the trial court impeded petitioner's efforts to put forth the preliminary findings of a handwriting expert; (3) as an indigent defendant, petitioner did not receive the assistance of all experts necessary for an adequate defense: and (4) the trial court committed an Ake error and abused its authority in not putting forth the requisite funds for an expert. Upon careful consideration of the record and the applicable law, the undersigned will recommend that petitioner's application for habeas corpus relief be denied.

I. BACKGROUND

In its unpublished memorandum and opinion affirming petitioner's judgment of conviction on appeal, the California Court of Appeal for the Third Appellate District provided the following factual summary:

In June 2010 a bank teller gave a man in disguise approximately $2,600. Following a fingerprint match, an information charged defendant with robbery and alleged that he had previously been convicted of robbery. (§ 211.) The information also alleged that the prior conviction brought defendant within the provisions of sections 667, subdivisions (b) through (i) and 1170.12. A jury trial followed.

Robert Schlalos worked as a teller for Chase Bank. One afternoon in June 2010 a customer wearing a sweatshirt, hat, and sunglasses approached Schlalos's window. The customer wore a "black mop-type thing" on his head, which appeared to be a wig. Schlalos identified the disguised customer from still images captured on video footage from the bank.

The customer said he had a check to cash and began checking his pockets. He pulled out a cell phone, then put it back in his pocket. The customer then pulled out a note and passed it to Schlalos. Schlalos slid the note to his manager, Danielle Stubbs, who was working to his right. The customer did not wear gloves.

The handwritten note stated: "Give me all the money, I have a bomb." After receiving the note, Schlalos opened his money drawer and began gathering between $2,600 and $2,700. As Schlalos stacked up the money, the customer grabbed it and ran out of the bank.

Schlalos did not notice any tattoos or scars on the robber. Schlalos described the robber as an average size white or Hispanic male between five feet ten inches and six feet tall, with a mustache and goatee. In addition, Schlalos described the individual's age as between his late 20's and early to mid-30's. Although defendant fit this description, Schlalos could not make a positive identification.

The other bank employees saw the robber, and their descriptions matched Schlalos's. Employees testified the robber wore a sweatshirt, hat, and sunglasses. He had close cropped, dark hair and appeared to be wearing a wig that looked like women's hair extensions. The robber did not wear gloves. All of the employees stated defendant resembled the robber, but they could not positively identify defendant as the robber.

A forensic investigator testified regarding fingerprint comparisons. Immediately following the robbery, the investigator went to the bank and processed prints found at the scene. Two prints taken from the bank door did not match any prints in the state database. The investigator recovered three latent prints from thepaper the robber had given Schlalos.

A second forensic investigator compared the prints found on the paper with the fingerprint records from the state database. The investigator concluded the prints on the paper matched defendant's fingerprints.

The match led to defendant's arrest. At the time of his arrest, defendant appeared Hispanic, in his mid-20's, six feet tall, and to weigh 180 pounds. Defendant had no tattoos or scars on his neck or face. When he was arrested, defendant had about $600 and was wearing a very expensive pair of Air Jordan tennis shoes. Defendant's 2004 convictions for robbery and assault were entered into evidence.

Defense Case

Defendant's nephew testified he picked up defendant from defendant's girlfriend's house on the day of the robbery between 4:00 p.m. and 4:15 p.m. The robbery took place at approximately 4:10 p.m.

Defendant's girlfriend, Franca Moreno, testified that on the day of the robbery defendant was at her house from 10:00 a.m. until 8:00 p.m. Moreno's mother testified that defendant was with her daughter all day the day of the robbery.

Defendant testified in his own behalf. In 2004 he assaulted a man and took his necklace; he was convicted of assault and robbery. At the time of the robbery in this case, he was on parole.

Defendant testified that on the day of the robbery he was with Moreno all day. That afternoon, defendant's father called and told defendant his car had been stolen. Later that day, his father called back and said it had been found. Late that night defendant and his father recovered the car, which had been vandalized. Defendant's sweatshirt and backpack were missing from the trunk.

The day before his arrest defendant won $300 playing poker at a casino. His father had given him $260 that week, and his sister had given him $200. [N. 2]

[N. 2] A police detective testified that in an interview after his arrest, defendant never mentioned winning any money at a casino before the robbery. Instead, defendant said his sister and some of his neighbors gave him the money. Nor did defendant mention being with Moreno at the time the robbery took place.

Defendant testified he had never been to the bank in question. He did not know how his fingerprints had gotten on the paper but thought the paper might have been in his backpack, which was in the stolen car. Defendant explained that he told officers he was home the day of the robbery, not at his girlfriend's house, because that was the first thing that came into his mind.

Defendant's father testified that his car was stolen on the day of the robbery. The car was reported stolen at approximately 4:30 that day. Officers located the car late that evening.

The jury found defendant guilty of robbery and found the prior conviction allegation true. The court sentenced defendant to a determinate term of 15 years in state prison: the upper term of five years, doubled, plus a five-year enhancement under section 667, subdivision (a). Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.

(Resp't's Lod. Doct. No. 9, at 2-4; People v. Rios, 2013 WL 6529326, *1-2.)

II. ANALYSIS

A. AEDPA Standards

The statutory limitations of federal courts' power to issue habeas corpus relief for persons in state custody is provided by 28 U.S.C. § 2254, as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). The text of § 2254(d) states:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim-

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

For purposes of applying § 2254(d)(1), clearly established federal law consists of holdings of the United States Supreme Court at the time of the last reasoned state court decision. Thompson v. Runnels, 705 F.3d 1089, 1096 (9th Cir.2013) (citing Greene v. Fisher, — U.S. —, —, 132 S.Ct. 38, 44 (2011); Stanley v. Cullen, 633 F.3d 852, 859 (9th Cir.2011) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06, 120 S.Ct. 1495 (2000)). Circuit court precedent may be instructive in determining what law is clearly established by the Supreme Court and whether a state court applied that law unreasonably. Stanley, 633 F.3d at 859. However, circuit precedent may not be "used to refine or sharpen a general principle of Supreme Court jurisprudence into a specific legal rule that th[e] [Supreme] Court has not announced." Marshall v. Rodgers, — U.S. —, —, 133 S.Ct. 1446, 1450 (2013) (citing Parker v. Matthews, — U.S. —, —, 132S.Ct. 2148, 2155 (2012)). Nor may it be used to "determine whether a particular rule of law is so widely accepted among the Federal Circuits that it would, if presented to th[e] [Supreme] Court, be accepted as correct. Id.

A state court decision is "contrary to" clearly established federal law if it applies a rule contradicting a holding of the Supreme Court or reaches a result different from Supreme Court precedent on "materially indistinguishable" facts. Price v. Vincent, 538 U.S. 634, 640, 123 S.Ct. 1848 (2003). Under the "unreasonable application" clause of § 2254(d)(1), a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from the Supreme Court's decisions, but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.¹ Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75, 123 S.Ct. 1166 (2003); Williams, 529 U.S. at 413; Chia v. Cambra, 360 F.3d 997, 1002 (9th Cir.2004). In this regard, a federal habeas court "may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that...