Rioux v. State, Case No. 2D17-4042

Decision Date28 June 2019
Docket NumberCase No. 2D17-4042
PartiesRUSSELL RIOUX, Appellant, v. STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellee.
CourtFlorida District Court of Appeals

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Polk County; James A. Yancey, Judge.

Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Karen M. Kinney, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and David Campbell, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.

NORTHCUTT, Judge.

Following a second resentencing proceeding, the trial court sentenced Russell Rioux to twenty-three years' imprisonment to be followed by life probation for each of six counts: four counts of sexual battery on a person less than twelve by a person less than eighteen (counts one through four) and two counts of lewd or lascivious molestation on a person less than twelve by a person less than eighteen (counts five and six). Rioux then initiated this appeal. During the pendency of the appeal, Rioux filed a motion to correct sentencing errors under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b)(2), alleging, among other things, that the sentences on counts five and six exceeded the statutory maximum of fifteen years' imprisonment. The trial court granted that motion and, in relevant part, reduced the sentences for counts five and six to fifteen years' imprisonment. However, the amended sentencing document still included the life probationary terms for those offenses. Rioux therefore filed another rule 3.800(b)(2) motion, alleging that the aggregate length of his split sentences still exceeded the statutory maximum. The trial court failed to rule on that second motion within the sixty days provided by rule, resulting in its being deemed denied. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.800(b)(2)(B).

The State correctly acknowledges that the sentences for counts five and six remain illegal. Counts five and six are both second-degree felonies that are punishable by a maximum of fifteen years' imprisonment. See §§ 800.04(5)(c)(1), 775.082(3)(c), Fla. Stat. (2007). And "[t]he law is clear that when a defendant is sentenced to a split sentence consisting of incarceration and probation, as provided by statute, the combined sanction cannot exceed the maximum period of incarceration provided by law." Smith v. State, 584 So. 2d 154, 154 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991) (citing State v. Holmes, 360 So. 2d 380, 383 (Fla. 1978)). The sentences imposed on counts five and six of fifteen years' imprisonment to be followed by life...

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