Rios v. Cozens

• Decision Date: 15 August 1972
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 499 P.2d 979 Federico RIOS, a minor, etc., Petitioner, v. Robert C. COZENS, as Director, etc., et al., Respondents. Sac. 7916. In Bank

Page 299

103 Cal.Rptr. 299

7 Cal.3d 792, 499 P.2d 979

Federico RIOS, a minor, etc., Petitioner, v. Robert C. COZENS, as Director, etc., et al., Respondents.

Sac. 7916.

Supreme Court of California,

In Bank.

Aug. 15, 1972.

Eugene M. Swann and Ronald F. Coles, Richmond, for petitioner. Dennis R. Powell, Maurice R. Jourdane, David H. Kirkpatrick, Richard A. Gonzales, Salinas, and Fred H. Altschuler, Cal. Rural Legal Assistance, San Francisco, as amici curiae on behalf of petitioner.

Evelle J. Younger, Atty. Gen., and Victor D. Sonenberg, Deputy Atty. Gen., for respondents.

MOSK, Justice.

Under the financial responsibility laws (Veh.Code, §§ 16000--16553) ¹ the Department of Motor Vehicles (hereinafter the department) will suspend the license of a driver who is involved in an automobile accident which has resulted in bodily injury or property damage in excess of $200 unless he either deposits security with the department sufficient in the opinion of the department to satisfy any final judgment against him up to a stated maximum or establishes his exemption from the security requirement by one of several methods, such as by showing that he was insured at the time of the accident. ² However, as a condition of the suspension, the department must make a determination that there is a reasonable possibility that a judgment may be recovered against the driver, based upon his potential culpability. (Orr v. Superior Court (1969) 71 Cal.2d 220, 227--228, 77 Cal.Rptr. 816, 454 P.2d 712.)

The question involved in this proceeding is whether the driver is entitled to a hearing on the issue of his potential culpability prior to the suspension of his license or whether the department may make its determination, as it now does, merely on the basis of written accident reports which the persons involved in the accident are required to file (§ 16000) without affording the driver an opportunity to personally appear. We conclude that the determination of possible culpability by the department without affording the licensee an opportunity for a hearing does not comply with the requirements of due process, in view of the United States Supreme Court decisions in Bell v. Burson (1971) 402 U.S. 535, 91 S.Ct. 1586, 29 L.Ed.2d 90 and Jennings v. Mahoney (1971) 404 U.S. 25, 92 S.Ct. 180, 30 L.Ed.2d 146.

Petitioner is a minor who was involved in an automobile accident on March 18, 1971. The driver of the other vehicle in the accident filed a report with the department claiming that he had incurred property damage of $260. Petitioner also filed an accident report. The department, apparently on the basis of these reports, found there was a reasonable possibility that a judgment might be recovered against petitioner as a result of the accident. Since petitioner was uninsured and could not deposit security, his license was suspended. He asserted that he was not responsible for the accident and demanded a hearing to determine whether there was any likelihood that he would be found liable.

Upon the refusal of the department to grant a hearing, he filed a petition for a writ of mandate in an appellate court through his guardian ad litem. The petition seeks, on behalf of petitioner and others similarly situated, to compel respondents, the department and its director, to revoke the order of suspension issued to petitioner and others whose licenses were suspended without hearing, and to afford them notice and an opportunity to be heard on the question of their possible culpability.

Petitioner relies on numerous recent cases in which the United States Supreme Court and this court have recognized that an individual is constitutionally entitled to a hearing prior to being deprived of a significant interest. (Goldberg v. Kelly (1970) 397 U.S. 254, 266, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 25 L.Ed.2d 287; Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp. (1969) 395 U.S. 337, 342, 89 S.Ct. 1820, 23 L.Ed.2d 349; Randone v. Appellate Department (1970) 5 Cal.3d 536, 547, 96 Cal.Rptr. 709, 488 P.2d 13.) This principle is applicable to a plethora of vital personal and property rights (see Randone v. Appellate Department, 5 Cal.3d 536, 548, fn. 8, 96 Cal.Rptr. 709, 488 P.2d 13), but it has most frequently been applied in this state to invalidate statutes affording a creditor prejudgment remedies against a debtor without prior notice or hearing (see, e.g., Blair v. Pitchess (1971) 5 Cal.3d 258, 96 Cal.Rptr. 42, 486 P.2d 1242; McCallop v. Carberry (1970) 1 Cal.3d 903, 83 Cal.Rptr. 666, 464 P.2d 122; Cline v. Credit Bureau of Santa Clara Valley (1970) 1 Cal.3d 908, 83 Cal.Rptr. 669, 464 P.2d 125).

The rule explicated in the foregoing cases is applicable to the instant circumstances. A person's interest in the retention of his driver's license and in the use of his motor vehicle represents a sufficiently important benefit to justify the requirement that he be accorded a hearing, before he is deprived of those rights, to determine whether there is a reasonable possibility that a judgment will be recovered against him.

Petitioner emphasizes that the rural and urban poor, who cannot afford to purchase insurance or to post security, are frequently faced with license suspension under the financial responsibility law, and that a person deprived of the right to drive may forfeit his employment and suffer other disabilities. If there had been any lingering doubt about the importance of the right to a driver's license, it has been dispelled by Bell v. Burson, supra, 402 U.S. 535, 91 S.Ct. 1586, 29 L.Ed.2d 90, in which the court stated, 'Once licenses are issued, as in petitioner's case, their continued possession may become essential in the pursuit of a livelihood. Suspension of issued licenses thus involves state action that adjudicates important interests of the licenses.' (402 U.S. at p. 539, 91 S.Ct. at p. 1589.)

We observe, as a second factor justifying a presuspension hearing, that the primary purpose of the financial responsibility law is not to assure that careless drivers are denied the use of the highways --since the most grossly negligent drivers who can post security or are exempt from complying with the requirement may retain their licenses--but, rather, to afford monetary protection to those who suffer injury or property damage by virtue of the carelessness of financially irresponsible drivers. (Barrera v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co. (1969) 71 Cal.2d 659, 671, 79 Cal.Rptr. 106, 456 P.2d 674.) We do not denigrate the desirability of making whole the victims of automobile accidents. But viewed in this economic context, the purpose of the statutes under consideration bears a remarkable relationship to prejudgment creditor's remedies and therefore does not justify a difference in treatment with regard to the right to a presuspension hearing.

Nevertheless, respondents argue, this court decided in Escobedo v. State of California (1950) 35 Cal.2d 870, 876--877, 222 P.2d 1, and Orr v. Superior Court, supra, 71 Cal.2d 220, 224--225, 77 Cal.Rptr. 816, 454 P.2d 712, that due process is not violated by the suspension of a license without a prior hearing if the department's action is subject to subsequent judicial review.

Two years after our decision in Orr v. Superior Court, supra, 71 Cal.2d 220, 77 Cal.Rptr. 816, 454 P.2d 712, the United States Supreme Court heard Bell v. Burson, supra, 402 U.S. 535, 91 S.Ct. 1586, 29 L.Ed.2d 90, in which the precise question was whether the State of Georgia could validly suspend the driver's license of an uninsured motorist who could not post security without affording him a hearing prior to revocation on the question of his responsibility for the mishap. The high court determined that a driver may not constitutionally be deprived of his license without a prior hearing to determine whether there is a reasonable possibility that a judgment would be rendered against him as a result of the accident. Insofar as a determination of possible fault is required before suspension our earlier opinions in Escobedo v. State of California, supra, 35 Cal.2d 870, 222 P.2d 1 and Orr v. Superior Court, supra, 71 Cal.2d 220, 77 Cal.Rptr. 816, 454 P.2d 712 are consistent with the principles of Bell.

The significance of Bell, however, is that the decision not only requires a prior determination of culpability as a condition of suspension but that it leaves no doubt such a determination must be made in the context of a hearing. Georgia actually provided a hearing prior to suspension, but the proceeding was confined to such questions as whether the driver was in fact involved in the accident and whether he came within any of the statutory exemptions. The high court held that in providing a forum to decide the question of possible liability Georgia could elect to include this issue at the hearing already provided by its laws (402 U.S. at pp. 542--543, 91 S.Ct. 1586), that the additional expense to the state was not a sufficient reason to deny a hearing (402 U.S. at p. 540, 91 S.Ct. 1586), and that the hearing required by due process must be meaningful (402 U.S. at pp. 541--542, 91 S.Ct. 1586). The opinion concludes that the failure of Georgia's statutory scheme to afford the petitioner a hearing prior to suspension on the question of liability denied him due process of law.

We are called upon, then, to examine the procedure followed in this state to determine if it satisfies the requirements of Bell v. Burson, supra, 402 U.S. 535, 91 S.Ct. 1586, 29 L.Ed.2d 90. Under our statutes, as stated above, any driver who is involved in an automobile accident which results in bodily injury or in property damage in excess of $200 must file a written accident report with the department within 15 days after the mishap. (§ 16000.) ³ The report contains an account of the driver's version of the accident, as well as information indicating whether he was insured, and estimating the amount of damage incurred. The department makes its determination of possible liability from the...