Ripple v. CBS Corp.
| Jurisdiction | Florida,United States |
| Parties | JENNIFER RIPPLE, etc., Petitioner, v. CBS CORPORATION, et al., Respondents. |
| Decision Date | 09 May 2024 |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
| Docket Number | SC2022-0597 |
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED.
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal Certified Direct Conflict of Decisions Fourth District - Case No. 4D2020-1939 (Broward County)
Mathew D. Gutierrez of The Ferraro Law Firm, P.A., Miami, Florida for Petitioner
Matthew J. Conigliaro of Carlton Fields, P.A., Tampa Florida, for Respondents
Daniel B. Rogers of Shook, Hardy &Bacon, L.L.P., Miami, Florida, for Amicus Curiae The Coalition for Litigation Justice, Inc.
We have for review the decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal in Ripple v. CBS Corp., 337 So.3d 45 (Fla 4th DCA 2022). In Ripple, the Fourth District affirmed the trial court's ruling on Jennifer Ripple's claim for damages under section 768.21(2) of the Florida Wrongful Death Act (the Act). Id. at 59.[1] That provision allows a "surviving spouse" to recover "for loss of the decedent's companionship and protection and for mental pain and suffering from the date of injury." The district court held that a spouse who married the decedent after the onset of the injury that caused the decedent's death cannot recover damages as a "surviving spouse" under section 768.21(2). Id. at 58. Ripple expressly and directly conflicts with a decision of another district court, Domino's Pizza, LLC v. Wiederhold, 248 So.3d 212, 221 (Fla. 5th DCA 2018), where the Fifth District Court of Appeal held that a spouse who married the decedent after the injury can recover damages as a "surviving spouse" under section 768.21(2). We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.[2]
For the reasons discussed below, we agree with the Fifth District and hold that a spouse who married the decedent after the injury can recover damages as a "surviving spouse" under section 768.21(2). We reject Respondents' argument that, in these circumstances, the common law "marriage before injury" rule bars recovery under section 768.21(2). Consequently, we approve the holding in Domino's and quash Ripple to the extent that it holds otherwise. In the present case, we hold that Jennifer Ripple can recover as a "surviving spouse" under section 768.21(2). We do not reach Ripple's alternative argument regarding the claim of the decedent's adult children for damages under section 768.21(3) of the Act.
Before his death, Richard Counter filed a personal injury complaint against multiple defendants (Defendants). Counter alleged common law negligence and strict liability actions and claimed that Defendants exposed him to asbestos from the 1950s through the 1990s. The pertinent timeline of events leading up to his death is as follows:
On May 22, 2015, the decedent was diagnosed with mesothelioma. Less than two months later, on July 4, 2015 the decedent married the woman with whom he had lived for decades .... On July 23, 2015, the decedent filed his original personal injury complaint.... Less than four months later, on November 1, 2015, the decedent died from mesothelioma.
The woman he married was Jennifer Ripple, Petitioner. Counter's relatives included Ripple and two adult children from a previous marriage.
Ripple, as personal representative of Counter's estate, amended the personal injury complaint, thereby replacing Counter's common law personal injury claims with the estate's wrongful death claims for damages under the Act. The estate sought damages for Ripple under section 768.21(2), which provides that "[t]he surviving spouse may also recover for loss of the decedent's companionship and protection and for mental pain and suffering from the date of injury." The estate sought alternative damages for the adult children under section 768.21(3), which provides that "[m]inor children of the decedent, and all children of the decedent if there is no surviving spouse, may also recover for lost parental companionship, instruction, and guidance and for mental pain and suffering from the date of injury."
Defendants-Respondents here-moved for judgment on the pleadings as to both Ripple's damages claim and the adult children's alternative damages claim. Defendants argued that Ripple could not recover damages under section 768.21(2) because she was not married to Counter at the time of his alleged asbestos exposure.[3] Defendants based their argument on Florida's common law rule that "a party must have been legally married to the injured person at the time of the injury in order to assert a claim for loss of consortium." Id. at 49-50 (). Defendants also argued that the rationale for this common law rule is that "a person may not marry into a cause of action and that a line must be drawn somewhere as to liability." Id. at 50 ().
Defendants further argued that Counter's adult children could not recover under section 768.21(3) because Ripple qualified as a "surviving spouse" under that subsection.
In its response, the estate argued that in Kelly v. Georgia-Pacific, LLC, 211 So.3d 340 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017), the Fourth District erroneously held that a spouse who married the decedent after the decedent's injury cannot recover damages under section 768.21(2). The estate argued that the trial court should deny Defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings under the Fifth District's decision in Domino's, which held that a spouse who married the decedent after the injury can recover damages under section 768.21(2). The estate noted that the Fifth District "adopted the 'common and ordinary' meaning of the term 'surviving spouse.'" Ripple, 337 So.3d at 50 . The estate explained that the Fifth District defined the term as" 'a married person who outlives his or her husband or wife,' irrespective of whether the marriage commenced before or after the decedent[]'s exposure to asbestos." Id. .
The estate alternatively requested that if the trial court followed Kelly instead of Domino's, it deny Defendants' motion as to Counter's adult children. The estate argued that Defendants employed an "irreconcilable contradiction" by asserting that Ripple was not a "surviving spouse" under section 768.21(2) but that she was such a spouse under section 768.21(3). Id.[4]
The trial court granted Defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings as to Ripple's damages claim but denied the motion as to the adult children's claim. In its written order, the trial court cited Kelly for its ruling on Ripple's claim but provided no reasoning for its ruling on the adult children's claim.
Defendants later moved for summary judgment as to the adult children's claim. Defendants argued that under the Act, adult children of the decedent may only recover damages under section 768.21(3) if there is no surviving spouse. Defendants claimed it was undisputed that Ripple was Counter's "surviving spouse."
The estate claimed in response that Defendants were extending Kelly's poor reasoning. The estate argued that Kelly is "contrary to established precedent," "contrary to the legislative intent," and "unconvincing." Id. at 51 ( )).
The trial court granted Defendants' motion for summary judgment. In its written order, the trial court concluded that "as there is a surviving spouse, albeit a spouse who is herself barred from recovery pursuant to Kelly, an adult child is barred from recovery pursuant to the plain language of section 768.21(3) of the Wrongful Death Act." Id. at 52. The trial court recognized the estate's argument that Defendants' interpretation of section 768.21(3) would "completely cut off recovery under the Wrongful Death statute for the decedent's family, other than for funeral expenses," which "would 'turn back the legal clock to a time when a tortfeasor could delay justice until the injured person died and thereby avoid all liability for their wrongdoing.'" Id. at 51-52. However, the trial court concluded that it was bound by Kelly and the Act's plain language.
The estate then voluntarily dismissed without prejudice its remaining claims. The estate asked the trial court to enter final judgment in Defendants' favor. After the trial court did so, the estate appealed both the order granting Defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings and the order granting Defendants' motion for summary judgment to the Fourth District.
The Fourth District affirmed the order granting Defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings as to Ripple's section 768.21(2) damages claim. However, it reversed the order granting Defendants' motion for summary judgment as to the adult children's section 768.21(3) damages claim.[5]
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