Ripley v. Kapiolani Estate, Ltd.

• Decision Date: 24 March 1915
• Court: Hawaii Supreme Court
• Parties: CLINTON B. RIPLEY AND LOUIS E. DAVIS, COPARTNERS DOING BUSINESS UNDER THE FIRM NAME AND STYLE OF RIPLEY & DAVIS, v. KAPIOLANI ESTATE, LIMITED.

22 Haw. 507

CLINTON B. RIPLEY AND LOUIS E. DAVIS, COPARTNERS DOING BUSINESS UNDER THE FIRM NAME AND STYLE OF RIPLEY & DAVIS,

v.KAPIOLANI ESTATE, LIMITED.

Supreme Court of the Territory of Hawai‘i.

Argued March 22, 1915.

Decided March 24, 1915.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HEREEXCEPTIONS FROM CIRCUIT COURT, FIRST CIRCUIT. HON. W. L. WHITNEY, JUDGE.

Syllabus by the Court

An exception in the following language, “That thereafter and on to wit: the 14th day of October, 1914, a decision was filed in the above entitled cause by the judge, and to the filing of which decision, the defendant duly excepted and the exception was allowed,” brings to the attention of this court no specific question of law presented to the trial court, and is too general to be considered in the appellate court.W. B. Lymer ( Thompson & Milverton with him on the brief) for plaintiffs.

J. Lightfoot for defendant.

ROBERTSON, C.J., QUARLES, J., AND CIRCUIT JUDGE STUART IN PLACE OF WATSON, J., DISQUALIFIED.

OPINION OF THE COURT BY QUARLES, J.

This case was heretofore in this court on exceptions from a verdict and judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, and a new trial was granted on the ground that it was apparent from the record and instructions given by the court, the jury, without evidence to support their verdict, found for the plaintiffs under the first count of their complaint which alleged a special promise, and not under the second count which was upon a quantum meruit for service rendered by the plaintiffs to the defendant, as architects. Upon the return of the cause to the circuit court the parties entered into a stipulation in writing whereby the plaintiffs withdrew the first count of their complaint, and the cause was submitted to the court without a jury upon the second count, and upon the evidence taken at the former trial as embodied in the official reporter's transcript, each party reserving the right to make objections to the evidence of any witness or any part thereof, and to except to the ruling of the court in sustaining or overruling any objection to any of the evidence. At the trial the defendant, upon certain grounds therein specified, objected to sixty-eight questions propounded by plaintiffs to divers witnesses, all of which were overruled, except as to objection No. 36, and the action of the trial court in this regard is alleged as the ground for defendant's first exception here. The defendant at the trial also moved to strike out divers answers of various witnesses, portions of certain other answers, and the entire evidence given by the witness Arthur Beeton, upon various grounds set forth in sixty-two separate paragraphs, all of which were overruled by the court except as to the matter set forth in the thirty-sixth paragraph, and the action of the trial court in this regard is alleged as the ground for the second exception now before us. We find no error in the court's ruling as to said motions to strike, and objections to the evidence mentioned in the said motions.

The remaining exceptions are in words and figures as follows, to wit:

“EXCEPTION NO. 3. That thereafter and on to wit: the 14th day of October, 1914, a decision was filed in the above entitled cause by said judge, and to the filing of which decision, the defendant duly excepted and the exception was allowed.”

EXCEPTION NO. 4. That thereafter, and on to wit: the 19th day of October, 1914, judgment was entered in the above entitled cause by the Clerk of said Court and to the entering of such judgment, defendant duly excepted and the exception was allowed.”

These two last exceptions are too general and indefinite to be considered. In a long line of decisions this court has held that exceptions must be sufficiently definite and...