Rios v. Dillman

• Decision Date: 23 August 1974
• Docket Number: No. 74-1136. Summary Calendar.,74-1136. Summary Calendar.
• Parties: Jose RIOS, et al., Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Dr. Everett G. DILLMAN, etc., et al., etc., Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

499 F.2d 329 (1974)

Jose RIOS, et al., Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Dr. Everett G. DILLMAN, etc., et al., etc., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 74-1136. Summary Calendar.^*

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

August 23, 1974.

Bart Cox, Am. Civ. Liberties Union, El Paso, Tex., for plaintiffs-appellants.

Travis White, City Atty., John C. Ross, Jr., Wade Adkins, Michael F. Ainsa, Asst. City Attys., El Paso, Tex., for defendants-appellees.

Before WISDOM, GOLDBERG and GEE, Circuit Judges.

GOLDBERG, Circuit Judge:

This case comes to us as an appeal from an order dismissing plaintiffs' complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, Fed.R.Civ.Pro. 12(b)(6).¹ The focus of our review is simple. In testing the sufficiency of a complaint against a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the trial court must utilize the now familiar litmus from Conley v. Gibson, 1957, 355 U.S. 41, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80.

Over and over and over again—but apparently not often enough—this Court has stated, explained, reiterated, stressed, rephrased, and emphasized one simple, long-established, well-publicized rule of Federal practice: a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim should not be granted unless it appears to a certainty that the plaintiff would not be entitled to recover under any state of facts which could be proved in support of his claim.

Cook & Nichol, Inc. v. Plimsoll Club, 5 Cir. 1971, 451 F.2d 505, 506 (Brown, C.J.).² On numerous occasions we have warned of the dangers inherent in precipitate, final disposition of a case on the basis of barebones pleadings. See Cook & Nichol, Inc. v. Plimsoll Club, supra, 451 F.2d at 506-507. By now it should be clear even to the most astigmatic that we view motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim with disfavor, and that in our opinion they should rarely be granted. See 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1357 at 598 (1969).

This does not mean, however, that motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim should never be granted. See, e. g., Robles v. El Paso Community Action Agency, 5 Cir. 1972, 456 F.2d 189; Jaeger v. Freeman, 5 Cir. 1969, 410 F.2d 528. "When used with care, there is a time and a place for 12(b) motions to dismiss." Cook & Nichol, Inc. v. Plimsoll Club, supra, 451 F.2d at 507 n. 8. In our opinion the case at bar represented the proper time and place for the use of Rule 12(b)(6). Finding no error in that disposition of the case, we affirm.

Like many other municipalities, El Paso, Texas has elected to grant preferential treatment to veterans seeking employment within the city's civil service. Under Article VIII, Section 3 and Article VI, Section 7 of the Civil Service Provisions of the El Paso Municipal Charter,³ anyone qualifying as a "veteran" and attaining a passing score on a civil service examination automatically receives an additional five points. The named plaintiffs, two policemen and two firemen, none of whom are "veterans" within the meaning of the ordinance, challenge the constitutionality of the veterans preference points on behalf of themselves and all other municipal employees who fall outside the statutory definition. Conceding the validity of veterans "credits" for original appointment in the civil service, they nevertheless insist that insofar as the ordinance adds preference points to veterans' promotional examinations it violates the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of equal protection of the laws. We do not agree.

The basic principles governing application of the Equal Protection Clause need no lengthy explication. The Fourteenth Amendment

does not deny to States the power to treat different classes of persons in different ways. citations omitted The Equal Protection Clause of that amendment does, however, deny to States the power to legislate that different treatment be accorded to persons placed by a statute into different classes on the basis of criteria wholly unrelated to the objective of that statute. A classification "must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike." citation omitted

Reed v. Reed, 1971, 404 U.S. 71, 75-76, 92 S.Ct. 251, 254, 30 L.Ed.2d 225, 229. To pass constitutional muster a legislative classification must bear some rational relationship to legitimate state purposes or governmental interests. United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 1973, 413 U.S. 528, 93 S.Ct. 2821, 37 L.Ed.2d 782, 787; San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 1973, 411 U.S. 1, 40, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 36 L.Ed.2d 16, 47; Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 1972, 406 U.S. 164, 172, 92 S.Ct. 1400, 31 L.Ed.2d 768, 777.⁴

Although the portions of the El Paso charter cited to us by the parties contain no explicit statement of purpose, the statutory objectives are hardly mysterious given the long-standing, wide-spread existence of veterans' preference legislation at all levels of government. Indeed, "it is apparent to anyone who has lived through periods of war that contrived explanations are not necessary." August v. Bronstein, supra note 4, 369 F.Supp. at 193. Historically veterans' preference laws have been directed to three principal objectives: (1) to recognize that the experience, discipline, and loyalty that veterans gain in military service are conducive to the better performance of public duties; (2) to encourage citizens to serve their country in time of war and to reward those who, either involuntarily or through enlistment, did so; and (3) to aid in the rehabilitation and location of the veteran whose normal life style has been disrupted by military service. Russell v. Hodges, 2 Cir. 1972, 470 F.2d 212, 218; White v. Gates, 102 U.S.App.D.C. 346, 253 F.2d 868, cert. denied, 1958, 356 U.S. 973, 2 L.Ed.2d 1147; Feinerman v. Jones, supra note 4, 356 F.Supp. at 259; Koelfgen v. Jackson, supra note 4, 355 F.Supp. at 253; Stevens v. Campbell, supra note 4, 332 F.Supp. at 106.

Appellants do not really challenge the propriety of any of these objectives, and in any event the decisions cited above— as well as the plethora of cases on which they rely—amply demonstrate that the legitimacy of the governmental interest in veterans preference legislation is beyond serious judicial dispute. Appellants' dissatisfaction with the El Paso scheme seems to be, rather, that the preference accorded to veterans is simply too great. To some extent appellants appear to be simply questioning the desirability of what is in effect a permanent promotional advantage for veterans in the civil service. We remind them that given a legitimate legislative end, this Court does not ordinarily sit to evaluate the wisdom of particular statutory means; that task is assigned to others in our system of government.

Appellants also challenge the placement of the line dividing those civil servants who are eligible for the promotional preference points from those who are ineligible. Understandably enough, the operative word in the El Paso ordinance is "veteran." It can hardly be debated that insofar as the statutory classification has the effect of limiting the preference to those who are in fact veterans, it makes no irrational, impermissible distinctions. Russell v. Hodges, supra, 470 F.2d at 218.⁵ The El Paso ordinance, however, goes several steps further, for it is perfectly explicit that not all those who have served in the military qualify as "veterans." In the first place, one must be a veteran of a war fought by the United States and must have received an honorable discharge from the service. Beyond that, one must have "rendered actual field duty" for a certain period of time, which varies depending on whether the service included duty overseas. As we have already indicated, appellants do not quarrel with the differential treatment accorded military alumni on examinations for original appointment in the civil service. Thus, the thrust of their equal protection argument is that the criteria used to identify the recipients of the promotional preference distinguish among those with prior military service in a manner which is unreasonable, arbitrary, and capricious given the size of the advantage granted.⁶

We find ourselves unable to accept appellants' position. We do not necessarily disagree with the proposition implicit in appellants' argument—that a classification may be rational and reasonable at one level of preferential treatment but irrational and arbitrary when the advantage granted is much stronger. But this is not such a case. The promotional preference provided under the El Paso scheme is certainly quite extraordinary, see Koelfgen v. Jackson, supra, 355 F.Supp. at 253, and we recognize that it may be unfair to withhold that preference from those with prior military service who for some reason do not meet all the qualifications outlined in the statutory definition of a veteran. Nonetheless, we are unwilling to conclude that the decision of El Paso to draw the qualifying line where it did is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.

Certainly El Paso could reasonably conclude that those honorably discharged veterans who performed field duty for a particular period of time during time of war are the ones most likely to have gained whatever experience, discipline, and loyalty are determined to be conducive to better performance as a public employee.⁷ The decision to grant those veterans the promotional preference as a means of encouraging military service in times of war and rewarding such service is not arbitrary or capricious. Nor is it unreasonable to determine that those veterans are the most worthy or the most in need of assistance in rehabilitation and employment placement to compensate for disruption caused by military service. Finally, we cannot say that the...