Rios v. State
| Decision Date | 12 June 2009 |
| Docket Number | No. 1223, September Term, 2008.,1223, September Term, 2008. |
| Citation | 974 A.2d 366,186 Md. App. 354 |
| Parties | Jeffrey RIOS v. STATE of Maryland. |
| Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
Ronald L. Schwartz, College Park (Maria E. Mena, on the brief), Silver Spring, for Appellant.
Mary Ann Ince (Douglas F. Gansler, Atty. Gen., on the brief), Baltimore, for Appellee.
Panel: DEBORAH S. EYLER, MEREDITH and ZARNOCH, JJ.
Appellant, Jeffrey Rios, was charged in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County with eleven offenses, including reckless endangerment. His counsel, Ronald L. Schwartz, entered into plea negotiations with the Assistant State's Attorney assigned to the case; these negotiations continued for about two weeks. In this interlocutory appeal, Rios contends that Schwartz and the prosecutor reached an agreement under which Rios would enter an Alford plea to reckless endangerment and the State would dismiss the remaining charges. But, at the end of the parties' negotiations, the prosecutor contended there was no agreement.
Rios filed a motion to enforce the alleged plea agreement, and the parties stipulated to a statement of facts. The circuit court denied the motion, finding that the parties never reached an agreement. Rios then noted this appeal, presenting the following questions:
I. Did the court err in finding that there was no plea agreement reached between the State and the Defendant?
II. If there was a plea agreement between the State and the Defendant, was such an agreement subject to specific enforcement?
Pursuant to Maryland Rule 8-603(c), the State included in its appellee's brief a motion to dismiss Rios's interlocutory appeal, citing the final judgment rule.
We deny the State's motion to dismiss, holding that the appeal is allowed under the collateral order doctrine. On the merits of the appeal, we answer both of the appellant's questions in the affirmative, concluding that the motions court was mistaken in ruling that Schwartz rejected the plea agreement by making a counteroffer before attempting to accept the outstanding offer from the State. Accordingly, we conclude that Rios and the State entered into an enforceable plea agreement.
On January 8, 2008, Rios was charged with three counts of first degree assault, three counts of second degree assault, three counts of use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence, reckless endangerment (Count X), and one count of unlawfully carrying a handgun. On Rios's behalf, Schwartz entered into plea negotiations with the prosecutor assigned to the case. The parties have stipulated to the facts regarding these negotiations, recited in Rios's motion to enforce the plea agreement as follows:
1. The Defendant, through his counsel, Ronald L. Schwartz, had entered into extensive plea negotiations with the State in the above entitled matter. Prior to the week beginning April 7, 2008, the Assistant State's Attorney assigned to the case, ["the prosecutor"], had offered the Defendant a plea to one count of possession of a handgun and one count of reckless endangerment, with time served. On or about April 8, 2008, the Defendant, through counsel, rejected the above noted offer, and told [the prosecutor] that he could recommend an Alford plea to reckless endangerment, with time served. The prosecutor agreed to such a plea offer. Counsel informed [the prosecutor] that he would discuss the matter with his client and get back to him. Counsel met with the Defendant who agreed to accept the plea offer.
2. On Friday, April 18, Defendant's counsel left several messages on [the prosecutor's] voice mail, regarding acceptance of the plea offer. A message was again left on Monday, April 21. On Tuesday, April 22, 2008, [the prosecutor] returned the call. Counsel made the following inquiry to [the prosecutor]: "Would you consider allowing a nolo plea to reckless?" [The prosecutor] informed Mr. Schwartz that he could not agree to a nolo plea. He stated that he was getting pressure from the police and his superiors to not make a plea offer. Counsel informed the prosecutor that his client would accept the plea offer made: Alford plea to reckless endangerment, with time served. [The prosecutor] informed counsel that he was meeting with the police and his superiors and did not think he could make any plea offer at the time.
3. Later in the week, [the prosecutor] called and informed Defendant's counsel that no plea offer would be made.
On May 23, 2008, Rios filed a "Motion to Enforce Plea Agreement and to Dismiss All Counts of the Indictment Except for the Tenth Count," arguing that the circuit court should, pursuant to an Alford plea, sentence Rios to time served for reckless endangerment and dismiss the remaining counts. On June 13, 2008, the circuit court held a hearing on the motion and reached the following decision:
The court, first off, with regard to whether or not one is guided by detrimental reliance or not in terms of determining whether or not there was a plea agreement here. The court believes that that factor is not an appropriate or necessary factor under a circumstance where there is no act required other than to plead guilty effectively.
The court accepts the facts as set forth, as stipulated by the parties. Those facts are set forth in a motion to enforce plea agreement and to dismiss all counts of the indictment except for the tenth count.
The court notes that there is a-let me go some place else first. In reference to Willingston [sic] and the restatement of contracts and the Katz [v. Pratt Street Realty Co., 257 Md. 103, 262 A.2d 540 (1970)] case, as well as [State v.] Brockman [, 277 Md. 687, 357 A.2d 376 (1976)] on the issue of the — the extent to which the — I call the strike application of the laws of contract apply to consideration of plea agreements. The court does not believe that any of those references changes a requirement to consider whether or not there is a counter offer. Whether or not certain words convert a response to an offer-to a counter offer and that the counter offer can be taken as rejection of the offer that is on the table.
There the court believes that it is ultimately called upon to determine whether or not the words ["]would you consider allowing a nolo to reckless["] constitutes a counter offer and might be accepted as a rejection here, relieving the obligation upon the State to accept any subsequent effort at forming a contract. Basically whether or not the State will be relieved of being bound by a subsequent effort to accept, if the statement which ["]will you consider allowing a nolo plea to reckless["] is deemed to be in the nature of a counter offer.
The court first finds that when defendant's counsel made the-what's been characterized as an inquiry to the Assistant State's Attorney, would you consider allowing a nolo plea to reckless. The court does not consider that to be a mere inquiry or a mere effort to modify. Meaning a mere effort to modify the plea offer that had been up for discussion to that point in time.
Why do I say that? The court notes from the assertion of facts that are accepted in the motion, that the State — there had been negotiations up to a point of the defendant asking the State to allow an Alford plea to reckless endangerment to time served. And it's not clear what happened to the count of possession of a handgun, but it was part of the discussion. And [the prosecutor] agreed to such a plea offer. Counsel informed [the prosecutor] that he will discuss the matter with his client and get back to him. So at that point in time, effectively what we have is an offer so-to-speak from the State as the court construes matters.
Counsel met with the defendant who agreed to accept the plea offer, but that acceptance had not been communicated to the court. And the court notes, particularly with the words that were used, that the leaving of several messages on [the prosecutor's] voice mail regarding the acceptance of the plea offer did not include the words to the effect that my client will accept the plea offer. And, indeed, that is corroborated within the court's mind by the conversation, would you consider allowing a nolo plea to reckless.
The court looking at the rules, particularly Rule 4-242. And is satisfied that an Alford plea is different from a plea of nolo contendere. Subsection (D) of that rule specifies that a defendant may plead nolo contendere only with the consent of the court. That is an important distinction.
Further, when the court looks at the annotation, and, in fact, I read all of the materials that counsel had provided to the court. And you can actually look at the notations that I made on it. And I tried to ignore the unlining [sic] the parties did. In the Katz case, however, I was glad to get to the underlining, and then I needed to go back in the Katz case to look at exactly the nature of what was purported to be the modification.
If I look at the annotations, they are fairly consistent in indicating that the entry of a plea of nolo plea is not a conviction. The court considers that to be — and the fact that that is the case, including the requirement of the consent of the court, although that comes later. The court is satisfied that the invitation that there will be an examination of nolo was, indeed, a counter offer. That was a rejection of the offer and the State was no longer bound to a plea agreement on the basis of the offer that existed prior to communication of the request that nolo be considered.
And Katz — in this regard, I think Katz is more relevant than most of the criminal cases. Which citing Williston appropriately by Mr. Schwartz, expresses frequently an offeree while making a positive acceptance of the offer, also makes a request or suggestion that some addition or modification be made. So long as it is clear that the meaning of the acceptance is positively and unequivocably to accept the offer. Whether...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Y.Y. v. State
... ... The court subsequently revoked appellant's bail. 9 ANALYSIS We first note that the circuit court's order denying appellant's motion to enforce the plea agreement is appealable [205 Md.App. 737]under the collateral order doctrine. See Rios v. State, 186 Md.App. 354, 36466, 974 A.2d 366 (2009) (The enforceability of alleged plea agreements is a proper basis [46 A.3d 1231] for interlocutory appeals because of the strong public policy that favors the plea negotiation process.). We now turn to appellant's argument that the circuit ... ...
-
Falero v. State
... ... The court also plays a role. Once the State and the defendant reach an agreement, the parties present it to the court, which has the discretion to accept or reject the plea. Rios, 186 Md.App. at 36263, 974 A.2d 366. If the court accepts the plea agreement, it must follow the terms. [212 Md.App. 586] Smith v. State, 80 Md.App. 371, 375, 563 A.2d 1129 (1989). More specifically, Md. Rule 4243(c)(2)(3) states, (2) Not Binding on the Court. The agreement of the State's ... ...
-
Attorney Grievance Com'n v. Gisriel
... ... state any facts suggesting malice, bad faith, evil motive, intent to injure, ill will, or fraud on the part of Martin, Gold Key, or Dunenfeld. No ... ...
-
Hartman v. State
... ... Unlike the aforementioned cases, we must determine whether the plea agreement remains intact, and therefore enforceable, in a de novo circuit court proceeding. The Court of Special Appeals' decision in Rios v ... State , 186 Md. App. 354, 974 A.2d 366 (2009) is instructive. In Rios , the Court of Special Appeals considered whether the parties had reached a plea agreement during plea negotiations. 9 In determining whether a plea agreement existed, the Court quoted our decision in State v ... Brockman ... ...
-
Liability Insurance and Contractual Aspects of Settlement.
...acceptance of an offer that varies even one term of the original offer is a counteroffer.") (citation omitted). (109) Rios v. State, 974 A.2d 366, 375-76 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2009); Muilenberg, Inc. v. Cherokee Rose Design & Build, L.L.C., 250 S.W.3d 848, 852 (Mo. Ct. App. (110) See, e.g......